Ethical Objectivity Through Science

1943 ◽  
Vol 52 (6) ◽  
pp. 553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Horace S. Fries
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Objectivity

‘The Women are Up to Something’

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 7-30
Author(s):  
Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb
Keyword(s):  
Combined Effect ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
Ethical Objectivity ◽  
Naturalistic Account ◽  
Mary Midgley

AbstractIn this essay, I offer an interpretation of the ethical thought of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch. The combined effect of their work was to revive a naturalistic account of ethical objectivity that had dominated the premodern world. I proceed narratively, explaining how each of the four came to make the contribution she did towards this implicit common project: in particular how these women came to see philosophical possibilities that their male contemporaries mostly did not.

scholarly journals El amor como actus humanus en Amor y responsabilidad (I). Love as Actus Humanus in Love and Responsibility (I)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
José María Madrona Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Ethical Objectivity

Amor y responsabilidad apenas si contiene declaraciones metodológicas. No obstante, se desarrolla íntegramente en el seno de una experiencia donde la objetividad ética puede recuperarse gracias a la verdad. La experiencia fenoménica o nominalista no albergaba recursos teóricos más que para fundamentar el amor sensual. La elevación teórica de éste al amor afectivo va de la mano de un nuevo tratamiento de la experiencia que cabría identificar como fenomenológico. Pero ambos son amores “psicológicos”. Quedan por examinar los perfiles de la experiencia exigidos por un tercer nivel: el amor ético-práctico. Una experiencia que no atiende en exclusiva a lo que sucede en la persona con ocasión del cumplimiento del acto. Junto con la vivencia que la persona tiene de sí como sujeto del valor ético, la experiencia ha de abarcar la de ser la persona fuente de aquel valor a través de la causalidad. Este tercer amor, “ético” y eficaz, responde, en el sujeto, a la más alta autoría, correlativa a un acto de objetividad moral. Será objeto de un artículo posterior. There are very few statements about methodology in Love and responsibility. Still, it progresses completely within the framework of experiences where ethical objectivity can be attained thanks to truth. Phenomenic or nominalistic experience had no theoretical resources except to provide a foundation for sensual love. The theoretical elevation of this love to affective love goes hand in hand with a new approach to experience which might be called phenomenological. But both are “psychological” loves. Still unexplored are the experience profiles required for a third level: the practical ethical love. Those experiences are not limited to what happens to the person in the fulfilment of the act. The living experience of the person as subject of ethical value is on a par with experiencing the being of the person who is the source of that value through causality. This third type of love, “ethical” and effective, represents the highest level of causality, and corresponds to an act of moral objectivity, which will be studied in another paper. 

Ethical objectivity: The test of time

Ratio ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-338
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Objectivity

Ethical Objectivity and Moral Education

1983 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brenda Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Ethical Objectivity

Ethical Objectivity

Philosophy ◽  
1950 ◽  
Vol 25 (95) ◽  
pp. 331-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Fraser
Keyword(s):  
Present State ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Ethical Judgment ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Middle Region ◽  
Ethical Action ◽  
Purposive Action ◽  
Ethical Objectivity

The present state of ethical theory and practice is disquieting. Objectivism, in all its varieties, is unconvincing, and subjectivism, hedonic or emotive, is intellectually incredible and socially intolerable. No one is ethically content—except the dogmatist and the sceptic, who act willy nilly with the exponents of “might-cum-persuasion makes right.” Can we find a happier middle region between these inhospitable poles? Perhaps the very limitations of human valuation will provide the ground that ethics requires.Let us begin by considering the conditions which must hold if ethical action is to be possible:1. Only if the agent can provide a justifying reason for his choice of action can he claim to act ethically. For ethical action is a species of purposive action, and to act purposively entails the ability to give justifying reasons for one's choice of action. (“Justifying” here is to be understood as “putatively justifying”). Thus ethical action presupposes putatively grounded ethical judgment.2. Justifying reasons must be acknowledgeable by all competent judges, i.e. by all persons who (I) are acquainted with all relevant knowledge of the nature and consequences of the alternative courses of action, (2) allow as far as possible for congenital, cultural and idiosyncratic bias, (3) are capable of sane and serious reflection, and (4) are able to make survey of their experience and to draw conclusions from it. For the judgment “the action A is ethically preferable to its alternatives B (in this situation)” entails “A ought to be done” which in turn entails “every competent judge is capable of acknowledging the ground of the judgment ‘A is ethically preferable to B’ and consequently would be able to set himself to perform A as an ethical act, (i.e. an autonomous act for which the agent can provide a justifying reason).” We can assure ourselves of this requirement of acknowledgeability by observing that whenever we resolve, and not merely settle, an ethical disagreement, we have achieved not only a factual, predictive, valuational and attitudinal agreement between the disputants, but a joint acknowledgment of the ground of the ethical judgment. Without this, the agreement could not be said to be ethical, whether the judgment be right or wrong or neither, but merely an agreement to disagree, ethically. Unless ethical disagreement is in principle resolvable, ethical judgment is impossible, for we should be unable to claim that our choice ought to be acted upon.

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