Free Will and Human Responsibility.

1912 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 481
Author(s):  
H. W. Wright ◽  
H. H. Horne
Philosophy ◽  
1929 ◽  
Vol 4 (15) ◽  
pp. 325-331
Author(s):  
Herbert Samuel

I was led to philosophy by politics. There can be no foundation for political action except in ethics; and there can be no foundation for ethics except in some form of metaphysics, whether religious or other. And one cannot travel very far along the philosophic road— particularly if one has in mind the need of arriving at some definite destination—without finding as an obstacle the perennial problem of Free Will. It is an obstacle which has somehow to be crossed. It cannot be evaded or ignored. The man who is dealing with public affairs—with the principles of Criminal Law, for example, or with the factors that make for peace or war, and indeed with any of the major questions that confront our society—if he tries to think things out, is faced constantly by the problem of individual human responsibility; just as the man of religion is faced by it constantly.


1912 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 332
Author(s):  
James B. Pratt ◽  
Herman Harrell Horne

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-175
Author(s):  
Thio Christian Sulistio ◽  
Esther Gunawan

Abstract. The world is currently enduring an epidemic of COVID-19 which causes suffering and pain. Facing the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesian people have shown various responses. One pupular respond is theological fatalism, which believe that God has determined everything so that human efforts and actions are not necessary. In connection to this, the question arouse whether Christian theology, especially Christian theodicy, which was represented in this paper by John Calvin and C. S. Lewis, fell into fatalism? To answer this question, the writer would compare of the two theodicies by using a literature research. Through this research, it was concluded that neither John Calvin's theodicy nor C. S Lewis's had fallen into theological fatalism. Both emphasized free will and human responsibility in making choices and actions. The right attitude is to submit to the authority of God's word which commands us to act by doing good to others who are suffering and sick.Abstrak. Dunia saat ini sedang dilanda wabah penyakit COVID-19 yang menyebabkan penderitaan dan kesakitan. Berhadapan dengan pandemi COVID-19, manusia Indonesia menunjukkan berbagai respon. Salah satu yang umum adalah fatalisme teologis yakni kepercayaan bahwa Allah sudah menetapkan segala sesuatu sehingga usaha dan perbuatan manusia tidak membuat perbedaan dan dampak di dalam sejarah kehidupan. Berkaitan dengan hal tersebut muncul pertanyaan apakah teologi Kristen, khususnya teodise Kristen, yang diwakili di dalam paper ini oleh John Calvin dan C. S. Lewis jatuh ke dalam fatalisme? Untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut penulis akan membandingkan kedua teodise tersebut dengan menggunakan studi pustaka. Melalui penelitian tersebut disimpulkan bahwa baik teodise John Calvin maupun C. S Lewis tidak jatuh ke dalam fatalisme teologis. Kedua-duanya sama-sama menekankan kehendak bebas dan tanggung jawab manusia di dalam melakukan pilihan dan tindakan. Sikap yang tepat adalah tunduk kepada otoritas firman Tuhan yang memerintahkan kita untuk bertindak dengan berbuat baik kepada sesama yang menderita dan sakit.


Metaphysica ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David K. Clark

AbstractThe heart of this essay, presented in part II, is an attempt to break the longstanding gridlock of the determinism/free-will controversy. Part I sets the table by examining recent attempts to refine and resolve this controversy. For example, Fischer’s groundbreaking case for semi-compatibilism seeks to soften the devastating impact of incompatibilism by arguing that while metaphysical (libertarian) freedom is indeed incompatible with determinism, human responsibility is not. But Fischer’s ingenious application of Frankfort-like examples simply cannot rescue any relevant notion of human responsibility. Rather, Fischer’s resourceful argumentation guides us to a pivotal realization. Kane’s Principle of Alternative Possibilities (the longstanding “could have done otherwise” necessary condition for human freedom aka Fischer’s “Leeway Principle”) is false. Thus, any successful attack against metaphysical freedom must target the “source-hood” thesis – an indeterministic agency theory of metaphysical freedom – the very idea of which is rejected by Hume, Nietzsche, Fischer et al as simply incoherent. But I argue that these philosophers are surely mistaken about the literal incoherence of the source-hood premise. Consequently, the current debate cannot move us beyond the frustration faced so squarely by Kant: we just can’t find a way to advance the case for or against metaphysical freedom. In Part II, I urge that an appeal to the a posteriori data of experience is sufficient to decisively resolve this recalcitrant impasse. This a posteriori evidence I argue, reveals that the thesis of metaphysical freedom is surely false. There is no human freedom; and neither are humans morally responsible for their choices. The supportive case supplied here will seek to rehabilitate Schopenhauer’s proclamation that while “man can do what he wants, he cannot will what he wants.”


Author(s):  
Michael S Gazzaniga

In Chapter 12, Michael Gazzaniga tells us: “We are . . . animals with brains that carry out every . . . action automatically and outside our ability to describe how it works . . .. a soup of dispositions controlled by genetic mechanisms, some weakly and some strongly expressed.” He also tells us: “We humans have something called the interpreter, located in our left brain, that weaves a story about why we feel and act the way we do.” Gazzaniga explores the concepts of free will and moral responsibility in light of such facts, arguing that we all remain personally responsible for our actions because responsibility arises out of each person’s interaction with the social layer she is embedded in. “Responsibility is not to be found in the brain,” he concludes, rather it is “a needed consequence of more than one individual interacting with another.”


Author(s):  
Jon Stewart

After a brief introduction to the life and work of the Greek dramatist Sophocles, Chapter 5 interprets Oedipus the King as a critical story of the human search for knowledge. Oedipus is known for his intelligence as is exemplified by his ability to defeat the Sphinx by figuring out the answer to its riddle. The tragedy also portrays the idea of natural law as an extension of the world of nature. In the play natural law is portrayed in terms of the laws prohibiting patricide and incest, which are regarded not just as violations of the human world but rather of nature itself. This picture is set against the threat of relativism and subjectivism that was starting to arise in Greek culture. The story also illuminates the Greek concept of fate, to which Oedipus falls victim, although he at every step tries to avoid it. This raises difficult questions about human responsibility, culpability, and free will. Sophocles’ tragedy is read as a criticism of the Greek scientific revolution and the Socratic spirit which puts value on learning new things based on reason instead of relying on the ancient customs and religious traditions.


1997 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-212
Author(s):  
JULIUS SCHREIDER

Moral relations with nature, I contend, are connected with our duty before a social environment. Elsewhere I have defined duty as '‘what is recommended by moral or religious law, and what one has to do in order to be in agreement with one's conscience’ (Schreider 1994, p. 27). Our highest duty, I have argued, is social duty, or duty towards humankind as a whole; but this kind of duty, in fact all so-called ‘moral duty’, is not natural, or predetermined by our natural essence (Schreider 1994, p. 99; Schreider 1996). Now, our social duties, not any ‘natural duties’, have implications for our relations with the environment. This is so, significantly, because no natural reasons exist for there to be harmony between humanity and the environment. Indeed, if such natural processes did exist, why should we invoke the need of duty towards nature, because whatever we did, would not we be doing things naturally? To engage duty, in fact, already presupposes the absence of such natural relations, and turns the spotlight on acts of free will, or human decisions and responsibilities. Our experience of history and social relations is such that we humans are more than often found independent of, sometimes even going against, the perceived ‘natural stream of events’, by either creating or solving environmental problems. The claims of duty, then, have to be clarified on any environmental philosophy, because there is a common trap of letting nature dictate morality, a problem apparent in neo-Spencerian ethics (cf. Trompf 1990, pp. 17-20). As I have not long ago maintained (Schreider 1994, p. 107), duty is a basis for our rational actions, designs and relations, and duty, we would thus rightly expect, has moral foundations, even (more controversially) religious ones. Human responsibility for nature loses any sense unless we presuppose it to depend on free will. Otherwise we are left with a predetermined course of events, not duty, and I hold we would even deny self-existence, ascribing our actions not to ourselves but to some ‘objective reasons’ (Schreider 1996).


2020 ◽  
pp. 27-31
Author(s):  
V. G. Napadysta

The article examines the ethical ideas in the creative heritage of H.I. Chelpanov, a Professor at St. Volodymyr University, a well-known scientist at the time, the founder of scientific institutions, who actively promoted the spread and deepening of philosophical culture among students and popularized topical ethical issues in public. Although the scientist paid more attention to psychology, it goes unnoticed that moral issues remain cross-cutting in all his works: articulation on the basis of ethics for other fields of scientific knowledge is obvious. H.I. Chelpanov's research interest was mainly focused on the problem of free will, which seems to be dominant in his ethical interests and the definition of value foundations in the vision of human life. According to the scientist, justifying the free will of man in a causally dependent world is extremely difficult and, at the same time, extremely important for the recognition of the highest values of humanity. In his view of free will, the decisive factor is not its causality but human responsibility for his\her actions. The solution of the free will problem for H.I. Chelpanov was possible only in the sphere of morality. Only from this position could free will be protected with the preservation of the original content. Because the problem of free will is solved for moral purposes, it can be solved regardless of whether the issue of causality is resolved. Freedom of will, therefore, he deduced from the sense of responsibility. H.I. Chelpanov not only justified the existence of free will, but also reflected on the ways to achieve it, because, in his opinion, freedom of will is not an original gift, but emerges as a result of hard work of the individual, which, in turn, opens opportunities to change and improve the personality, if desired. H.I. Chelpanov was an implacable opponent of the great European "pessimists" – A. Schopenhauer and E. Hartmann, defended the groundlessness of fatalistic predictions about the moral development of both the individual and humanity as a whole.


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