Black Success in Local Runoff Elections

1990 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 1205-1220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles S. Bullock, ◽  
A. Brock Smith
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacque Gao

This article compares Plurality Voting (PV) and two forms of Runoff Elections (RE) in a setting in which (i) there are two majority-preferred alternatives, (ii) a strong minority backs a third alternative which would make the majority strictly worse off, and (iii) some of the majority voters are uninformed about the "correct" majority alternative. I show that in the informative equilibrium in Majority Runoff Elections (MRE), uninformed majority voters vote randomly with strictly positive probability, achieving partial information aggregation, while they always abstain in Automatic Runoff Elections (ARE), achieving full information aggregation and strictly improving the majority's welfare. However, uninformed majority voters do not abstain in PV, resulting in less information aggregation than in both MRE and ARE.


1993 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 200
Author(s):  
William Crotty ◽  
Charles S. Bulloch ◽  
Loch K. Johnson

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacque Gao

This article compares Plurality Voting (PV) and two forms of Runoff Elections (RE) in a setting in which (i) there are two majority-preferred alternatives, (ii) a strong minority backs a third alternative which would make the majority strictly worse off, and (iii) some of the majority voters are uninformed about the "correct" majority alternative. I show that in the informative equilibrium in Majority Runoff Elections (MRE), uninformed majority voters vote randomly with strictly positive probability, achieving partial information aggregation, while they always abstain in Automatic Runoff Elections (ARE), achieving full information aggregation and strictly improving the majority's welfare. However, uninformed majority voters do not abstain in PV, resulting in less information aggregation than in both MRE and ARE.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary W. Cox ◽  
Jon H. Fiva ◽  
Daniel M. Smith

The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).


Author(s):  
James P. Brennan

The victory of the Center-Right alliance that supported candidate Mauricio Macri in the November 2015 presidential runoff elections ushered in a new era in the human rights movement in Argentina. The welter of bills crafted and passed by the kirchnerista legislative majority in the weeks between the election and the December 10, 2015, inauguration of the new president included a little-noticed law creating a bicameral committee to investigate those business accomplices of the dictatorship who had thrived under military rule and cooperated with the activities of the security forces whose murderous tactics fell disproportionately hard on labor activists and the working class generally. Opposed for diverse reasons by the Unión Cívica Radical, dissident Peronists not aligned with ...


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