Ambition Theory and Candidate Members of the Soviet Politburo

1974 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth N. Ciboski
Keyword(s):  
Ambition Theory

Principal-Agent Theory, Career Prospects, and U.S. Attorneys

2018 ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Banks Miller ◽  
Brett Curry
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
Career Ambition ◽  
Ambition Theory ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Service Employment

This chapter explores two theories central to understanding the behavior of federal prosecutors. First, principal-agent theory is introduced to frame the relationship between national political actors, or principals, in the executive and legislative branches and their agents—U.S. Attorneys (USAs). In that exploration, the chapter focuses on problems of adverse selection and the monitoring of agents by principals. Second, the chapter considers career ambition theory as it pertains to the post-service employment opportunities of USAs. That discussion focuses on the potential of USAs to ascend to higher positions in the administration or secure nomination to the federal bench, both of which require the approval of principals in the executive branch.

scholarly journals Ambition Theory and the Black Politician

1980 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pauline Terrelonge Stone
Keyword(s):  
Ambition Theory

Policy and Power: The Career of T'ao Chu 1956–66

1973 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 267-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter R. Moody
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Political Behaviour ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Ambition Theory ◽  
Political Opinions ◽  
Contemporary Chinese ◽  
Deductive Explanation

“Kremlinological” approaches to the study of contemporary Chinese politics are sometimes criticized for seeming to embody the “rather crude view of politics being concerned with factional strife and power politics.” Certainly, for most politicians most of the time, it would be wrong as well as cynical to regard “power” as being the ultimate goal. On the other hand, few would deny that politics does, in part, involve factional strife and power politics, and some political scientists believe that political behaviour may be best explained through a focus on the play of power. Thus, Joseph Schlesinger explains certain aspects of American politics by what he calls “ambition theory”: “A politician's behavior is a response to his office goals.” Anthony Downs works out a good deductive explanation of the behaviour of political parties in a democracy by starting with the hypothesis that politicians act in a rational manner, espousing ideologies and policies which enable them to maintain or expand their power. The point of these hypotheses is not that politicians are an unusually venal race of men; the hypotheses do not purport to be accurate descriptions of political motivations. Rather, the assertion is that whatever the ultimate motives of political actors, an approach which hypothesizes that they will behave as though power were their goal does yield helpful and concise explanations of their behaviour. This article about the political career of one Chinese politician, T'ao Chu, from 1956 through 1966, will attempt to see how far hypotheses concentrating on “pure power” provide a useful explanation of events in comparison with those which give more weight to stated political opinions.

Ambition as a micro-foundation of party loyalty

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 538-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theresa Kernecker
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Political Ambition ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Selection Procedures ◽  
Party Loyalty ◽  
Attitudinal Data ◽  
Ambition Theory ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Micro Foundations

The micro-foundations of party unity are still an understudied topic in comparative politics. This article explores the effects of political ambition on party loyalty in Members of the Chamber of Deputies’ (MCDs) claimed votes based on attitudinal data. Ambition theory posits that ambitious politicians should act according to the (s)electorate they are aiming to win for the next election, therefore acting prospectively in their legislative votes. Findings suggest that MCDs seeking office in the national executive branch are more likely to follow the party line and less likely to side with their district or vote inconsistently. While inclusiveness of candidate selection procedures alone does not have an effect, its interaction with differing ambitions does. The results provide us with a first systematic analysis of ambition and its effect on party loyalty in 14 countries by examining the individual MCD more closely.

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