Political Surfing over Economic Waves: Parliamentary Election Timing in India

1993 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 1100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdur R. Chowdhury
2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199717
Author(s):  
Charles T. McClean

How can incumbent governments benefit when they control the timing of elections? The conventional wisdom is that incumbents gain an advantage by timing elections to coincide with favorable economic conditions. An alternative mechanism that has received less attention is the element of surprise: the incumbent’s ability to exploit the opposition’s lack of election preparedness. I theorize and empirically test this surprise mechanism using candidate-level data from Japanese House of Representatives elections (1955–2017). The results show that in surprise elections, opposition parties recruit fewer, lower-quality candidates, spend less money campaigning, coordinate their candidates less effectively, and ultimately receive fewer votes and seats. Evidence from fixed effects models and exogenously timed by-elections further suggest that surprise matters more in shorter, competitive election campaigns and helps incumbents more with confronting inter-party as opposed to intra-party electoral competition. These findings add to our understanding of how strategic election timing can undermine electoral accountability.


Politics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 510-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Maškarinec

In the 2017 Czech parliamentary election, the Czech Pirate Party (Pirates) gained 10.79% of the votes – an unprecedented success, compared to most of the pirate parties across Europe. However, as their electoral gain varies widely across the Czech Republic’s territory, this article analyses all (more than 6000) Czech municipalities in the elections of 2010, 2013, and 2017 to explain this variation. Overall, the success of the Pirates was driven especially by obtaining much more support in larger municipalities with younger populations (although not only those aged 18–24 but also older ones), lower unemployment, higher turnout, and lower support for leftist parties. Thus, from a spatial perspective, the patterns of Pirate voting largely resembled long-term spatial support for Czech rightist parties and we can conclude that the Pirates made considerable inroads to regions which had historically been strongholds of the Civic Democratic Party, as the former main party of the right, but also strongholds of minor right-wing (‘liberal centre’) parties of the 1990s and early 2000s. Success of the Pirates thus was based especially on votes from municipalities located in more developed areas, where the Pirates received many more votes than in structurally disadvantaged regions.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Stephen Ferris ◽  
Marcel-Cristian Voia

Abstract. In this paper we examine the length of political tenure in Canadian federally elected parliamentary governments since 1867. Using annual data on tenure length, we categorize the distribution of governing tenures in terms of a hazard function: the probability that an election will arise in each year, given that an election has not yet been called. Structuring the election call as an optimal stopping rule, we test whether that distribution responds predictably to characteristics of the political and/or economic environment. The results of using the continuous Cox and Gompertz models together with the discrete semi-parametric proportional hazard model suggest that governing parties in Canada do engage in election timing and that the only economic policy measure that is used consistently in conjunction with election timing is fiscal expenditure.Résumé. Dans cet ouvrage, nous examinons la durée d'un régime parlementaire canadien depuis la Confédération de 1867. Nous utilisons des données annuelles et nous représentons la distribution de durée de vie d'un gouvernement par une fonction de hazard, c'est-a-dire, la probabilité qu'une élection soit déclenchée durant une année spécifique étant donné qu'elle ne l'a pas encore été jusqu'à présent. Nous modélisons un déclenchement d'élection par une règle d'arrêt optimal el nous testons si la distribution dépend des caractéristiques de l'environnement politique et économique tel que prédit selon la théorie. Nous résultats basés les modèles de hazard proportionnel continu de type Cox et Gompertz et discret semi-paramétrique révèlent que les partis fédéraux au pouvoir au Canada choisissent le moment opportun pour déclencher une élection. De plus, les dépenses fiscales sont la seule variable de politique économique qui y soit systématiquement relié.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Widfeldt

1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sten Berglund

1955 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1067-1084 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Bone

Last September 29th, with over forty million voters eligible, Indonesia initiated its first parliamentary election since independence. Although the election of the 260-member, unicameral Parliament concluded November 29th, December 15th sees the voters again casting their ballots—this time for a 520-member constituent assembly charged with drafting Indonesia's first permanent constitution.The struggle to carry out elections has been a difficult and protracted one. It has required a decade of strenuous effort characterized by armed struggle, domestic insecurity, shortages of trained personnel and equipment, problems of communication between the nation's hundreds of islands scattered over 3,000 miles from east to west, an overwhelmingly illiterate electorate and, recently at least, reluctance on the part of certain influential groups to hasten matters.Whatever may be the outcome, the intent to hold elections has been present ever since the Indonesian Republic proclaimed its independence from the Netherlands on August 17, 1945. In a decree issued on November 3, 1945, for example, the Government of the Indonesian Republic avowed its intent to execute “the elections for members of the peoples' representative bodies in the month of January, 1946.” The decree in question was issued for the unique purpose of urging the formation of political parties.


Author(s):  
Afroz Ahmad ◽  
Usha Roopnarain

The last Indian parliamentary election held in 2014, proved to be the finest example of India’s age-old commitment towards the pinnacle of democratic norms. India had set a niche by conducting the largest democratic franchise in history. First time ever since the 1984, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) achieved the majority in the Lok Sabha without clubbing with coalition partners. It also got the absolute mandate to rule India’s federal government by ending the Congress monopoly. Interestingly, the Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi in his campaigns criticized Congress-led United Progressive Alliance II (UPA II) for its impotency towards establishing friendly and cooperative relations with India’s neighbors. He also gave assurance that if his party (BJP) got the mandate, his leadership would adopt appropriate measures to resuscitate convivial ties with neighbors. Since forming the government, Prime Minister Modi has been persistently trying to pursue those promises by proceeding towards friendly ties with India’s neighbors. In the light of above discussion, this paper seeks to critically analyze the progress in Indo-Nepal relations under BJP government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document