Modeling U.S. Budgetary and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: A Disaggregated, Systemwide Perspective

1993 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsai-Tsu Su ◽  
Mark S. Kamlet ◽  
David C. Mowery
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 130
Author(s):  
Igor Chugunov ◽  
Valentina Makohon

The purpose of the article is to reveal the role of budgetary projection in the system of financial and economic regulation of social processes within the framework of improving the efficiency of fiscal policy intended to macroeconomic stability maintenance in both countries with transformational and advanced economies. The comparative and factorial methods allowed to developthe features of the institutional environment of the budgetary progection methodology, to identify approaches for its improvement. Methodology. Substantiation of the role of budget forecasting in the system of financial and economic regulation of social processes, determination of provisions for improving its methodology is based on generalized and systematic approaches that are applied in both developed and transformational economies. An analysis of the stages of the process and the budgetary projection methods evaluation, that are used in different countries, have been carried out. Results showed that the efficient budgetary projection methodology is the basis for sound fiscal policy. The development of realistic budgetary projections facilitates justified management decisions aimed at ensuring the country financial firmness. Devia-tions from budget revenues from the projected indicators do not make it possible to achieve certain fiscal policy outcomes and, accordingly, cause a budget cut. In order to develop realistic budgetary projections, a welldesigned and coherent database is needed for all time series, necessary to analyze and project budget revenues. Time series of key determinants affecting the budget revenues level should be available at different frequencies (monthly, quarterly, annually). Where data reflecting similar economic processes by different revenue sources are available, any differences between them shall be determined by reference to their coverage and methodology. Practical implications. Budgetary projections are the basis for the formation of effective fiscal policy and the benchmark of the reproduction process. Adequate level of justification for budget projection will help to provide a dynamic balance of budgetary indicators and the budgetary system stability. Institutional changes to the budgetary projection methodology should be made on the basis of taking into account the dynamic interrelation of budgetary and macroeconomic indicators. The remarkable task here is the development of an economic and mathematical model based on the assessment of the national economy capabilities by reference to the assessment of macroeconomic proportions and the corresponding social and economic conditions of social production. Value/ originality. Developing the budgetary projection approaches in the context of improvement of the fiscal policy efficiency is an important precondition for ensuring macroeconomic stability. In order to increase the budget projection justifiability, it is advisable to make institutional changes to its methodology. Based on the methioned above, the article reveals the essence and role of the budgetary projection in the system of financial and economic regulation of social processes in the context of improving the fiscal policy effectiveness aimed at macroeconomic stability maintenance; approaches to improving the budgetary projection methodology have been identified, and it has been determined that the soundness and feasibility of budgetary projection are the basis for effective fiscal policy. The predictability of budgetary criteria, budgetary architectonics contribute to improving the efficiency of transformations in the public finance system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER T. CALCAGNO ◽  
EDWARD J. LÓPEZ

AbstractTwo shifts of informal rules occurred in the decades around the turn of the 20th century that continue to shape U.S. fiscal policy outcomes. Spending norms in the electorate shifted to expand the scope of the government budget to promote economic security and macroeconomic stability. Simultaneously, norms for elected office shifted to careerism. Both norms were later codified into formal rules as legislation creating entitlement programs, macroeconomic responsibility, and organizational changes to the fiscal policy process. This institutional evolution increased demand for federal expenditures while creating budgetary commons, thus imparting strong motivations to spend through deficit finance in normal times. Despite the last four decades of legislative attempts to constrain spending relative to taxes, the informal norms have trumped the formal constraints. While the empirical literature on deficits has examined the constraining effects of informal rules, this paper offers a novel treatment of shifting norms as having expansionary effects on deficits.


Author(s):  
Mark I. Vail

This chapter analyzes how Italian clientelist liberalism has shaped policy outcomes in fiscal policy, labor-market policy, and financial regulation since the early 1990s. Unlike France and Germany, where national liberal traditions were successfully synthesized with the postwar political-economic order, in Italy a weakly embedded liberalism became increasingly dominated and undermined by clientelistic imperatives. Like its German counterpart, Italian liberalism has traditionally viewed groups as the fundamental components of the social and economic order. Unlike those in Germany, however, these groups have acted and been seen as acting as impediments to adjustments rather than partners with the state. The result has been a zero-sum conception of political reform, a conflation of notions of the limits of state power with the vested interests of powerful groups, and a deep distrust of the state. In fiscal policy, labor-market policy, and financial regulation, these political dysfunctions have frustrated reforms and undermined effective adjustment.


Author(s):  
Mark I. Vail

This chapter analyzes how the German tradition of corporate liberalism has shaped policy outcomes in fiscal policy, labor-market policy, and financial regulation since the early 1990s. After German reunification and in the wake of the fiscal-policy strictures of the Maastricht Treaty, German authorities developed reform strategies designed to support economic growth, reduce unemployment, and modernize their financial systems. In so doing, they rejected neoliberal prescriptions in favor of policies that sheltered and subsidized core groups in their export-based growth model, in particular skilled workers and employers in export sectors, internationally competitive SMEs, and economically strategic financial institutions. In all three policy areas, reform trajectories of both Left and Right reflected corporate-liberal commitments to a supportive role for the state, the privileging of mesoeconomic policy instruments between macro and micro levels, and an emphasis on core groups as central political-economic constituencies, often at the expense of peripheral or unincorporated outsiders.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-774 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Lowry ◽  
James E. Alt ◽  
Karen E. Ferree

Clear fiscal policy effects appear in American state gubernatorial and legislative elections between 1968 and 1992, independent of the effects of incumbency, coattails, term limits, and macroeconomic conditions. The results show that accountability is generally stronger following a period of unified party control than under divided government. Voter reactions to taxes and spending relative to the state economy are conditional on expectations, which differ for each party. Net of these expectations, Republican gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated increases in the size of the state budget; Democrats do not and, indeed, may be rewarded for small increases. Independent of this, the incumbent governor's party is punished in legislative elections for failing to maintain fiscal balance. Taken together, these results show how electoral accountability for fiscal policy outcomes is strong but highly contingent on a complex configuration of party labels, partisan control, expectations, and institutions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 59-80
Author(s):  
Mary P. Murphy

AbstractThe paper examines various rationales for applying equality and human rights proofing mechanisms to fiscal policy. The principle of using available resources to the maximum to progressively realise human rights, and not to erode the revenue capacity of developing nations to do likewise, is at the heart of emerging human rights norms. To date, Irish budgetary processes and major policy statements such as the Commission on Taxation or the draft outline National Plan on Business and Human Rights Strategy have not engaged with the principles of maximising available resources or extraterritoriality. Proofing fiscal policy is also relevant from the perspective of fiscal welfare where taxation instruments, traditionally used as a revenue-gathering mechanism, are increasingly used as distributional mechanisms to achieve policy outcomes in pensions, health, housing and employment, with important equality and distributive dimensions, particularly from gender, age and socioeconomic perspectives. A number of practical institutional mechanisms and evaluative questions can guide equality and human rights proofing of fiscal policy, but commitments to maximise resources to realise rights also need to be promoted through a public discourse which sees taxation as potential investment in society rather than a burden or cost on the economy.


2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torsten Persson ◽  
Guido Tabellini

We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies. We rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference, due to nonrandom selection of these constitutional rules. The findings are consistent with our theoretical priors: presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections.


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