A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights: Airport Slots

1991 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 951 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Itai Sened
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Airport Slots

Self-Ownership, Autonomy, and Property Rights

1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
High Tide ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
To Come ◽  
Made In

Writers of very different persuasions have relied on arguments about self-ownership; in recent years, it is libertarians who have rested their political theory on self-ownership, but Grotian authoritarianism rested on similar foundations, and, even though it matters a good deal that Hegel did not adopt a full-blown theory of self-ownership, so did Hegel's liberal-conservatism. Whether the high tide of the idea has passed it is hard to say. One testimony to its popularity was the fact that G. A. Cohen for a time thought that the doctrine of self-ownership was so powerful that an egalitarian like himself had to come to terms with it; but he has since changed his mind. I have tackled the topic of self-ownership glancingly elsewhere, but have not hitherto tried to pull together the observations I have made in passing on those occasions. The view I have taken for granted and here defend is that self-ownership is not an illuminating notion—except in contexts that are unattractive to anyone of libertarian tastes.

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Feser
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Initial Acquisition ◽  
The World ◽  
Solid Foundation

Critics of Robert Nozick's libertarian political theory often allege that the theory in general and its account of property rights in particular lack sufficient foundations. A key difficulty is thought to lie in his account of how portions of the world which no one yet owns can justly come to be initially acquired. But the difficulty is illusory, because (contrary to what both Nozick and his critics assume) the concept of justice does not meaningfully apply to initial acquisition in the first place. Moreover, the principle of self-ownership provides a solid foundation for Nozick's libertarianism, and when seen in the light of that principle and its full implications, the standard purported examples of injustices in acquisition are revealed to be nothing of the kind.

THE LIBERTARIAN NONAGGRESSION PRINCIPLE

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 62-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Zwolinski
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Redistributive Taxation

Abstract:Libertarianism is a controversial political theory. But it is often presented as a resting upon a simple, indeed commonsense, moral principle. The libertarian “Nonaggression Principle” (NAP) prohibits aggression against the persons or property of others, and it is on this basis that the libertarian opposition to redistributive taxation, legal paternalism, and perhaps even the state itself is thought to rest. This essay critically examines the NAP and the extent to which it can provide support for libertarian political theory. It identifies two problems with existing libertarian appeals to the NAP. First, insofar as libertarians employ a moralized understanding of aggression, their principle is really about the protection of property rights rather than the prohibition of aggression. Second, the absolutist prohibition on aggression, which libertarians typically endorse and which is necessary to generate strongly libertarian conclusions, is grossly implausible. The essay concludes by setting forth a version of the NAP that does not suffer from these problems. It argues that this more moderate and defensible version of the NAP still has important libertarian implications, but that a full defense of libertarianism cannot rely upon appeals to nonaggression alone.

The Hobbesian Hypothesis in Contemporary Political Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Supporting Evidence ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Property System ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Jan Narveson ◽  
Lockean Proviso

This chapter argues that “the Hobbesian hypothesis” (the claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfilled: everyone is better off in a state society with a private property system than they could reasonably expect to be in any society without either of those institutions) plays a large role in contemporary justifications of the state and/or the property rights system. The search turns up few attempts to justify existing states or property rights systems without some version of the hypothesis. Theorists asserting it as an obvious truth in need of little or no supporting evidence include David Gauthier, Jean Hampton, James Buchanan, Gregory S. Kavka, George Klosko, Dudley Knowles, Christopher Heath Wellman, Robert Nozick, Jan Narveson, and many others. Critics include Alan Ryan, Carole Pateman, Charles Mills, Patricia Williams, and others. Yet all this disagreement has produce very little debate or interest in an empirical investigation of the hypothesis.

FOUNDING LIBERALISM, PROGRESSIVE LIBERALISM, AND THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald J. Pestritto
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Progressive Era ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Original Version ◽  
The Political ◽  
American Liberalism ◽  
Fundamental Transformation

AbstractThis article contends that liberalism in America underwent a fundamental transformation during the Progressive Era. This transformation took place, partly, through the Progressives' reinterpretation of the doctrine of property rights that had served as a foundation for founding-era liberalism. Progressives rejected the eighteenth-century, natural-rights principles which had privileged individual rights to life, liberty, and property as the fundamental aims of any just government, and argued instead that America at the turn of the twentieth century was beset by a tyranny of the minority which was employing property rights to inhibit genuine freedom for the bulk of the population. This article examines the character of founding-era liberalism and points to the connection between the political theory of the Declaration of Independence and John Locke's Second Treatise of Government. It then provides an account of the Progressive critique of this original version of American liberalism. The Progressive critique is shown to take two forms: a rejection of property rights in principle, followed by a rejection of them in practice.

The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Harris ◽  
Meina Cai ◽  
Ilia Murtazashvili ◽  
Jennifer Murtazashvili
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights

Political Theory and Miscellaneous

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (02) ◽  
pp. 399-402
Author(s):  
Harold F. Gosnell
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory
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