Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.

1994 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 979
Author(s):  
Hugh J. McCann ◽  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Action Understanding ◽  
Intentional Behavior

Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.

1994 ◽  
Vol 103 (1) ◽  
pp. 175
Author(s):  
George M. Wilson ◽  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Action Understanding ◽  
Intentional Behavior

More than control freaks: Evaluative and motivational functions of goals

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Paglieri ◽  
Cristiano Castelfranchi
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Action Control ◽  
Information Resources ◽  
Action Understanding ◽  
Homeostatic Mechanism ◽  
Intentional Behavior

AbstractTrue to its sensorimotor inspiration, Hurley's shared circuits model (SCM) describes goal-states only within a homeostatic mechanism for action control, neglecting to consider other functions of goals – namely, evaluation and motivation. This restriction thwarts Hurley's project of identifying the information resources enabling social cognition. In order to master intentional behavior, deliberation, and action understanding, we need to be more than just “control freaks.”

Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. Alfred R. Mele

Ethics ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 103 (4) ◽  
pp. 839-841
Author(s):  
Michael J. Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Action Understanding ◽  
Intentional Behavior

Intentional Behavior in Dog-Owner and Dog-Unfamiliar Person Communication

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandra Rossi ◽  
Emily Cahill ◽  
Colin Allen
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Behavior

On the Role of Attention and Ascription in the Formation of Intentions within Behavior

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-196
Author(s):  
Michela Summa
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Behavior ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Active Nature

This article explores the roots of action in behavior. Departing from the standard understanding of action as ‘intentional behavior’, we argue that this view is often based on the underestimation of the intentional structures that are already operative within behavior. Distinguishing between a broader and a narrower meaning of intentionality, we then elaborate on the processes that lead from the diffuse and operative intentionality of behavior to the focused intentionality of action. In order to properly appreciate these processes, we show that a reassessment of the phenomenon of attention – which takes into consideration its double (passive and active) nature as well as its social embedment – is required. Finally, we discuss the interplay between the obtained reframing of the genesis of intentional actions with the phenomenon of social ascription

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