Stability in the Absence of Deposit Insurance: The Canadian Banking System, 1890-1966

1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 1137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Carr ◽  
Frank Mathewson ◽  
Neil Quigley
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Canadian Banking

The Canadian Banking System. James Holladay

1938 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-444
Author(s):  
C. A. Curtis
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Canadian Banking

Was the Bank Holiday of 1933 Caused by a Run on the Dollar?

1987 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barrie A. Wigmore
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Foreign Exchange ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Domestic Currency ◽  
New Information ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Specific Timing

International, rather than domestic, causes of both the Bank Holiday of 1933 and the calm in the banking system that followed are emphasized here. New information on gold losses by the New York Federal Reserve, rather than domestic currency hoarding, serve to explain the Bank Holiday's specific timing. Expectations that Roosevelt would devalue the dollar stimulated much of the gold loss. I also argue that Roosevelt's restrictions on gold holdings and foreign exchange dealings and his devaluation of the dollar by 60 percent were more important to the stability of the banking system after the Bank Holiday than was deposit insurance.

scholarly journals Sources Of Non-Performing Loans In Turkish Banking System

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gokhan Karabulut ◽  
Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Developing Economies ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
System Stability ◽  
Insurance System ◽  
Turkish Government ◽  
Deposit Insurance System ◽  
The Impact

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-small;">The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the unlimited deposit insurance on non-performing loans and market discipline. Deposit insurance program play a crucial role in achieving financial stability. Governments in many advanced and developing economies established deposit insurance schemes for reducing the risk of systemic failure of banks. Deposit insurance has a beneficial effect of reducing the probability of a bank run.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>However deposit insurance systems have its own set of problems. Deposit insurance systems create moral hazard incentives that encourage banks to take excessive risk. Turkey established an explicit deposit insurance system in 1960. Until 1994, the coverage determined by a flat rate but in that date, Turkey experienced a major economic crisis. In April 1994, Turkish government started to apply an unlimited deposit insurance scheme to restore banking system stability. Unlimited deposit insurance caused a remarkable increase at non-performing loans. This paper empirically estimates the impact of unlimited deposit insurance system on non-performing bank loans (NPLs) and analyses the other potential sources of NPLs. </span></p>

scholarly journals Fear, deposit insurance schemes, and deposit reallocation in the German banking system

2019 ◽  
Vol 105 ◽  
pp. 151-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Falko Fecht ◽  
Stefan Thum ◽  
Patrick Weber
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System

The Canadian Banking System. 1817-1890.

1895 ◽  
Vol 5 (18) ◽  
pp. 233
Author(s):  
F. E. Steele ◽  
R. M. Breckenridge
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Canadian Banking

scholarly journals The US banking system: does the size of the institution matter to its economic-financial situation?

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-19
Author(s):  
José Alejandro Fernández Fernández ◽  
Virginia Vázquez ◽  
Juan Antonio Vicente Virseda
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Factorial Analysis ◽  
Financial Situation ◽  
Financial Variables ◽  
The Us ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
The Relationship

This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of the entities in the US banking system and their economic-financial situation. The objective of this study is to group different economic and financial variables of the entities together into factors that characterize the US banking system and identify and identify how the factors vary according to the size of the entities. To do this, we start from the values taken by 32 economic-financial and regulatory ratios, obtained directly from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), for a period between the first quarter of 1990 and the penultimate of 2016. With this data it is performed a factorial analysis that allows synthesizing the 32 variables in 7 factors and, at the same time, obtaining relationships between these variables and the size and between themselves. Finally, through a neural network, the previous factors are hierarchized according to the influence that the size of the entities exerts on them. Among the conclusions reached, it should be noted that the loan structure is the factor that best classifies the size. It also determines the existence of a negative ?profitability-solvency? relationship with larger entities, (Assets> $ 250 B.) and smaller ones (Assets <$ 100 M.), as well as demonstrating the existence of moral hazard and the need for regulation that limits said risk (because the largest entities are the least solvent and assume the most risks).

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