Totalitarian Art in the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy and the People's Republic of China.

1991 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 766
Author(s):  
Albert Bergesen ◽  
Igor Golomstock
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Third Reich

Trophies of War

2019 ◽  
pp. 212-242
Author(s):  
Brandon M. Schechter
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
Prisoners Of War ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Red Army ◽  
The Third Reich ◽  
Clear Objective ◽  
Better Than

This chapter focuses on all manner of trophies, from German prisoners of war to objects looted from houses in the Third Reich. Between 1941 and 1945, soldiers of the Red Army were confronted with an enemy who was often better dressed, wealthier, and initially much more effective. First on Soviet territory and then abroad, Red Army soldiers confronted an alien culture. For average citizens, this trip abroad was a unique chance to go beyond Soviet borders, one that came at great personal risk and with a clear objective—to destroy Fascism and the Third Reich. What soldiers saw along the way was puzzling. They not only reckoned with material objects and institutions that the Soviet Union had purged but were also left to wonder why people who lived materially so much better than they did had waged a genocidal war against them, marked by systematic rape, pillaging, and wanton destruction. The chapter then shows how a Soviet understanding of jurisprudence and a particular perception of the bourgeois world combined with a desire for vengeance to both justify looting and frame Soviet understandings of the Third Reich.

Alexander B. Rossino. Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003. xv, 343 pp.

AJS Review ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 381-383
Author(s):  
David Engel
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
The Other ◽  
University Of Kansas ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
The Third ◽  
Eastern Front ◽  
German Army ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Third Reich

Historians of the Third Reich have long noted that Nazi Germany's actions on the battlefield and occupation policies were governed both by conventional military and radical ideological considerations. Much attention has been devoted to the problem of separating the two strands analytically, to determining which actions and policies should be labeled as primarily one or the other and which elements within the regime thought and behaved mainly according to conventional versus ideological notions. In recent years it has become common to place German military operations before June 1941 under the “conventional” rubric and to date the “ideological” war from the invasion of the Soviet Union, which began in that month. On the other hand, whereas the German army was once widely thought to have constituted a bastion of conventional thinking even after the ideological war had been launched, scholars have increasingly implicated it in the perpetration of ideologically rooted crimes (particularly the murder of Jews on the eastern front).

Recruiting Agents in Industry and Trade—Lifting the Veil on Early People's Republic of China Operational Work

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 1345-1369 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL SCHOENHALS
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
Public Security ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Operational Activities ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Economic Espionage

AbstractThis paper is concerned with the operational activities of the public security organs of the People's Republic of China during the immediate post-1949 period of regime consolidation. The main part of the paper is a case-study of a 1950 pilot scheme to recruit agents in critical sectors of industry and trade in the city of Yingkou in Northeast China, a scheme in due course subsumed under a nationwide programme with a similar focus. In the years to follow, the operational recruitment of agents would become one of China's arguably most important operational responses to the twin Cold War threats of economic espionage and—above all—sabotage. This paper's findings suggest, with respect to operational activities, that in order to represent and explain more fully, in Leopold von Ranke's words, ‘how things really were’, social and political historians may well want to shift their focus away from successive highly public Maoist ‘mass movements’ and look instead to what transpired out of the public eye in the interregnum of ordinary times that such movements punctuated. If and when they do, they will discover significant yet hitherto largely unexplored similarities between the work of the early People's Republic of China public security organs and their counterparts in the Soviet Union and other (former) socialist states.

The Maturing of Soviet-Chinese Relations

1985 ◽  
Vol 481 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
YAN MEI
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Principal Axis ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

It is argued that Soviet policy toward the People's Republic of China since 1960 has been reactive to Chinese initiatives. Both Chinese and Soviet policies are analyzed in the context of the maturation of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is seen to be the principal axis of conflict within this triangle. China and the Soviet Union now exhibit an increasing realism and tolerance toward each other, with an attempt to minimize their ideological differences and former suspicions. Both countries are committed to normalizing the relationship.

scholarly journals Rząd Polski na Wychodźstwie wobec zbrodni niemieckich w Polsce, 1939–1943. Uwagi do problemu

2015 ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Wanda Jarząbek
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Criminal Policy ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
World War ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Third Reich ◽  
Post War ◽  
Polish Government

The policy of the Polish government in exile during World War II has been the subject of numerous studies, but it still seems reasonable to trace their relation to crimes committed on Polish soil. The aim of this article is not to present the whole problem, but just outline the attitude towards German crimes. It must be remembered that the Polish government was also confronted with the occupation policy of the Soviet Union and the crimes committed in Volhynia and Galicia by Ukrainian nationalists. The final caesura of the article is the President’s decree of on punishment for war crimes released on March 30, 1943.The Polish government was of the opinion that the crimes should be punished primarily on the level of individuals who committed them, but the consequence of the criminal policy of the Third Reich should be the adoption of such a post-war policy against Germany that would guarantee compensation for victim countries, including compensation for material damage, and lead to a change in the German mentality, which was blamed partly responsible for the policy of the Third Reich. Such an attitude was shared by the anti-Hitler coalition countries.On the practical level, the Polish government’s policy had several stages. Initially, they collected information, tried to make it public and sough the cooperation of other countries. Despite numerous doubts were reported, they decided to amend the Polish criminal law to allow punishing war criminals more proportionally, as they thought, to the committed acts. The government’s activity probably influenced the attitude of the Allies, although it is difficult to accurately recognize and describe this issue. As a result of the situation after World War II, the new Polish authorities pursued a policy of punishing the guilty. Due to the international situation, i.e. the growing conflict between the coalition partners, many criminals escaped  punishment.

From Crisis to Opportunity

2019 ◽  
pp. 199-230
Author(s):  
Anand Toprani
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Oil Resources ◽  
War Effort ◽  
The Third Reich

This chapter offers a reassessment of Germany’s oil strategy during World War II. Fuel consumption during Germany’s early campaigns (1939–40) was lower than expected, but the swift victory over France left the Third Reich in a quandary. Before the war, Europe had imported two-thirds of its petroleum consumption. Germany’s prewar efforts had only aimed to make it self-sufficient—the Third Reich could not hope, however, to replace the supplies other European nations had imported from overseas. German planners concluded that unless Germany took control of the oil resources of either the Soviet Union or the Middle East, fuel shortages would soon derail the entire war effort. This looming energy crisis in Europe strengthened Hitler’s ideological and strategic conviction that Germany should risk a two-front war in 1941 by attacking the Soviet Union before the United States could intervene.

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