Hsün Tzu on the Mind: His Attempted Synthesis of Confucianism and Taoism

1980 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee H. Yearley
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Hsun Tzu ◽  
The Mind

Using contemporary Western philosophic ideas, this essay examines Hsün Tzu's view of the mind as both a director of action and a spectator of action. In analyzing the mind as director, Hsün Tzu argues against Mencius's idea that the mind simply extends one's natural tendencies. Hsün Tzu's presentation of the mind as spectator— an idea developed chiefly in his discussion of obsession—accepts Chuang Tzu's stress on the importance of detachment, but argues that such detachment need not necessitate withdrawal from normal action. Hsün Tzu's two views of the mind can be reconciled by examining the mind's relationship to desires and to moral judgments. That examination also leads to the conclusion that Hsün Tzu thinks moral judgments have only a conventional and not a universal basis.

Lewis, Clarence Irving (1883–1964)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra B. Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Sensory Experience ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Creative Activity ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Way

The American philosopher C.I. Lewis held that in all knowledge there are two elements: that which is presented to sense and the construction or interpretation which represents the creative activity of the mind. Contrary to Kant, Lewis claimed that what is fixed and unalterable is not the structure that we bring to the sensibly presented, but rather the sensibly presented itself. The categories that mind imposes do not limit experience; they determine the interpretation we place upon experience, and if too much of experience eludes our categorizations, new ones should be established. It is pragmatically necessary that we create interpretive structures which will work in getting us around in sensory experience. This important and novel doctrine, Lewis’ ‘pragmatic a priori’, emerged through the development of ideas which took root during his study of logic. The problems of choosing among alternative logics led him to assert the need for pragmatic criteria. The way we conceptually structure or categorize experience answers to pragmatic criteria of purposes, intents and interests. Only within a context defined by a priori categorizations can empirical judgments be made. These empirical judgments proceed from apprehensions of the sensibly presented to assertions of objectivities. Moral judgments require both judgments of good and decisions of right. Judgments of value are tied to qualitative satisfactions disclosed in experience and are empirical claims. Decisions about the morally right are based on imperatives of reason.

Reading Literary Fiction and Theory of Mind: Three Preregistered Replications and Extensions of Kidd and Castano (2013)

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 522-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kidd ◽  
Emanuele Castano
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Popular Fiction ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Literary Fiction ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Successful Replication ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Nonsignificant Effect

Scholars from diverse disciplines have proposed that reading fiction improves intersubjective capacities. Experiments have yielded mixed evidence that reading literary fiction improves performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, a test of Theory of Mind. Three preregistered experiments revealed mixed results. Applying the “small telescopes” method developed by Simonsohn revealed two uninformative failures to replicate and one successful replication. On a measure of the importance of intentions to moral judgments, results were more mixed, with one significant effect in the expected direction, one nonsignificant effect, and one significant effect in the unexpected direction. In addition, two experiments yielded support for the exploratory but preregistered hypothesis that characters in popular fiction are perceived as more predictable and stereotypic than those in literary fiction. These findings help clarify the sociocognitive effects of reading literary fiction and refine questions for future research.

scholarly journals Anti-egalitarians perceive corporations as less agentic and judge their misconduct less harshly

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Martin Lees ◽  
Simone Tang ◽  
Jim Sidanius
Keyword(s):  
Political Ideology ◽  
Social Dominance Orientation ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Corporate Misconduct ◽  
Mind Perception ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Psychological Perceptions ◽  
Ideological Attitudes

How society should respond to corporate misconduct is the subject of intense debate. Although the ideologies that people hold are key to understanding how they make moral judgments, existing research has been silent on how ideological beliefs drive psychological perceptions of corporations and responses to their misconduct. Here we examine the role ideological attitudes about social hierarchy play in driving perceptions of corporations and their misconduct. Across four convenience samples we find that those who hold anti-egalitarian attitudes (those high in social dominance orientation) are less likely to perceive corporations as possessing an agentic mind (Studies 1a and 1b) and thus judge corporate misconduct as less immoral (Studies 2 and 3), even after controlling for left-right political orientation. These results suggest a unique relationship between ideology and the mind perception of organizations that contributes to leniency toward corporate misconduct, and help integrate theoretical work across political ideology and mind perception.

How Imagined Interaction Conflict-Linkage Theory Complements Social Intuitionist Theory in Terms of Moral Judgments

2021 ◽  
pp. 126-139
Author(s):  
James M. Honeycutt
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Classic Model ◽  
Social Intuitionist Model ◽  
The Mind

Traditionally, research on moral reasoning has been based on the idea that moral judgments are based on reasoning and cognitive development. For example, Kohlberg's classic model of moral reasoning argues that morality develops with aging and experience in terms of preconventional, conventional, and postconventional beliefs. Conversely, Haidt's social intuitionist model offers a view in which moral judgments can be impetuous and driven primarily by intuition, not reason. This idea reflects the concept of moral dumbfounding, in which people maintain a moral judgment based on conditioning. A cognitive theory that explains the conditioning for moral dumbfounding is imagined interaction conflict-linkage theory. This theory explains how arguments are ruminated in the mind. People often remember episodes of disagreement, arguing, or fighting and dwell on them. This chapter will review research in these areas. Additionally, a few examples pertaining to personality and ideological beliefs in terms of COVID-19 pandemic compliance and rule violations are discussed.

How Homo economicus lost her mind and how we can revive her

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter DeScioli
Keyword(s):  
Economic Thought ◽  
History Of Economic Thought ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
Target Article ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Behavior

AbstractThe target article by Boyer & Petersen (B&P) contributes a vital message: that people have folk economic theories that shape their thoughts and behavior in the marketplace. This message is all the more important because, in the history of economic thought, Homo economicus was increasingly stripped of mental capacities. Intuitive theories can help restore the mind of Homo economicus.

Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

Metaphors in the Mind

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeannette Littlemore
Keyword(s):  
The Mind
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