Exclusion Failure Does Not Demonstrate Unconscious Perception

2007 ◽  
Vol 120 (2) ◽  
pp. 173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary D. Fisk ◽  
Steven J. Haase
Keyword(s):  
Unconscious Perception

Higher Order Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Order State

Rosenthal's rendition of representationalism denies intentionalism. His higher order theory instead asserts that a perceptual state's phenomenal character is set by that state's being related to, because represented by, another, but higher order, cognitive state. The theory arises from the doubtful supposition of unconscious perception and mistakenly construes intrinsic phenomenal character extrinsically, as one state's serving as the content of another. Yet it remains mysterious how and why a higher order state might be so potent as to determine phenomenal character at all. Better to resist higher order theory’s embrace of dubious unconscious perceptual states and account for states so-called simply in terms of humdrum mnemonic malfeasance. Moreover, since the suspect theory allows higher order misrepresentation, it implies sufferance of impossible phenomenal character. Equally problematic, representationalism pitched at the higher order entails the existence of bogus phenomenal character when upstairs states represent downstairs nonperceptual states.

scholarly journals Contents of Unconscious Color Perception

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Błażej Skrzypulec
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Color Perception ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Theoretical Investigations ◽  
Significant Support

AbstractIn the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a negative thesis—that the main experimental paradigms used in studying unconscious color perception do not provide support for the position that conscious and unconscious color representations have the same type of content. More specifically, I claim that there is no significant support for the claim that unconscious vision categorically represents surface colors.

scholarly journals Unconscious perception and phenomenal coherence

Analysis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake Quilty-Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Low Degrees ◽  
Rule Out

Abstract It is an orthodoxy in cognitive science that perception can occur unconsciously. Recently, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters and Ian Phillips have argued that this orthodoxy may be mistaken. They argue that many purported cases of unconscious perception fail to rule out low degrees of conscious awareness while others fail to establish genuine perception. This paper presents a case of unconscious perception that avoids these problems. It also advances a general principle of ‘phenomenal coherence’ that can insulate some forms of evidence for unconscious perception from the methodological critiques of Lau, Peters and Phillips.

Conscious and Unconscious Representations of Observed Actions in the Human Motor System

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (9) ◽  
pp. 2028-2041 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan D. A. Mattiassi ◽  
Sonia Mele ◽  
Luca F. Ticini ◽  
Cosimo Urgesi
Keyword(s):  
Motor System ◽  
Action Observation ◽  
Single Pulse ◽  
Basic Mechanism ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Motor Resonance ◽  
Specific Increase ◽  
Human Motor ◽  
Hand Action

Action observation activates the observer's motor system. These motor resonance responses are automatic and triggered even when the action is only implied in static snapshots. However, it is largely unknown whether an action needs to be consciously perceived to trigger motor resonance. In this study, we used single-pulse TMS to study the facilitation of corticospinal excitability (a measure of motor resonance) during supraliminal and subliminal presentations of implied action images. We used a forward and backward dynamic masking procedure that successfully prevented the conscious perception of prime stimuli depicting a still hand or an implied abduction movement of the index or little finger. The prime was followed by the supraliminal presentation of a still or implied action probe hand. Our results revealed a muscle-specific increase of motor facilitation following observation of the probe hand actions that were consciously perceived as compared with observation of a still hand. Crucially, unconscious perception of prime hand actions presented before probe still hands did not increase motor facilitation as compared with observation of a still hand, suggesting that motor resonance requires perceptual awareness. However, the presentation of a masked prime depicting an action that was incongruent with the probe hand action suppressed motor resonance to the probe action such that comparable motor facilitation was recorded during observation of implied action and still hand probes. This suppression of motor resonance may reflect the processing of action conflicts in areas upstream of the motor cortex and may subserve a basic mechanism for dealing with the multiple and possibly incongruent actions of other individuals.

scholarly journals Unconscious perception of visual stimuli reveals an early neural signature of memorability

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (10) ◽  
pp. 570
Author(s):  
Yalda Mohsenzadeh ◽  
Aude Oliva ◽  
Dimitrios Pantazis
Keyword(s):  
Visual Stimuli ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Neural Signature

Stimulus Processing during Apparent Unconsciousness in Anesthetized Volunteers

1986 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 587-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benno Bonke ◽  
Jože Rupreht ◽  
John H. M. Van Eijndhoven
Keyword(s):  
Nitrous Oxide ◽  
General Anesthesia ◽  
Motor Response ◽  
Effective Concentration ◽  
Healthy Male ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Stimulus Processing ◽  
Motor Responses ◽  
Minimal Effective Concentration ◽  
Period Return

Return of motor-responses upon request as an indicator of stimulus processing during apparent unconsciousness in general anesthesia was studied in 8 healthy, male volunteers during prolonged inhalation of nitrous oxide. First the minimal effective concentration of nitrous oxide was established for each volunteer, based upon continued absence of motor-responses to repeated verbal commands. One week later this concentration of nitrous oxide was administered for a 3-hr. period; return of motor-responses after at least 30 min. of absence was considered a sign of so-called unconscious perception. Four volunteers showed return of motor-response within the 3 hr. of exposure, but two of these had been rather restless throughout the session. Results indicate that unexpected processing of information by patients may occur during presumed unconsciousness after a prolonged inhalation of nitrous oxide in general anesthesia.

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