Comments: Clark on Natural Necessity

1965 ◽  
Vol 62 (21) ◽  
pp. 625
Author(s):  
Roger C. Buck
Keyword(s):  
Problemos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Riya Manna ◽  
Rajakishore Nath

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.


Dialogue ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bigelow

Recently, Brian Ellis came up with a neat and novel idea about laws of nature, which at first I misunderstood. Then I participated, with Brian Ellis and Caroline Lierse, in writing a joint paper, “The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature” (Ellis, Bigelow and Lierse, forthcoming). In this paper, the Ellis idea was formulated in a different way from that in which I had originally interpreted it. Little weight was placed on possible worlds or individual essences. Much weight rested on natural kinds. I thought Ellis to be suggesting that laws of nature attribute essential properties to one grand individual, The World. In fact, Ellis is hostile towards individual essences for any individuals at all, including The World. He is comfortable only with essential properties of kinds, rather than individuals. The Ellis conjecture was that laws of nature attribute essential properties to the natural kind of which the actual world is one (and presumably the only) member.


2021 ◽  
pp. 41-64
Author(s):  
Priscilla Alderson

Chapter 2 sets out basic critical realism concepts to show how they help to resolve the problems examined in Chapter 1. The concepts or themes include: the need to separate ontology-being from epistemology-thinking; the transitive and intransitive; the semiotic triangle; open and closed systems and demi-regs; the possibility of naturalism; natural necessity or the three levels of reality, the empirical, actual and real; a detailed example of the three levels in Mexican neonatal research; retroduction; creative power1 and coercive power2; time sequencing; political economy; the search for generative mechanisms; dichotomies, and policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-89
Author(s):  
Fumiaki Toyoshima
Keyword(s):  

1981 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 386-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Hochberg

2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Kohl

Abstract:I propose a new way of understanding Kant’s doctrine of freedom. My reading seeks to combine features of two popular opposed lines of interpretation, namely, of metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings. I defend the view that Kant’s idealist attempt to ‘save’ human freedom involves substantive metaphysical commitments. However, I show that this interpretation can fruitfully integrate important insights that are standardly associated with deflationary readings: first, the idea that for Kant freedom and natural necessity can be ascribed to one and the same human being; and second, the idea that for Kant the belief in freedom and the belief in natural necessity belong to two different standpoints.


2016 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
István Mészáros

Unlike materially grounded and strictly determined primitive equality, the realization of universally shared substantive equality is feasible only at a highly developed level of social/economic advancement that must be combined with the consciously pursued non-hierarchical (and thereby non-antagonistic) regulation of a historically sustainable social reproductive metabolism. That would be a radically different social metabolism, in contrast to all phases of historical development hitherto—including of course the spontaneous primitive equality of the distant past rooted in the grave material constraints of directly imposed natural necessity and struggle for survival.… "Materiality" of that kind, despite its unquestionable substantiveness, as linked to the corresponding hemmed-in "spontaneity," is obviously not enough in order to achieve historical sustainability.… The requirement of materiality, in the case of the human being whose fundamental existential substratum is objectively determined nature, is essential. The seminal condition of materiality with regard to equality can be swept aside or wished out of existence—as a rule in a revealingly discriminatory and class-bound self-serving way—only by some idealist philosophical conception; one that predicates the commendability of some kind of equality (e.g., "in the eyes of God" or "before the Law") and at the same time denies the realizability of materially embodied substantive equality, in its defense of a most iniquitous social order.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.


Synthese ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. J. Oddie
Keyword(s):  

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