Hume: The Relation of the Treatise of Human Nature (Book I.) to the Inquiry Concering Human Understanding.

1905 ◽  
Vol 2 (14) ◽  
pp. 383
Author(s):  
Wilbur M. Urban ◽  
W. B. Elkin
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding

A Change for the Better

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-246
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common Sense Philosophy ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
Epistemological Framework ◽  
Internalist Reliabilism

This chapter makes the case that Hume’s epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is superior to that of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, the framework of EHU 12 has strong parallels to contemporary epistemology, in contrast to the Title Principle from THN 1.4.7.11. In particular, aspects of this framework have affinities with Wright-style conservatism, and Steup’s internalist reliabilism. Second, this framework avoids the weaknesses that afflicted the Title Principle: it has adequate foundation, is able to satisfactorily reject superstition, and is founded on truth. Third, unlike its analogue in the Treatise, the epistemological framework of the Enquiry is able to offer a ‘compleat answer’ to Reid and Beattie by denying the common-sense philosophy that is the fundamental basis of their critiques of his philosophy.

Deciphering Hume

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-215
Author(s):  
Evgeniy N. Blinov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Radical Empiricism ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Gradual Shift ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Philosophical Project

The present article analyzes an ambitious attempt to revisit and reevaluate Hume’s metaphysical project in the early 21th century, proposed by Vadim Vasilyev. His claim is to demonstrate that the problems raised by the author of Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding are far from being completely resolved and could provide us some valuable hints into the problems of contemporary analytical metaphysics. Against a widespread consensus that the evolution in Hume’s had been insignificant, Vasilyev maintains that his philosophical project underwent crucial transformations. He provides evidence of a gradual shift from a radical empiricism to a moderate rationalism by re-examining some classical problems of Hume’s studies and providing a critical analysis of the problems of causality and personal identity. This review provides some arguments for and against Vasilyev’s claims.

scholarly journals Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-161
Author(s):  
Jani Hakkarainen
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Metaphysical Realism ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Realist Interpretation ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Decisive Objection ◽  
Sceptical Argument

In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 (1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in particular) and believing in the existence of Real (distinct and continued) entities. The problem with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various ways to avoid this problem do not work. Accordingly, this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism.

scholarly journals A imaginação como fundamento das ciências experimentais

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Main Aspect ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Mind

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.

Critical Self-Reflection

2020 ◽  
pp. 167-178
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Way

This chapter argues that the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding expresses Hume’s own dissatisfaction with the treatment of scepticism found in the Treatise of Human Nature. EHU 1.12 argues that curiosity, so crucial in THN 1.4.7, can in fact lead one to false metaphysics. EHU 5.1 is striking insofar as it states that Hume’s preferred Academical philosophy does not mingle with the passions. This is antithetical to the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11), which recommends assenting to reason when it mixes with the passions. Thus, the Enquiry seems to distinctly reject the anti-sceptical framework of the Treatise, paving the way for a new epistemology in the later work.

The Scepticism of Book 1, Part 4

2020 ◽  
pp. 96-116
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores the secondary literature on the relationship between Hume’s treatments of scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, and briefly outlines the position that while Hume’s starting and finishing epistemological positions are similar between the two, his justifications for reaching such a finishing point differs considerably between the two. It then proceeds to offer a brief overview of THN 1.4.1 (Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason), THN 1.4.2 (Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses), THN 1.4.3 (Of the Antient Philosophy), and THN 1.4.4 (Of the Modern Philosophy), which are relevant to Hume’s considered treatment of scepticism in THN 1.4.7 (Conclusion of this book).

Hume’s Negative Argument on Induction

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-78
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Negative Argument ◽  
Human Understanding

This chapter compares Hume’s negative arguments on induction in Section 1.3.6 of the Treatise of Human Nature and Section 4 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. It finds that the argument in the Enquiry is intended to establish a primarily sceptical result, while the argument in the Treatise is intended to establish a primarily psychological result. For one, the surrounding context in the Treatise suggests a more descriptive nature to the argument of THN 1.3.6, while the surrounding context in the Enquiry suggests a more normative nature to the argument of EHU 4. Moreover, the structure of the arguments themselves in these two sections offer further evidence for this difference.

The Relation between the Treatise and the Enquiry

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Preliminary Investigation ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Intellectual Legacy

This chapter outlines two critical interpretive issues: the relationship between Hume’s scepticism and his naturalism; and the relationship between the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. In particular, it makes a preliminary case that these two interpretive issues are intimately connected: Hume changes his epistemology between the Treatise and the Enquiry due to a dissatisfaction with his treatment of scepticism in the former work. The chapter offers a preliminary investigation of Hume’s characterisation of the relationship between the Treatise and the Enquiry. It outlines a case for Hume’s motivation in writing the Advertisement and the Enquiry being a concern for his intellectual legacy. In particular, it is suggested that the Enquiry and the Advertisement are meant to rectify Hume’s treatment of scepticism in the Treatise.

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