Explaining the Long-Term Maintenance of a Military Regime: Panama before the U.S. Invasion

1992 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve C. Ropp

Before the U.S. invasion of December 1989, Panama experienced one of the longest periods of military rule in the modern-day history of Latin America. While numerous authoritarian military regimes emerged in the region during the 1960s and established for themselves a relatively high degree of autonomy from both domestic and international actors, only those in Panama, Paraguay, and Chile survived until the late 1980s. And of these three surviving military regimes, only Panama's was ended through the application of external military force. For the past several years, there has been considerable discussion of the factors that seem best to account for General Manuel Antonio Noriega's personal ability to resist U.S. pressure from 1987 until 1989 and to largely insulate himself from the political and economic constraints of Panamanian domestic politics. However, much less attention has been devoted to discussion of the factors that explain the long-term maintenance of the military authoritarian regime in existence for fifteen years prior to his assumption of power. This analysis suggests that the long-term maintenance of Panama's military authoritarian regime was due in large part to its ability to acquire substantial amounts of foreign capital. During the 1970s, such capital was preferentially obtained from the international banking community. During the 1980s, it was obtained through illicit activities of various kinds, including participation in the growing international drug trade.

Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim

Many scholars consider the military dictatorship a distinct authoritarian regime type, pointing to the singular patterns of domestic and international behaviors displayed by military regimes. Existing studies show that compared with civilian dictatorships, military dictatorships commit more human rights abuses, are more prone to civil war, and engage in more belligerent behaviors against other countries. Despite their coercive capacity, rulers of military dictatorships tend to have shorter tenures than rulers of non-military dictatorships. Additionally, military dictatorships more quickly and peacefully transition to democracy than their non-military counterparts and frequently negotiate their withdrawal from power. Given the distinct natures of military dictatorships, research on military dictatorships and coups has resurged since 2000. A great body of new research utilizing new theories, data, and methods has added to the existing scholarship on military rule and coups, which saw considerable growth in the 1970s. Most studies tend to focus on domestic issues and pay relatively little attention to the relationship between international factors and military rule. However, a growing body of studies investigates how international factors, such as economic globalization, international military assistance, reactions from the international community, and external threat environments, affect military rule. One particularly interesting research topics in this regard is the relationship between external territorial threats and military rule. Territorial issues are more salient to domestic societies than other issues, producing significant ramifications for domestic politics through militarization and state centralization. Militaries play a pivotal role in militarization and state centralization, both of which are by-products of external territorial threats. Thus, external territorial threats produce permissive structural conditions that not only prohibit democratization but also encourage military dictatorships to emerge and persist. Moreover, if territorial threats affect the presence of military dictatorships, they are more likely to affect collegial military rule, characterized by the rule of a military institution, rather than military strongman rule, characterized by the rule by a military personalist dictator. This is because territorial threats make the military more internally unified and cohesive, which helps the military rule as an institution. Existing studies provide a fair amount of empirical evidence consistent with this claim. External territorial threats are found to increase the likelihood of military regimes, particularly collegial military regimes, as well as the likelihood of military coups. The same is not true of non-territorial threats. This indicates that the type of external threat, rather than the mere presence of an external threat, matters.


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 330-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Buehler ◽  
Mehdi Ayari

Why do autocrats retain some elites as core, long-term members of their ruling coalitions for years, while others are dismissed in months? How and why might the type of elites retained within coalitions vary across time and different autocrats? Although what constitutes an authoritarian regime’s ruling coalition varies across countries, often including the military and dominant parties, this article focuses on one critical subcomponent of it—an autocrat’s cabinet and his elite advisors within it, his ministers. Because coalitions function opaquely to prevent coups, scholars consider their inner-workings a black box. We shed light through an original, exhaustive dataset from the Middle East of all 212 ministers who advised Tunisian autocrats from independence until regime collapse (1956–2011). Extracting data from Arabic sources in Tunisian national archives, we track variation in minister retention to identify which elites autocrats made core, long-term advisors within ruling coalitions. Whereas Tunisia’s first autocrat retained elites as ministers due to biographical similarities, capacity to represent influential social groups, and competence, its second autocrat did not. He became more likely to dismiss types of elites retained under the first autocrat, purging his coalition of ministers perceived to be potential insider-threats due to their favored status under his predecessor.


2001 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 213-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kelly

Much has been written about transitional justice in the circumstances of organised states progressing towards democracy. Another category of transitional justice demanding equal study and resolution has, however, emerged. That is the interim administration of justice in the vacuum of the disrupted state following traumatic internal conflict, usually involving war crimes and crimes against humanity. Two things are characteristic of this circumstance: first, the requirement for a deployed international military force to do ‘something’ about fundamental law and order while waiting for the civil administrative ‘cavalry’ to arrive; second, the fact that a civil administrative element will eventually have to take over from the military and will also be required to do ‘something’ about the immediate law and order problem but in a manner that leads into the long term reconstruction and ‘end state’ process. In the future, this environment may also include the operation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where many issues of jurisdiction, investigation, prosecution and the impact on long term rehabilitation will need to be managed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 385
Author(s):  
Mahamood M. Hassan

The ability of the Social Security retirement program to pay the promised benefits to future generations has been debated since the 1960s. Various suggestions have been made, but the one that has attracted the most passionate opinions has been whether some or all of the Social Security Trust Funds should be invested in the stock market, which would yield higher returns than on the Federal government issued bonds (Treasury Bonds). In reviewing 88 years of financial market data going back to 1926, the author shows that investing in the stock market (using the S&P 500 as the proxy) will most probably produce higher returns for the U.S. taxpayer (investor) over the long term, but the investor will have to be prepared for a roller-coaster ride of highs and lows.


2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 11-23
Author(s):  
Bakht Munir ◽  
Zaheer Iqbal Cheema ◽  
Jawwad Riaz

Modern-day democracies are constructed on the constitutional mechanism of separation of powers introduced in the U.S. Constitution where Pakistan stands with no exception. With qualitative research methodology, this paper aims to investigate the following issues: origin and evolution of the concept of separation of powers with reference to formalist and functionalist theories, application of tripartite government in the context of Pakistan, why the application of this concept could not receive its due appreciation in Pakistan, the role of the military as an additional unavoidable stakeholder in the evolution of trichotomy of powers in the democratic transition and judicial response to circumscribe unbridled military regimes in Pakistan. This article also explicates how the state organs can help identify their jurisdictional bounds to avoid the potential threat of confrontation and suggests how in the transition of institutional demarcations self-realisation of constraints can play a considerable role to comprehend the spirit of constitutionalism.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Byers

It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.International lawyers in the Department of State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in shaping the law to accommodate the interests of the United States. One example, though by no means the only one, concerns the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.


Author(s):  
Etsuko Takushi Crissey

The Battle of Okinawa, which began in late March and ended in late June, 1945, took the lives of 94,000 Japanese soldiers, 28,000 Okinawans in local defence corps, which included middle school boys, 12,500 Americans, and an estimated 122,000 civilians, between one-fourth and one-third of the prefecture’s wartime population. Most of the survivors ended up in refugee camps for several months. It was the only battle of the Pacific War fought in a Japanese prefecture. With the congealing of the Cold War in the late 1940’s, the U.S. government decided to hold strategically located Okinawa for the long term, stationing some 30,000 troops there. The U.S. created civilian administrative agencies, but the military maintained ultimate authority until reversion to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. The result was an economy heavily dependent on jobs and incomes generated by the bases, such as auto mechanic, janitor, maid, taxi driver, bar hostess, and prostitute. To make room for the rapidly expanding bases, the U.S. military forcibly evicted Okinawans from their land with “bayonets and bulldozers.” Massive protests led to Congressional hearings and marginally increased, though still wholly inadequate, “rental payments” to landowners. Reversion restored Japanese administration to Okinawa, but the bases remain to this day,


Author(s):  
Peter Feaver ◽  
Damon Coletta

The United States boasts an enviable record regarding the military’s role in politics: never a coup and never a serious coup attempt. However, this does not mean that the military always played only a trivial role in politics. On the contrary, as the Framers worried, it is impossible for a democracy to maintain a military establishment powerful enough to protect it in a hostile international environment without at the same time creating an institution with sufficient clout to be a factor in domestic politics. The U.S. military’s political role has ebbed and flowed over the nearly 250 years of the nation’s history. The high-water mark of political influence came in the context of the gravest threat the country has faced, the Civil War, when the military enforced emergency measures approved by Congress, beyond the letter of the Constitution, including during Reconstruction when the military governed rebellious states of the former Confederacy. These were notable exceptions. For most of the 19th century, the military operated on the fringes of civilian politics, although through the Army Corps of Engineers it played a key role in state-building. When the United States emerged as a great power with global interests, the political role of the military increased, though never in a way to directly challenge civilian supremacy. Today, the military wields latent political influence in part because of its enormous fiscal footprint and in part because it is the national institution in which the public express the highest degree of confidence. This has opened the door for myriad forms of political action, all falling well below the red lines that most concern traditional civil–military relations theory. Military involvement in the American political system may be monitored and evaluated using a typology built around two columns that highlight the means of military influence—the first column is comprised of formal rules and institutions and the second encompasses the norms of military behavior with respect to civilian authority and civil society. While traditional civil–military relations theory focuses on military coups and coup prevention, theory based on this typology can help explain American civil–military relations, illuminating the warning signs of unhealthy friction under democratic governance and promoting republican vigilance at those moments when the U.S. military takes a prominent role and wades more deeply into domestic politics.


Author(s):  
Maggie Dwyer

Interstate conflict has been rare in sub-Saharan Africa and militaries often do not fit the image of a force focused on external threats. Instead, they have often been heavily engaged in domestic politics, regularly serving as regime protection. For many militaries on the continent, the continued internal focus of the armed forces has been shaped by practices under colonialism. One defining feature of African militaries’ involvement in politics is the coup d’état. From the 1960s to the 1980s coups were the primary method of regime change, making the military central to the political landscape of the continent. By the start of the 21st century there were far fewer direct attempts at military control of African states, yet militaries continue to influence politics even under civilian leadership. While there are differences in the role of militaries based on the unique circumstances of each state, there are also general patterns regarding new missions undertaken by armed forces following the end of the Cold War. These include peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance, all of which generally involve international partnerships and cooperation. Yet these missions have also had domestic political motivations and effects.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-116
Author(s):  
George A. Seaver ◽  

It is now apparent even to traditional civil rights advocates that the well-meaning effort to be inclusive has degenerated into identity politics and its violent offspring in universities, the judicial system, and public education. Reviewing these institutions, it is necessary to return to what civil rights were intended to be, to their inherent part of the original “extended republic” concept used by James Madison. Prior to the U.S. Constitution, republican forms of government were considered appropriate only for limited, homogeneous populations, or city-states. The extension to a large republic in terms of population and land area, to multitudinous factions, was Madison’s greatest contribution to the Constitution and the long-term “exceptionalism” of the U.S. republic. The widely-held belief that attention to minorities began in the 1960s with the “Civil Rights Revolution” is wrong as demonstrated by the extended republic’s dependence on them and its success. The multiplicity and competition of factions, sects, and interests, the greater the multiplicity the greater the security, was the reason for this success, and government interference was considered harmful to this end. To help us return to that concept is the purpose of this essay.


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