Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism. By Bülent Gökay. Routledge Studies in the History of Russia and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge Publishers, 2006. xiv, 184 pp. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. $120.00, hard bound.

Slavic Review ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 554-555
Author(s):  
Gareth M. Winrow
Politeja ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (7 (34/2)) ◽  
pp. 181-194
Author(s):  
Igor Grieckij

Central and Eastern Europe countries and NATO enlargement in foreign policy of Russian Federation in 1992‑1992 The beginning of the 1990s is one of the most interesting and controversial periods in the history of Russian foreign policy. At that time, extensive reforms were introduced in Russia in the framework of transition to market economy and institutions of civil society. Russia’s foreign policy has undergone great changes, as well, many of its fundamental provisions were subject to significant adjustment. In particular, the new leadership of Russia is no longer considered NATO as an enemy, and even let in a possibility of Russia’s prospects for NATO membership in future. However, by 1994, the Kremlin’s position on that issue has changed dramatically. This article examines the nature of these changes in Russia’s foreign policy, as well as the reasons why the Russian government perceived negatively the CEE countries’ aspirations to join NATO, and considered it as a threat to its national interests.


1987 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 246-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Piotrowski

When the Red Army moved through Eastern Europe in 1945, it faced the problem of creating what the men in the Kremlin called “friendly” governments. In several countries, Joseph Stalin in short order resolved the dilemma by putting into power Communists who had arrived in the van of his army. In the Western mind, Stalin represented a force inexorably driven by a logic inherent in all totalitarian systems. Stalin became the reincarnation of Hitler, a dictator who sought to impose his system on all territories under his sway—and whose appetite could not be sated. Such a view left little ambiguity in interpreting Stalin's foreign policy. It offered no room for an assessment that Soviet foreign policy was driven by a mix of motives, not only by aggression steeped in Communist ideology, but also by considerations of national security, opportunism, and compromise.


Author(s):  
Albert Resis

The precise function that Marxist-Leninist ideology serves in the formation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy remains a highly contentious question among Western scholars. In the first postwar year, however, few senior officials or Soviet specialists in the West doubted that Communist ideology served as the constitutive element of Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, the militant revival of Marxism-Leninism after the Kremlin had downplayed it during 'The Great Patriotic War" proved to be an important factor in the complex of causes that led to the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Moscow's revival of that ideology in 1945 prompted numerous top-level Western leaders and observers to regard it as heralding a new wave of Soviet world-revolutionary messianism and expansionism. Many American and British officials were even alarmed by the claim, renewed, for example, in Moscow's official History of Diplomacy, that Soviet diplomacy possessed a "scientific theory," a "weapon" possessed by none of its rivals or opponents. This "weapon," Marxism-Leninism, Moscow ominously boasted, enabled Soviet leaders to comprehend, foresee, and master the course of international affairs, smoothing the way for Soviet diplomacy to make exceptional gains since 1917. Now, in the postwar period, Stalinist diplomacy opened before the Soviet Union "boundlesshorizons and the most majestic prospects."


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 537
Author(s):  
Herbert S. Dinerstein ◽  
Adam B. Ulman

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document