The Political Economy of Foreign Investment in Mexico: Nationalism, Liberalism, Constraints on Choice

International consensus supported Lebanon's effort to rebuild its shattered economy after the civil war and Rafiq Hariri, with Saudi and Western backing, took over as Prime Minister in 1992 to oversee the reconstruction program. Yet persistent Syrian efforts through Lebanese allies, including President Emile Lahoud, to undermine Hariri by blaming him for the country's economic woes raised suspicions that Damascus sought unrivalled influence in Lebanon. Hariri's efforts to privatize the corrupt state sector and attract direct foreign investment proved incompatible with Syrian hegemony. Complex factors were behind Syria's stance, relating to its insecurity in Lebanon, heightened by perceptions of Hariri's association with the West and the personal financial interests of leaders of the Syrian Ba'th regime in Lebanon's economy. The crisis crossed the point of no return with the extension of Lahoud's presidential term in September 2004.

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The political economy of foreign investment and industrial development: the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand in comparative perspective

Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy ◽

10.1080/13547860.2019.1577207 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 25 (1) ◽

pp. 16-39

Author(s):

Manuel F. Montes ◽

Jerik Cruz

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Foreign Investment ◽

Industrial Development ◽

The Philippines ◽

Comparative Perspective ◽

The Political

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Human Rights Promotion through Transnational Investment Regimes: An International Political Economy Approach

Politics and Governance ◽

10.17645/pag.v1i1.91 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 1 (1) ◽

pp. 16-31 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Claire Cutler

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Human Rights ◽

Foreign Investment ◽

International Investment ◽

Democratic Legitimacy ◽

The Political ◽

International Human Rights ◽

International Investment Agreements ◽

International Human ◽

Investment Agreements

International investment agreements are foundational instruments in a transnational investment regime that governs how states regulate the foreign-owned assets and the foreign investment activities of private actors. Over 3,000 investment agreements between states govern key governmental powers and form the basis for an emerging transnational investment regime. This transnational regime significantly decentralizes, denationalizes, and privatizes decision-making and policy choices over foreign investment. Investment agreements set limits to state action in a number of areas of vital public concern, including the protection of human and labour rights, the environment, and sustainable development. They determine the distribution of power between foreign investors and host states and their societies. However, the societies in which they operate seldom have any input into the terms or operation of these agreements, raising crucial questions of their democratic legitimacy as mechanisms of governance. This paper draws on political science and law to explore the political economy of international investment agreements and asks whether these agreements are potential vehicles for promoting international human rights. The analysis provides an historical account of the investment regime, while a review of the political economy of international investment agreements identifies what appears to be a paradox at the core of their operation. It then examines contract theory for insight into this apparent paradox and considers whether investment agreements are suitable mechanisms for advancing international human rights.

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