A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Political System ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Large Party ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Ideal

A theory of government formation in parliamentary systems is developed from a model incorporating policy-oriented parties with spatial preferences and a formation process in which parties are selected in sequence to attempt to form a government. A government is formed when the policy proposed by the party selected is sustained on a vote of confidence. The equilibria identify the government and the policy it will implement and depend on the configuration of preferences and on the government formation process. For example, in a political system with two large parties and one small party and in which one of the two large parties will be selected to attempt to form a government, the government will be formed by a large party with the support of the small party. The policy will reflect the preferences of the small party but will be closer to the ideal point of the large party.

Predicting the Outcome of the Government Formation Process: Fuzzy Single-Dimensional Models

2014 ◽  
pp. 51-80
Author(s):  
Peter C. Casey ◽  
Michael B. Gibilisco ◽  
Carly A. Goodman ◽  
Kelly Nelson Pook ◽  
John N. Mordeson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Dimensional Models ◽  
The Government

Government Formation and Endogenous Parties

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Formal Theory ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
System A ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
The Government

I provide a formal theory of government for a political system characterized by a proportional representation electoral system, a parliamentary government that exercises collective responsibility, and a government formation process. Political parties are assumed to be policy-oriented and to serve the interests of those who vote for them. Parties choose policy platforms that determine their representation in parliament; and given that representation, the parties bargain over the government to be formed and the policies that government will implement. The model yields equilibria with the property that parties choose dispersed policy positions. Thus, electoral incentives in proportional representation parliamentary systems need not lead to policy convergence. The theory provides predictions of party locations such as those developed in the manifesto project.

Government formation and policy formulation : Patterns in Belgium and the Netherlands

Res Publica ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-82
Author(s):  
Robert L. Peterson ◽  
Martine De Ridder ◽  
J.D. Hobbs ◽  
E.F. McClellan
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Dutch Government ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Made In

Based on a study of three Belgian and Dutch government formations, this article examines the relationship between the formation of government coalition's and the formulation of public policy. The government formation process is disaggregated into three stages : the selection of participants in the bargaining process, the negotiation of the governmental agreement and the allocation of portfolios. These stages are then discussed in the context of a schema which focusses on the effects of contextual, relational and outcome components. By modifying assumptions made in traditional coalition studies, the government formation process is seen as involving the transferof issues from institutional arenas to a non-institutional arena in which bargaining processes are used to map and develop issue specific areas of consensus.

Predicting the Outcome of the Government Formation Process: A Fuzzy Two-Dimensional Public Choice Model

2014 ◽  
pp. 129-147
Author(s):  
Peter C. Casey ◽  
Michael B. Gibilisco ◽  
Carly A. Goodman ◽  
Kelly Nelson Pook ◽  
John N. Mordeson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Formation Process ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
The Government

scholarly journals Presidential Partisanship in Government Formation: Do Presidents Favor Their Parties When They Appoint the Prime Minister?

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 803-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bucur ◽  
José Antonio Cheibub
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Postwar Period ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
The Government ◽  
To Come ◽  
Main Factor

Although often conceived as nonpartisan actors, presidents wield considerable political and institutional powers in parliamentary and semipresidential democracies. Do they interfere in the government-formation process in such a way as to change the outcome that parliamentary parties would have otherwise reached? We address this issue by examining the conditions under which the parties of presidents and prime ministers are the same in parliamentary and semipresidential democracies. We use data for twenty-one countries over the postwar period and find that when presidents are directly elected and are constitutionally empowered to nominate the prime minister, the two leaders tend to come from the same party. This, however, is only true when the bargaining environment within parliament is complex, that is, when there are multiple viable governing coalitions. In this sense, the distribution of forces within parliament is still the main factor determining the identity of the prime minister, even in the presence of strong presidents.

2002 Draft II: Head of State and the Executive Branch

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Elliot Bulmer
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
The Government

This, the second of three central chapters examining the SNP’s 2002 constitutional text, focuses on the roles and powers of the head of state, the government and the executive branch. It discusses the position of the monarchy in an independent Scotland, both in terms of its symbolic-ceremonial function and its constitutional powers, as well as examining the relationships between the prime minister, cabinet, and Parliament, in the proposed constitutional draft. A number of problems are identified, including inconsistencies and ambiguities surrounding the government formation process and reserve powers of the monarch in relation to government formation and the refusal of royal assent.

Intra-Christian competition will increase in Lebanon

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Financial System ◽  
General Election ◽  
The Political ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Christian Community ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government

Significance Seven months after a general election, the country remains without a government amid a dispute between Hezbollah, a Shia group, and the Sunni Prime Minister-designate Saad al-Hariri. Yet the government formation crisis is not only a product of Sunni-Shia tensions in the region; it stems equally from deep schisms in the Christian community. Impacts Continued confrontation will keep Christians divided and weak in the political system. If Aoun is incapacitated, the interim government would disagree over the process to replace him, triggering a much deeper governing crisis. If Washington implements a full range of sanctions against Hezbollah-linked activities, the financial system would threaten to collapse.

scholarly journals New Empirical Strategies for the Study of Parliamentary Government Formation

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Glasgow ◽  
Matt Golder ◽  
Sona N. Golder
Keyword(s):  
Formation Process ◽  
Unobserved Heterogeneity ◽  
Mixed Logit ◽  
Testing Procedure ◽  
Random Coefficients ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Conditional Logit ◽  
Parliamentary Government ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
The Government

In recent years, a consensus has developed that the conditional logit (CL) model is the most appropriate strategy for modeling government choice. In this paper, we reconsider this approach and make three methodological contributions. First, we employ a mixed logit with random coefficients that allows us to take account of unobserved heterogeneity in the government formation process and relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. Second, we demonstrate that the procedure used in the literature to test the IIA assumption is biased against finding IIA violations. An improved testing procedure reveals clear evidence of IIA violations, indicating that the CL model is inappropriate. Third, we move beyond simply presenting the sign and significance of model coefficients, suggesting various strategies for interpreting the substantive influence of variables in models of government choice.

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