[The Effect of Approval Balloting on Strategic Voting under Alternative Decision Rules]: Errata

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 1062
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rules ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Alternative Decision ◽  
Approval Balloting

The Effect of Approval Balloting on Strategic Voting under Alternative Decision Rules

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 509-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Merrill ◽  
Jack Nagel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rules ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Sincere Voting ◽  
Alternative Decision ◽  
Approval Balloting

Voting systems combine balloting methods with decision rules or procedures. Most analyses of approval voting (a balloting method) assume it will be combined with plurality rule but advocates often urge its use with more complex procedures. Because much of the case for approval balloting hinges on its encouragement of sincere voting, we ask whether it retains this advantage when combined with multistage procedures. After distinguishing five forms of sincere and insincere approval voting, we find that certain elements of multistage procedures promote departures from purely sincere strategies, including, in some instances, strictly insincere voting. However, most strategic approval voting involves truncating the approved list, including bullet-voting, which is especially likely under certain threshold rules. Coalitions also increase members' incentive to truncate. We conclude that approval balloting with plurality rule remains preferable to conventional single-vote plurality, but we urge caution and further research regarding combining approval balloting with multistage rules.

Imperfect Knowledge and Stable Governance in Democracies: An Agent-Based Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 568-582
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Fernández-Márquez ◽  
Francisco J. Vázquez ◽  
Luis Fernando Medina
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rules ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Agent Based Model ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Ideological Position ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Perfect Knowledge ◽  
Imperfect Knowledge ◽  
Aggregate Effect

In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model of elections and government formation where voters do not have perfect knowledge about the parties’ ideological position. Although voters are boundedly rational, they are forward-looking in that they try to assess the likely impact of the different parties over the resulting government. Thus, their decision rules combine sincere and strategic voting: they form preferences about the different parties but deem some of them as inadmissible and try to block them from office. We find that the most stable and durable coalition governments emerge at intermediate levels of informational ambiguity. When voters have very poor information about the parties, their votes are scattered too widely, preventing the emergence of robust majorities. But also, voters with highly precise perceptions about the parties will cluster around tiny electoral niches with a similar aggregate effect.

Evaluation of Alternative Decision Rules for Postemergent Herbicide Treatments in Soybean

jpa ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfons Weersink ◽  
William Deen ◽  
Susan Weaver
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rules ◽  
Herbicide Treatments ◽  
Alternative Decision

scholarly journals Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Laslier ◽  
Karine Van der Straeten
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Approval Balloting

Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Berejikian
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Behavioral Decision Theory ◽  
Behavioral Decision ◽  
Structure Problem ◽  
Methodological Approaches ◽  
Agent Structure ◽  
Alternative Decision

Unraveling the nexus between agents and structures is fundamental to an understanding of political and social change. The two most prominent methodological approaches to explain revolutionary collective action involve either individual reductionism or structural reductionism. Both approaches result in theoretical inconsistencies and/or explanatory anomalies. An alternative proposed here utilizes the concept of framing developed in behavioral decision theory primarily by Quatrone and Tversky. It directly addresses the agent-structure problem by developing the proposition that individuals evoke alternative decision rules in different structural contexts. The result is greater theoretical coherence and resolution of anomalous cases. Additionally, this model begins to define a new role for ideology in explanations of revolutionary collective action.

scholarly journals A Utilitarian Assessment of Alternative Decision Rules in the Council of Ministers

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Beisbart ◽  
Luc Bovens ◽  
Stephan Hartmann
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rules ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
Alternative Decision
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