[The Effect of Approval Balloting on Strategic Voting under Alternative Decision Rules]: Errata

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 1062
1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 509-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Merrill ◽  
Jack Nagel

Voting systems combine balloting methods with decision rules or procedures. Most analyses of approval voting (a balloting method) assume it will be combined with plurality rule but advocates often urge its use with more complex procedures. Because much of the case for approval balloting hinges on its encouragement of sincere voting, we ask whether it retains this advantage when combined with multistage procedures. After distinguishing five forms of sincere and insincere approval voting, we find that certain elements of multistage procedures promote departures from purely sincere strategies, including, in some instances, strictly insincere voting. However, most strategic approval voting involves truncating the approved list, including bullet-voting, which is especially likely under certain threshold rules. Coalitions also increase members' incentive to truncate. We conclude that approval balloting with plurality rule remains preferable to conventional single-vote plurality, but we urge caution and further research regarding combining approval balloting with multistage rules.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 568-582
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Fernández-Márquez ◽  
Francisco J. Vázquez ◽  
Luis Fernando Medina

In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model of elections and government formation where voters do not have perfect knowledge about the parties’ ideological position. Although voters are boundedly rational, they are forward-looking in that they try to assess the likely impact of the different parties over the resulting government. Thus, their decision rules combine sincere and strategic voting: they form preferences about the different parties but deem some of them as inadmissible and try to block them from office. We find that the most stable and durable coalition governments emerge at intermediate levels of informational ambiguity. When voters have very poor information about the parties, their votes are scattered too widely, preventing the emergence of robust majorities. But also, voters with highly precise perceptions about the parties will cluster around tiny electoral niches with a similar aggregate effect.


jpa ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfons Weersink ◽  
William Deen ◽  
Susan Weaver

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Laslier ◽  
Karine Van der Straeten

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Berejikian

Unraveling the nexus between agents and structures is fundamental to an understanding of political and social change. The two most prominent methodological approaches to explain revolutionary collective action involve either individual reductionism or structural reductionism. Both approaches result in theoretical inconsistencies and/or explanatory anomalies. An alternative proposed here utilizes the concept of framing developed in behavioral decision theory primarily by Quatrone and Tversky. It directly addresses the agent-structure problem by developing the proposition that individuals evoke alternative decision rules in different structural contexts. The result is greater theoretical coherence and resolution of anomalous cases. Additionally, this model begins to define a new role for ideology in explanations of revolutionary collective action.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Beisbart ◽  
Luc Bovens ◽  
Stephan Hartmann

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