The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order

1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 901-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youssef Cohen ◽  
Brian R. Brown ◽  
A. F. K. Organski

The central argument of this paper is developed as a criticism of a widely accepted interpretation of collective violence in new states. It is shown that instead of indicating political decay, violence in these states is an integral part of the process of accumulation of power by the national state. To the degree that this power accumulation is necessary for the imposition or maintenance of order, collective violence also indicates movement towards political order on a new scale. Admittedly, our evidence is far from definitive. Nevertheless, it consistently contradicts the interpretation of violence as political decay and supports our interpretation of violence as a usual feature of the process of primitive accumulation of power.

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 649-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Astrid Sahm

The new states emerging from the break-up of the Soviet Union not only had to manage the task of political and economic reforms but were also forced to develop a suitable national state ideology in order to ensure their achieved independence. The existence of a national consensus is essential for the stability of every state and society, and during periods of transition the question how national identity is defined becomes especially important. Thus, on the one hand, the dominance of a concrete national state concept may facilitate the transformation process because people are ready to bear the social costs of economic reforms in the name of state sovereignty, as was the case in Lithuania. On the other hand, a continuing Soviet cultural hegemony can also block necessary modernization in the post-Soviet period.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Robert B. Talisse

The Introduction canvasses the major concepts discussed in the book: democracy, citizenship, civility, partisanship, and polarization. It also provides a sketch of the book’s central argument. There is a tension at the heart of the moral office of democratic citizenship. Citizens are called upon to take responsibility for their political order, and hence must act in ways that further justice. Yet they also must show a due regard for one another’s equality. They must treat their fellow citizens as their political equals. In many cases, these directives pull in opposing directions: in treating our political opponents as our equals, we seem to be conceding something to their views, which we hold as misguided and possibly unjust. It seems, then, that the directive to pursue justice supplies reasons to disregard our opponents, to treat them as less than our political equals. Perhaps democratic citizenship is self-defeating?


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tracy B Strong

A central argument of the Leviathan has to do with the political importance of education. Hobbes wants his book to be taught in universities and expounded much in the manner that Scripture was. Only thus will citizens realize what is in their hearts as to the nature of good political order. Glory affects this process in two ways. The pursuit of glory by a citizen leads to political chaos and disorder. On the other hand, God’s glory is such that one can do nothing but acquiesce to it. The Hobbesian sovereign shares some of the effects of glory that God has naturally; this, however, has to be supplemented by awe and that but fear.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 438-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rigby ◽  
Charles Seguin

The racial position of European immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries vis-à-vis blacks and whites is debated. Some argue that many European immigrant groups were initially considered nonwhite, while others argue that they were almost always considered white, if sometimes still from a distinct intrawhite racial category. Using a new dataset of all lynchings in the American Midwest from 1883 to 1941, we explore differences in collective violence enacted upon three groups: native-born whites, blacks, and European immigrants. We find that European immigrants were lynched in ways, and at rates, much more similar to that of native whites than to those of blacks. Blacks in the Midwest were lynched at roughly 30 times the rate of native-born whites and European immigrants, and were sometimes ritually burned in massive “spectacle lynchings” while native whites and European immigrants were never burned. We find suggestive evidence that European immigrants were perceived to have posed threats to the political order. Our results suggest that, in the American Midwest, despite nativist othering, European immigrants were fully on the white side of the color line, and were protected from collective violence by their white status.


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