Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Dilip Mookherjee
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Herbert Simon ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Selective Incentives ◽  
Individual Choices

Work by Axelrod, Hardin, and Taylor indicates that problems of repeated collective action may lessen if people use decentralized strategies of reciprocity to induce mutual cooperation. Hobbes's centralized solution may thus be overrated. We investigate these issues by representing ongoing collective action as an n-person repeated prisoner's dilemma. The results show that decentralized conditional cooperation can ease iterated collective action dilemmas—if all players perfectly monitor the relation between individual choices and group payoffs. Once monitoring uncertainty is introduced, such strategies degrade rapidly in value, and centrally administered selective incentives become relatively more valuable. Most importantly, we build on a suggestion of Herbert Simon by showing that a hierarchical structure, with reciprocity used in subunits and selective incentives centrally administered, combines the advantages of the decentralized and centralized solutions. This hierarchical form is more stable than the decentralized structure and often secures more cooperation than the centralized structure. Generally, the model shows that the logic of repeated decision making has significant implications for the institutional forms of collective action.

THE DIVERSITY IN THE DECISION FACILITATES COOPERATION IN THE SEQUENTIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (03) ◽  
pp. 377-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
TETSUSHI OHDAIRA ◽  
TAKAO TERANO
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Novel Method ◽  
The One ◽  
High Level

The condition of cooperation in social conflicts of interest has been an interesting topic. On the one hand people usually desire to make their own profit. On the other hand, they mutually cooperate. This fact has motivated many researchers. Some solutions for this question have been proposed, and particular studies indicate that the diversity in decision-making or relationships promotes cooperation. In this research, we achieve the diversity by utilizing the novel method that refers to the mechanism of correction regarding each probability that every strategy comes to the representative by decision-making of group. This mechanism works when difference between the probability of the first and others becomes quite large. If once every group adopts this corrected decision, he/she achieves mutual cooperation of high level in the sequential prisoner's dilemma game in case the number of strategies (= players) is within the definite range. We also note that this game can effectively describe the property of evolution of strategy only with a small number of players. When each group has many players, in contrast to previous research, the decision with correction also has an effect on the suppression of prevalence of defection. In addition, we also show that the decision of this model is analogous to the system of redistribution of revenue, which provides balance of strength between several teams in professional sports.

scholarly journals Collective action or individual choice: Spontaneity and individuality contribute to decision-making in Drosophila

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabelle Steymans ◽  
Luciana M. Pujol-Lereis ◽  
Björn Brembs ◽  
E. Axel Gorostiza
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Adaptive Behavior ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Behavioral Trait ◽  
Behavioral Traits ◽  
Unique Character ◽  
Individual Choices

AbstractOur own unique character traits make our behavior consistent and define our individuality. Yet, this consistency does not entail that we behave repetitively like machines. Like humans, animals also combine personality traits with spontaneity to produce adaptive behavior: consistent, but not fully predictable. Here, we study an iconically rigid behavioral trait – insect phototaxis – that that nevertheless also contains both components of individuality and spontaneity. In a light/dark T-maze, approximately 70% of a group of Drosophila fruit flies choose the bright arm of the T-Maze, while the remaining 30% walk into the dark. Taking the photopositive and the photonegative subgroups and re-testing them reveals the spontaneous component: a similar 70-30 distribution emerges in each of the two subgroups. Increasing the number of choices to ten choices, reveals the individuality component: flies with extremely negative first choices were more likely to show photonegative behavior in subsequent choices and vice versa. General behavioral traits, independent of light/dark preference, contributed to the development of this individuality. The interaction of individuality and spontaneity together explains why group averages, even for such seemingly stereotypical behaviors, are poor predictors of individual choices.

scholarly journals Collective action or individual choice: Spontaneity and individuality contribute to decision-making in Drosophila

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. e0256560
Author(s):  
Isabelle Steymans ◽  
Luciana M. Pujol-Lereis ◽  
Björn Brembs ◽  
E. Axel Gorostiza
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Adaptive Behavior ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Behavioral Trait ◽  
Behavioral Traits ◽  
Unique Character ◽  
Individual Choices

Our own unique character traits make our behavior consistent and define our individuality. Yet, this consistency does not entail that we behave repetitively like machines. Like humans, animals also combine personality traits with spontaneity to produce adaptive behavior: consistent, but not fully predictable. Here, we study an iconically rigid behavioral trait, insect phototaxis, that nevertheless also contains both components of individuality and spontaneity. In a light/dark T-maze, approximately 70% of a group of Drosophila fruit flies choose the bright arm of the T-Maze, while the remaining 30% walk into the dark. Taking the photopositive and the photonegative subgroups and re-testing them reveals the spontaneous component: a similar 70–30 distribution emerges in each of the two subgroups. Increasing the number of choices to ten choices, reveals the individuality component: flies with an extremely negative series of first choices were more likely to show photonegative behavior in subsequent choices and vice versa. General behavioral traits, independent of light/dark preference, contributed to the development of this individuality. The interaction of individuality and spontaneity together explains why group averages, even for such seemingly stereotypical behaviors, are poor predictors of individual choices.

scholarly journals EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY DYNAMICS FOR TAG-BASED COOPERATION AND DEFECTION IN THE SPATIAL AND ASPATIAL SNOWDRIFT GAME

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (11) ◽  
pp. 1230039 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT A. LAIRD
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Lattice Models ◽  
Evolutionary Strategy ◽  
Phenotypic Traits ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Mutual Defection

Cooperation is a costly behavior undertaken by one individual which benefits another individual. Since cooperators are easily exploited by defectors (those who receive the benefits of cooperation but do not cooperate themselves), the evolution and maintenance of cooperation rely on mechanisms that allow cooperators to interact with one another more frequently than would be predicted based on their relative abundance in a population. One simple mechanism is based on the recognition of "tags" — arbitrary, yet identifiable phenotypic traits. Tags allow for the existence of conditionally cooperative strategies; e.g. individuals could adopt a strategy whereby they cooperate with tag-mates but defect against non-tag-mates. Previous research has considered the tag and strategy dynamics of unconditional and conditional strategies engaged in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the paradigmatic framework for studying the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation, in which defection against a cooperator yields the greatest fitness payoff, followed by mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and cooperation with a defector. Here, using complementary spatial and aspatial lattice models, an alternative payoff structure is considered, based on the Snowdrift game, in which the rankings of the payoffs associated with mutual defection and cooperation with a defector are reversed relative to the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the absence of mutation, it is demonstrated that the aspatial two-tag game tends to collapse into the traditional, non-tag-based Snowdrift game, with the frequency of cooperators and defectors predicted precisely by evolutionary dynamics analysis. The spatial two-tag game, on the other hand, produces a richer variety of outcomes, whose occurrence depends on the cost-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation; these outcomes include the dominance of conditional cooperators, the dominance of unconditional defectors, and the cyclic (or noncyclic) coexistence of the two. These outcomes are then shown to be modified by mutation (which softens the transition boundaries between outcomes), and by the presence of more than two tags (which promotes nepotistic conditional cooperation).

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Seyhun Saral
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Initial Move ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Strategy Types

Conditional cooperation has been a common explanation for the observed cooperation, and its decline in social dilemma experiments. Numerous studies showed that most of the experimental subjects can be categorized into three types: conditional cooperators, self-maximizers and hump-shaped (triangle) cooperators. In this study, I investigate conditional strategy types and their role on the emergence of cooperation and their evolutionary success. For this purpose, I use an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The agents are characterized by their initial move and their conditional responses to each level of cooperation. By using simulations, I estimate the likelihood of cooperation for different probability of continuations.I show that, when the continuation probability is sufficiently large, high levels cooperation is achieved. In this case, the most successful strategies are those who employ an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation, followed by perfect conditional cooperators. In intermediate levels of continuation probabilities, however, hump-shaped contributor types are the ones that are most likely to thrive, followed by imperfect conditional cooperators. Those agents cooperate in a medium level of cooperation within themselves and each other. The results explain the existence of hump-shaped type of cooperators with a purely payoff-based reasoning, as opposed to previous attempts to explain this strategy with psychological mechanisms.

Continuous Decisions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seng Bum Michael Yoo ◽  
Benjamin Hayden ◽  
John Pearson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Control Theory ◽  
Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Action Planning ◽  
Extended Period ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
Engineering Control ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Academic Study

Humans and other animals evolved to make decisions that extend over time with continuous and ever-changing options. Nonetheless, the academic study of decision-making is mostly limited to the simple case of choice between two options. Here we advocate that the study of choice should expand to include continuous decisions. Continuous decisions, by our definition, involve a continuum of possible responses and take place over an extended period of time during which the response is continuously subject to modification. In most continuous decisions, the range of options can fluctuate and is affected by recent responses, making consideration of reciprocal feedback between choices and the environment essential. The study of continuous decisions raises new questions, such as how abstract processes of valuation and comparison are co-implemented with action planning and execution, how we simulate the large number of possible futures our choices lead to, and how our brains employ hierarchical structure to make choices more efficiently. While microeconomic theory has proven invaluable for discrete decisions, we propose that engineering control theory may serve as a better foundation for continuous ones. And while the concept of value has proven foundational for discrete decisions, goal states and policies may prove more useful for continuous ones.

Collective Action

2019 ◽  
pp. 466-488
Author(s):  
Jac C. Heckelman
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
Slow Growth ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Institutional Instability ◽  
Selective Incentives ◽  
Mancur Olson

The theory of collective action, as outlined by Mancur Olson, is presented. Olson argued that individuals are subject to free-riding behavior, which can be overcome by selective incentives. The larger is the potential group, the greater the hurdles to successful formation. Thus, smaller groups with more narrow interests are more likely to form, leading to an emphasis on policy reform that concentrates benefits to the group while diffusing the costs on greater society. The accumulation of such groups will slow growth, and this sclerotic effect is reversed due to institutional instability. This chapter develops a critical appraisal of the theory and the accumulated evidence in the literature that follows from Olson.

The Fertile Fields of Policy? Examining Fertility Decision-Making and Policy Settings

2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Maree Maher
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Work And Family ◽  
Fertility Rates ◽  
Family Policies ◽  
Fertility Decision ◽  
Individual Choices ◽  
Fertility Choices ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Oecd Data

OECD data suggest a significant gap between desired fertility rates and the total fertility rate achieved in developed industrial nations. In a qualitative study conducted in Australia in 2002 and 2003, people were asked how family policies influenced their decisions to have children. Participants did not clearly associate their fertility choices and prevailing policy settings. But their decision-making was grounded in commonplace accounts of incompatibility in balancing work and family. This article considers how individual choices may be shaped by such social and policy discourses and what implications this has for our understanding of the relationship between fertility choices and policy settings.

Towards an Enhanced Institutional Structure of the Eurasian Economic Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 152 ◽  
pp. 102-111
Author(s):  
Igor V. Pilipenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Economic Commission ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
The Eu

This article considers how to enhance the institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in order to enable timely decision-making and implementation of governance decisions in the interests of Eurasian integration deepening. We compare the governance structures of the EAEU and the European Union (EU) using the author’s technique and through the lens of theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism elaborated with respect to the EU. We propose to determine a major driver of the integration process at this stage (the College of the Eurasian Economic Commission or the EAEU member states), to reduce the number of decision-making bodies within the current institutional structure of the EAEU, and to divide clearly authority and competence of remaining bodies to exclude legal controversies in the EAEU.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document