The Paradox of Minimax Regret

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 918-918 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Beck

The introduction of decision making under uncertainty by Ferejohn and Fiorina is an interesting addition to the literature on rational theories of citizen participation. Decision making under uncertainty assumes, however, that the actor has no knowledge of the probabilities of the various outcomes; this is obviously no more true than the assumption of perfect information about these probabilities made in the decision making under risk model. Voters have some, but not perfect, information about the probabilities of at least some of the different possible outcomes.Specifically, let us look at the two-party case. In Ferejohn's notation, (p3 + p4) is the probability of an individual's vote making a difference. We might expect a rational citizen to know that this probability is at most minuscule, even if he cannot calculate its exact value.

1986 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 12-16
Author(s):  
Kay L. Thomas

AbstractThis paper deals with the Danish Child Welfare Law, which was passed in 1974 as part of an integrated welfare law aiming at decentralization of decision making in local government, and maximum citizen participation.The law provides for counselling, recommendations and injunctions in connection with counselling, appointment of personal guidance officers, and taking children into care. The greater part of decision making is made in co-operation with parents. The few cases of removal of a child from the home without parental consent are conducted under the auspices of the local council welfare committee, presided over by a judge. Parents are given access and must be heard. Parents have wide rights of appeal.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debra W. Soh

Decision making under risk has been intensively studied; however, little is understood about how decision making under risk changes with increased ecological validity. The current study investigated whether increased ecological validity resulted in greater decision quality and a minimization of the description-experience gap. Whether presenting items as abstract monetary gambles or framed within a meaningful context, decision quality was higher for loss items when presented as a description, and for gain items when experienced. When the rare event was a nonzero gain or loss, decision quality was increased when abstract monetary gambles were presented as a description. When the rate event was a zero gain, higher decision quality resulted if the gamble was experienced. When the rare event was a zero loss, higher decision quality resulted if the gamble was presented as a description. Implications for future research are discussed, with regard to improving understanding of decision making under uncertainty.


Author(s):  
Max A. Little

Decision-making under uncertainty is a central topic of this book. A common scenario is the following: data is recorded from some (digital) sensor device, and we know (or assume) that there is some “underlying” signal contained in this data, which is obscured by noise. The goal is to extract this signal, but the noise causes this task to be impossible: we can never know the actual underlying signal. We must make mathematical assumptions that make this taskp possible at all. Uncertainty is formalized through the mathematical machinery of probability, and decisions are made that find the optimal choices under these assumptions. This chapter explores the main methods by which these optimal choices are made in DSP and machine learning.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debra W. Soh

Decision making under risk has been intensively studied; however, little is understood about how decision making under risk changes with increased ecological validity. The current study investigated whether increased ecological validity resulted in greater decision quality and a minimization of the description-experience gap. Whether presenting items as abstract monetary gambles or framed within a meaningful context, decision quality was higher for loss items when presented as a description, and for gain items when experienced. When the rare event was a nonzero gain or loss, decision quality was increased when abstract monetary gambles were presented as a description. When the rate event was a zero gain, higher decision quality resulted if the gamble was experienced. When the rare event was a zero loss, higher decision quality resulted if the gamble was presented as a description. Implications for future research are discussed, with regard to improving understanding of decision making under uncertainty.


Psihologija ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Milicevic ◽  
Dubravka Pavlicic ◽  
Aleksandar Kostic

The goal of this study was to investigate the dynamics of decision making under risk. In three experiments this dynamics have been explored with respect to probability of outcome and with respect to frame, i.e. the way the outcomes of the alternatives have been specified. The process of decision making was explored within a framework of expected utility and Prospect theory. The outcomes of alternatives as well as their probabilities were quantitatively specified (so that the expected value of a risk alternative was equal to the value of a non-risk alternative). The results of experiments indicate that the attitude towards risk (risk-proneness vs. risk-averseness) depends on the outcome probability and the way the outcomes were specified (i.e. positive/negative frame). It was also demonstrated that content strongly affects the choices made in decision making. This outcome is somewhat unexpected and requires additional empirical evaluation.


1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 525-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Ferejohn ◽  
Morris P. Fiorina

Various analysts have noted that the decision to vote in mass elections is difficult to justify from the standpoint of an expected utility maximization model. Put simply, the probability that a citizen's vote will affect the outcome is so small that the expected gains from voting are outweighed by the costs in time and effort. Such analyses treat rational behavior as synonymous with expected utility maximization. In this paper we show that an alternative criterion for decision making under uncertainty, minimax regret, specifies voting under quite general conditions. Both two and three candidate plurality elections are considered. Interestingly, a minimax regret decision maker never votes for his second choice in a three candidate election, whereas expected utility maximizers clearly may. Thus, the model proposed has implications for candidate choice as well as turnout.


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