Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?

1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 898-915 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Ashcraft
Keyword(s):  
Political Thought ◽  
John Locke ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The State ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
Ethical Argument ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Political Group ◽  
Historical Fact ◽  
Moral Fiction

For nearly two centuries, the mere mention of the “state of nature” was sufficient to provoke a controversy. Did the writer intend an historical reference or was he employing a fictional concept as a means of presenting an a priori ethical argument? The question, at least in so far as it applies to John Locke, has never been satisfactorily answered—although it has frequently been brushed aside as unimportant. Yet, many of the “contradictions” which seem to characterize Locke's political thought might be resolved if only we could be certain of the meaning he attributed to the state of nature.Lacking that certainty, we are left to choose from among the various meanings others have associated with Locke's use of the concept. First, it is charged that, if Locke did intend his portrait of the state of nature to serve as an historical account of the origins of government, it is bad history. Most political societies did not begin as Locke suggests. As one writer puts it “history and sociology lend but little support to this theory of free men entering into a compact and so creating a political group.” Secondly, if the state of nature is but a fiction abstracted from history, that in itself may be grounds for rejecting its usefulness as a concept. Marx, for example, is critical of the ‘state of nature’ approach to politics because it assumes in an abstract fashion precisely what must be proven by reference to concrete historical facts.

1. The state of nature

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
State Of Nature

This chapter examines whether it is possible for human beings to live in a state of nature. Sometimes it is claimed that not only have human beings always lived under a state, but that it is the only way they possibly could live. On this view, which is often associated with Aristotle, the state exists naturally in the sense of being natural to human beings. In response, some theorists argue that human beings have been able to live without the state. To elucidate the issue further, this chapter analyses the views of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It also considers the arguments of anarchists and suggests that the gap between rational anarchism and the defence of the state is vanishingly small.

scholarly journals Nature and Artifice in Hobbes’s International Political Thought

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-34
Author(s):  
Maximilian Jaede
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
The State ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Lasting Peace ◽  
Contrary Effect

This article argues that the artificiality of Hobbesian states facilitates their coexistence and eventual reconciliation. In particular, it is suggested that international relations may be characterised by an artificial equality, which has a contrary effect to the natural equality of human beings. Unlike individuals in Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, sovereigns are not compelled to wage war out of fear and distrust, but have prudential reasons to exercise self-restraint. Ultimately rulers serve as disposable figureheads who can be replaced by a foreign invader. Thus, this article highlights the implications of Hobbes’s views on sovereignty by acquisition, which allow for states to be decomposed and reassembled in order to re-establish lasting peace. It is concluded that these findings help to explain why Hobbes does not provide something akin to modern theories of international relations, as foreign affairs appear to be reducible to a matter of either prudence or political philosophy.

O ESTADO MÍNIMO DE ROBERT NOZICK

2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (100) ◽  
pp. 225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luiz Felipe Netto de Andrade e Silva Sahd
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Present Article ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The State ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Public System ◽  
Minimal State ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Assurance System

O presente artigo tem como objetivo reconstruir argumentos centrais desenvolvidos por Robert Nozick, acerca das posições extremas que não diferenciam Estado-providência e  Estado totalitário na política dos libertarianos norte-americanos, isto é, sobre as afinidades percebidas por Nozick com as teses desta corrente de pensamento, embora se afastando num ponto essencial: a questão do Estado. Ao contrário da teoria anarquista, o Estado mínimo é preferível ao estado de natureza, tal como John Locke o descreve. De fato, o estado de natureza expõe, segundo Nozick, os indivíduos a todo tipo de violência que nenhum “sistema de proteção privado” bastaria para evitar. O remédio para as violações dos contratos consiste na criação de um sistema de proteção público dotado oficialmente do monopólio do uso da força.Abstract: The present article aims at reconstructing Robert Nozick’s central arguments about the extreme positions held by North American libertarians who do not distinguish between Welfare State and Totalitarian State. Despite divergences on a pivotal question, that of the State, there are some affinities between Nozick and this current of thought. Contrary to the anarchist theory, the Minimal State is preferable to the state of nature as described by John Locke. According to Nozick, the state of nature exposes individuals to all kinds of violence from which no “private assurance system” whatsoever can protect them. The remedy for the breach of contracts resides in the creation of a public system of protection that officially holds the monopoly of the use of force.

TOWARD A THEORY OF EMPIRICAL NATURAL RIGHTS

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hasnas
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
The State ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Close Approximation ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Limited Government ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Traditional Natural

Natural rights theorists such as John Locke and Robert Nozick provide arguments for limited government that are grounded on the individual's possession of natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Resting on natural rights, such arguments can be no more persuasive than the underlying arguments for the existence of such rights, which are notoriously weak. In this article, John Hasnas offers an alternative conception of natural rights, “empirical natural rights,” that are not beset by the objections typically raised against traditional natural rights. Empirical natural rights are rights that evolve in the state of nature rather than those that individuals are antecedently endowed with in that state. Professor Hasnas argues that empirical natural rights are true natural rights, that is, pre-political rights with natural grounds that can be possessed in the state of nature, and that, when taken together, they form a close approximation of the Lockean rights to life, liberty, and property. He furthers argues that empirical natural rights are normatively well-grounded because respecting them is productive of social peace, which possesses instrumental moral value regardless of one's conception inherent value. Professor Hasnas thus offers his conception of rights as solved problems as an alternative and potentially more secure footing for the traditional natural rights arguments for limited government associated with Locke and Nozick.

scholarly journals Thinking about relations: Strathern, Sahlins, and Locke on anthropological knowledge

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Locke ◽  
The State ◽  
Cultural Relativism ◽  
Trading Zone ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
The Past ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
The Social

John Locke is known within anthropology primarily for his empiricism, his views of natural laws, and his discussion of the state of nature and the social contract. Marilyn Strathern and Marshall Sahlins, however, have offered distinctive, novel, and broad reflections on the nature of anthropological knowledge that appeal explicitly to a lesser-known aspect of Locke’s work: his metaphysical views of relations. This paper examines their distinctive conclusions – Sahlins’ about cultural relativism, Strathern’s about relatives and kinship – both of which concern the objectivity of anthropological knowledge. Although Locke’s own views of relations have been neglected by historians of philosophy in the past, recent and ongoing philosophical discussions of Locke on relations create a productive trading zone between philosophy and anthropology on the objectivity of anthropological knowledge that goes beyond engagement with the particular claims made by Sahlins and Strathern.

Prerogative and the Rule of Law in John Locke and the Lincoln Presidency

2005 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Mattie
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
John Locke ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Fundamental Importance ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
State Of Nature

Locke's Second Treatise of Government argues for the rule of law as just and rightful politics, not only in the fundamental legislation that is the constitution but also in regular governance by the legislature. Locke also argues for executive prerogative, the power of doing good without or even against law during contingency and necessity. Rule by legislation and rule by prerogative each preserve the political community and reflect its foundation out of the state of nature. But they do not easily coexist in the constitution, which provides no means to judge the rightful use of prerogative. President Lincoln's strong, discretionary actions during the crisis of the Civil War illustrate Locke's argument about prerogative's fundamental importance and its problematic relation to ordinary lawfulness. However, as Lincoln recognized, both the Constitution and Congress formally provided for an executive power that was remarkably compatible with the rule of law—and that thereby responded to the Lockean problem.

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