Decision Costs in Coalition Formation

1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 556-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Adrian ◽  
Charles Press
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Competent Authority ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Information Costs ◽  
Zero Sum

Choices made in coalition formation are costly to participants, complex, and difficult to measure with precision because observable coalitions are multi-person, non-zero-sum games. At least eight decision costs are included in the process. The purpose of this paper is to identify them and to examine their usefulness in explaining coalition formation. Decisions include: (1) information costs, (2) responsibility costs, (3) intergame costs, (4) costs of division of payoffs, (5) dissonance costs (6) inertia costs, (7) time costs, and (8) persuasion costs.Coalition building is an essential aspect of decision making within any political system. Whether one is studying the behavior of a municipal planning commission, a committee or sub-committee of a legislative body, the United Nations Security Council, or any other decision-making institution in which more than one person is involved in reaching a decision, the essential problem is often one of establishing a winning coalition within the entire group membership. A winning coalition is any portion of the group that can decide to do or not to do something that is on the agenda of the group and over which it has competent authority. The requirements of what constitutes a winning coalition are determined by the formal and informal rules of the game. Most commonly, one of the rules is that a winning coalition must consist of one-half the members of the group plus one and this assumption is made for purposes of this paper. The size of the coalition needed is important for individual and coalition strategies, but it is not important conceptually. That is, the problems involved in securing a winning coalition on the United States Supreme Court when only four votes are needed in order to agree to hear a case affects the strategy of the members of the court, but is of no theoretical importance to coalition formation.

Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition

1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 1202-1214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Hardin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
General Class ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
The United States ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Restricted Class ◽  
Size Principle ◽  
Zero Sum

The proof of Riker's size principle is inadequate for the general class of zero-sum bargaining games (whether symmetric or asymmetric), and the principle is valid only for a very restricted class of games—the supersymmetric games and their asymmetric counterparts. Butterworth's modification of the size principle (the maximum number of positive gainers principle) can be extended to cover games which are only approximately symmetric. Roll-call voting in the United States House of Representatives overwhelmingly violates the size principle; hence, the House does not generally play a supersymmetric zero-sum bargaining game. More generally, both Butterworth's and Riker's principles seem inapplicable to large bodies.

Universalism in Experimental Committees

1982 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary J. Miller ◽  
Joe A. Oppenheimer
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Experimental Design ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Real World ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Committee Decision Making ◽  
Expected Benefits ◽  
High Level ◽  
Rational Choice Theories

Most rational choice theories of committee decision making predict a process of competitive coalition formation leading to a minimum winning coalition. Committee experiments reported to date tend to support these theories. However, both theories and committee experiments are contradicted by the evidence of real-world legislatures making distributive decisions; these decisions are characterized by coalitions of the whole providing virtually all members with a share of distributive benefits. The results in this article help to resolve this contradiction by showing that if the committee experimental design includes a universalistic alternative which provides a high level of expected benefits for committee members, it will be selected. Competitive coalition formation occurs in experimental settings which do not include such an alternative. The results call into question the generality of ordinalist theories of competitive coalition formation.

A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions

1971 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 741-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Lyle Butterworth
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Research Note ◽  
Size Principle ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Upper Limit ◽  
Individual Player ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Rational Players

This paper is concerned with the problem of relating aggregate coalition payoffs to the winnings of an individual player, so that some theoretical foundation might be developed for dealing with problems of coalition formation. Professor William H. Riker was concerned with this problem in his Theory of Political Coalitions; in that book he developed a formulation holding that in several common political situations players would strive to form only minimum winning coalitions. Riker based that formulation on his derivation in game theory of “the size principle,” which held that in zero-sum games among rational players with perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions would occur. The first part of this research note shows that there is a difficulty in Riker's derivation of the “size principle,” presents counter-examples to that principle, and shows that it is unsound in general. The second part of this note develops the maximum number of positive gainers principle, which shows that in the kind of games being examined there is a maximum upper limit to the number of players who will positively gain; but this does not insure that the winning coalition will be minimal.

The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Hurst
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Issue ◽  
The Relationship

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.

Russian Federation and the United States of America: geostrategic directions to manage the Ukrainian crisis

2019 ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Attarid Awadh Abdulhameed
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Ukrainian Crisis ◽  
Zero Sum

Ukrainia Remains of huge importance to Russian Strategy because of its Strategic importance. For being a privileged Postion in new Eurasia, without its existence there would be no logical resons for eastward Expansion by European Powers.  As well as in Connection with the progress of Ukrainian is no less important for the USA (VSD, NDI, CIA, or pentagon) and the European Union with all organs, and this is announced by John Kerry. There has always ben Russian Fear and Fear of any move by NATO or USA in the area that it poses a threat to  Russians national Security and its independent role and in funence  on its forces especially the Navy Forces. There for, the Crisis manyement was not Zero sum game, there are gains and offset losses, but Russia does not accept this and want a Zero Sun game because the USA. And European exteance is a Foot hold in Regin Which Russian sees as a threat to its national security and want to monopolize control in the strategic Qirim.

Ban Ki-moon, 2007–2016

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Gowan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Central African Republic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cautious Approach ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
The Face

During Ban Ki-moon’s tenure, the Security Council was shaken by P5 divisions over Kosovo, Georgia, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Yet it also continued to mandate and sustain large-scale peacekeeping operations in Africa, placing major burdens on the UN Secretariat. The chapter will argue that Ban initially took a cautious approach to controversies with the Council, and earned a reputation for excessive passivity in the face of crisis and deference to the United States. The second half of the chapter suggests that Ban shifted to a more activist pressure as his tenure went on, pressing the Council to act in cases including Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Syria. The chapter will argue that Ban had only a marginal impact on Council decision-making, even though he made a creditable effort to speak truth to power over cases such as the Central African Republic (CAR), challenging Council members to live up to their responsibilities.

scholarly journals 307 A systems approach to understanding biosecurity decision-making

2020 ◽  
Vol 98 (Supplement_4) ◽  
pp. 43-43
Author(s):  
Scott C Merrill ◽  
Christopher Koliba ◽  
Gabriela Bucini ◽  
Eric Clark ◽  
Luke Trinity ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Risk Mitigation ◽  
African Swine Fever Virus ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mitigation Strategies ◽  
Communication Strategy ◽  
Livestock Industry ◽  
Diarrhea Virus ◽  
Operational Level

Abstract Disease and its consequences result in social and economic impacts to the US animal livestock industry, ranging from losses in human capital to economic costs in excess of a billion dollars annually. Impacts would dramatically escalate if a devastating disease like Foot and Mouth Disease or African Swine Fever virus were to emerge in the United States. Investing in preventative biosecurity can reduce the likelihood of disease incursions and their negative impact on our livestock industry, yet uncertainty persists with regards to developing an effective biosecurity structure and culture. Here we show the implications of human behavior and decision making for biosecurity effectiveness, from the operational level to the owner/managerial level and finally to the systems level. For example, adjustments to risk messaging strategies could double worker compliance with biosecurity practices at the operational level. The improvement of our risk communication strategy may increase willingness to invest in biosecurity. Furthermore, the adaptation of policies could nudge behavior so that we observe a short disease outbreak followed by a quick eradication instead of a pandemic. Our research shows how the emergence of now-endemic diseases, such as Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus, cannot be adequately modeled without the use of a human behavioral component. Focusing solely on any one sector or level of the livestock system is not sufficient to predict emergent disease patterns and their social and economic impact on livestock industries. These results provide insight toward developing more effective risk mitigation strategies and ways to nudge behavior toward more disease resilient systems.

“Little Plants in the Country”: Henry Ford's Village Industries and the Beginning of Decentralized Technology in Modern America

Prospects ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 181-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard P. Segal
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
New York ◽  
Information Processing ◽  
Real Estate ◽  
New York Times ◽  
The United States ◽  
Physical Proximity ◽  
The World ◽  
Word Processors

“Technology Spurs Decentralization Across the Country.” So reads a 1984 New York Times article on real-estate trends in the United States. The contemporary revolution in information processing and transmittal now allows large businesses and other institutions to disperse their offices and other facilities across the country, even across the world, without loss of the policy- and decision-making abilities formerly requiring regular physical proximity. Thanks to computers, word processors, and the like, decentralization has become a fact of life in America and other highly technological societies.

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