Alcohol and Politics in France

1957 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 976-994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard E. Brown

“On jongle trop avec la structure d'un Pays qui a été, dans le monde, le défenseur de l'individu, de la liberté, du sens de la mesure. Un petit paysan sur sa terre, n'est-il pas humainement autre chose que le chômeur de demain ou l'ouvrier qui sera condamné à fabriquer toute sa vie des boulons?”Le Betteravier Français, September 1956, page 1.Large-scale state intervention in the alcohol market in France dates from World War I, when the government committed itself to encourage the production of alcohol. Two chief reasons then lay back of this decision: a huge supply of alcohol was needed for the manufacture of gunpowder, and the devastation of the beet-growing regions of the north had severely limited production of beet alcohol, thereby throwing the domestic market out of balance. A law of 30 June 1916, adopted under emergency procedure, established a state agency empowered to purchase alcohol. At the end of the war, a decree of 1919 accorded the government the right “provisionally” to maintain the state monopoly. In 1922 the beetgrowers and winegrowers gave their support to the principle of a state monopoly which, in effect, reserved the industrial market for beet alcohol and the domestic market for viticulture. In 1931 the state was authorized to purchase alcohol distilled from surplus wine.

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Andrew Jackson

One scenario put forward by researchers, political commentators and journalists for the collapse of North Korea has been a People’s Power (or popular) rebellion. This paper analyses why no popular rebellion has occurred in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un. It challenges the assumption that popular rebellion would happen because of widespread anger caused by a greater awareness of superior economic conditions outside the DPRK. Using Jack Goldstone’s theoretical expla-nations for the outbreak of popular rebellion, and comparisons with the 1989 Romanian and 2010–11 Tunisian transitions, this paper argues that marketi-zation has led to a loosening of state ideological control and to an influx of infor-mation about conditions in the outside world. However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. Unlike Tunisia, the DPRK lacks a dissident political elite capable of leading an opposition movement, and unlike Romania, the DPRK authorities have shown some flexibility in their anti-dissent strategies, taking a more tolerant approach to protests against economic issues. Reduced levels of violence during periods of unrest and an effective system of information control may have helped restrict the expansion of unrest beyond rural areas.


Author(s):  
Chiedza Simbo

Despite the recent enactment of the Zimbabwean Constitution which provides for the right to basic education, complaints, reminiscent of a failed basic education system, have marred the education system in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding glaring violations of the right to basic education by the government, no person has taken the government to court for failure to comply with its section 75(1)(a) constitutional obligations, and neither has the government conceded any failures or wrongdoings. Two ultimate questions arise: Does the state know what compliance with section 75(1)(a) entails? And do the citizens know the scope and content of their rights as provided for by section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe? Whilst it is progressive that the Education Act of Zimbabwe as amended in 2020 has addressed some aspects relating to section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution, it has still not provided an international law compliant scope and content of the right to basic education neither have any clarifications been provided by the courts. Using an international law approach, this article suggests what the scope and content of section 75(1)(a) might be.


Author(s):  
Angela Dranishnikova

In the article, the author reflects the existing problems of the fight against corruption in the Russian Federation. He focuses on the opacity of the work of state bodies, leading to an increase in bribery and corruption. The topic we have chosen is socially exciting in our days, since its significance is growing on a large scale at all levels of the investigated aspect of our modern life. Democratic institutions are being jeopardized, the difference in the position of social strata of society in society’s access to material goods is growing, and the state of society is suffering from the moral point of view, citizens are losing confidence in the government, and in the top officials of the state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (10(79)) ◽  
pp. 12-18
Author(s):  
G. Bubyreva

The existing legislation determines the education as "an integral and focused process of teaching and upbringing, which represents a socially important value and shall be implemented so as to meet the interests of the individual, the family, the society and the state". However, even in this part, the meaning of the notion ‘socially significant benefit is not specified and allows for a wide range of interpretation [2]. Yet the more inconcrete is the answer to the question – "who and how should determine the interests of the individual, the family and even the state?" The national doctrine of education in the Russian Federation, which determined the goals of teaching and upbringing, the ways to attain them by means of the state policy regulating the field of education, the target achievements of the development of the educational system for the period up to 2025, approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of October 4, 2000 #751, was abrogated by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of March 29, 2014 #245 [7]. The new doctrine has not been developed so far. The RAE Academician A.B. Khutorsky believes that the absence of the national doctrine of education presents a threat to national security and a violation of the right of citizens to quality education. Accordingly, the teacher has to solve the problem of achieving the harmony of interests of the individual, the family, the society and the government on their own, which, however, judging by the officially published results, is the task that exceeds the abilities of the participants of the educational process.  The particular concern about the results of the patriotic upbringing served as a basis for the legislative initiative of the RF President V. V. Putin, who introduced the project of an amendment to the Law of RF "About Education of the Russian Federation" to the State Duma in 2020, regarding the quality of patriotic upbringing [3]. Patriotism, considered by the President of RF V. V. Putin as the only possible idea to unite the nation is "THE FEELING OF LOVE OF THE MOTHERLAND" and the readiness for every sacrifice and heroic deed for the sake of the interests of your Motherland. However, the practicing educators experience shortfalls in efficient methodologies of patriotic upbringing, which should let them bring up citizens, loving their Motherland more than themselves. The article is dedicated to solution to this problem based on the Value-sense paradigm of upbringing educational dynasty of the Kurbatovs [15].


2007 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 303-321
Author(s):  
Lode Wils

In het tweede deel van zijn bijdrage 1830: van de Belgische protonatie naar de natiestaat, over de gebeurtenissen van 1830-1831 als slotfase van een passage van de Belgische protonatie doorheen de grote politiek-maatschappelijke en culturele mutaties na de Franse Revolutie, ontwikkelt Lode Wils de stelling dat de periode 1829-1830 de "terminale crisis" vormde van het Koninkrijk der Verenigde Nederlanden. Terwijl koning Willem I definitief had laten verstaan dat hij de ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid definitief afwees en elke kritiek op het regime beschouwde als kritiek op de dynastie, groeide in het Zuiden de synergie in het verzet tussen klerikalen, liberalen en radicale anti-autoritaire groepen. In de vervreemding tussen het Noorden en het Zuiden en de uiteindelijke revolutionaire nationaal-liberale oppositie vanuit het Zuiden, speelde de taalproblematiek een minder belangrijke rol dan het klerikale element en de liberale aversie tegen het vorstelijk absolutisme van Willem I en de aangevoelde uitsluiting van de Belgen uit het openbaar ambt en vooral uit de leiding van de staat.________1830: from the Belgian pre-nation to the nation stateIn the second part of his contribution 1830: from the Belgian pre-nation to the nation state, dealing with the events from 1830-1831 as the concluding phase of a transition of the Belgian pre-nation through the major socio-political and cultural mutations after the French Revolution, Lode Wils develops the thesis that the period of 1829-1830 constituted the "terminal crisis" of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands. Whilst King William I had clearly given to understand that he definitively rejected ministerial responsibility and that he considered any criticism of the regime as a criticism of the dynasty, the synergy of resistance increased between the clericalists, liberals and radical anti-authoritarian groups in the South. In the alienation between the North and the South and the ultimate revolutionary national-liberal opposition from the South the language issue played a less important role than the clericalist element and the liberal aversion against the royal absolutism of William I and the sense of exclusion of the Belgians from public office and particularly from the government of the state.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283
Author(s):  
Subhendu Ranjan Raj

Development process in Odisha (before 2011 Orissa) may have led to progress but has also resulted in large-scale dispossession of land, homesteads, forests and also denial of livelihood and human rights. In Odisha as the requirements of development increase, the arena of contestation between the state/corporate entities and the people has correspondingly multiplied because the paradigm of contemporary model of growth is not sustainable and leads to irreparable ecological/environmental costs. It has engendered many people’s movements. Struggles in rural Odisha have increasingly focused on proactively stopping of projects, mining, forcible land, forest and water acquisition fallouts from government/corporate sector. Contemporaneously, such people’s movements are happening in Kashipur, Kalinga Nagar, Jagatsinghpur, Lanjigarh, etc. They have not gained much success in achieving their objectives. However, the people’s movement of Baliapal in Odisha is acknowledged as a success. It stopped the central and state governments from bulldozing resistance to set up a National Missile Testing Range in an agriculturally rich area in the mid-1980s by displacing some lakhs of people of their land, homesteads, agricultural production, forests and entitlements. A sustained struggle for 12 years against the state by using Gandhian methods of peaceful civil disobedience movement ultimately won and the government was forced to abandon its project. As uneven growth strategies sharpen, the threats to people’s human rights, natural resources, ecology and subsistence are deepening. Peaceful and non-violent protest movements like Baliapal may be emulated in the years ahead.


2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Imam Koeswahyono

Abstrak The right of management of the state since early Dutch colony until thisrecent transition era has became terminology that been debated. Thatcontroversy persists by the strength of the state intervention through the vitalnatural resources for agrarian nations beside biased articulation indiscourse but also on state right in praxis terms. Those situations haveprolonged even had begun any transformation in politic's paradigm of priorNew Order (Orde baru) to the recent transition era and had not impacted tothe reconceptualization through that state right and praxis. Under the authortought it needs significant effort which is based under legal pluralism,decentralization by the participative of legislative drafting method alsosustainability and public anccountability principles. Without considering tothose factors the author remark it would arise mis-perceptive through theright managament of the state, latent/massive conflict over regions thatcontra productive to development progr.ess and such natural disasters


1977 ◽  
Vol 17 (192) ◽  
pp. 111-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Zorgbibe

“Whenever a large organized group believes it has the right to resist the sovereign power and considers itself capable of resorting to arms, war between the two parties should take place in the same manner as between nations…” This statement by de Vattel in the 19th century seemed destined to take its place as a part of positive law, constituting part of what was known as recognition of belligerency, tantamount to the recognition by the established government of an equal status for insurgents and regular belligerents. When a civil war became extensive enough, the State attacked would understand that it was wisest to acknowledge the existence of a state of war with part of the population. This would, at the same time, allow the conflict to be seen in a truer light. The unilateral action of the legal government in recognizing belligerency would be the condition for granting belligerent rights to the parties. It would constitute a demonstration of humanity on the part of the government of the State attacked and would also provide that government with prospects for effective pursuit of the war. By admitting that it was forced to resort to war, it would at least have its hands free to make war seriously.


Author(s):  
Thomas Greven

The root causes of the ongoing crisis in Northern Mali lie in the region’s underdevelopment, exacerbated by longstanding, if recently decreasing, neglect of the central government; the complex social relationship between the largest minority, the Tuareg, and the majority population, which has worsened since a largely unresolved crisis in the 1990s; and the growing interest of a small but growing number of actors involved in the drug trade and other criminal activities in the absence of the state. Among the latter have been a growing number of Jihadists, at first mostly from Algeria, who have been taking Western citizens hostage and therefore caused the US and France to pressure the Malian government to re-establish a presence of the state in the North. The clash was all but inevitable when several thousand heavily armed Tuareg fighters came to Mali after the defeat of Gaddafi in Libya. A new element of the crisis is the growing number of jihadists among the Tuareg rebels and other Malians, but neither Tuareg irredentism nor Islamic fundamentalism has more than minority support in Mali, Northern Mali, or among the Tuareg. The coup d’état against the president, while most likely a spontaneous reaction to the inability of the government to fight the rebellion, uncovered a structural crisis of Malian democracy and society. The disintegration of Mali’s long-praised formal democratic institutions after the coup showed fundamental problems. However, political supporters of the coup who assumed that the population’s tacit support of the coup could be turned into a movement for fundamental social change, had to find that it was largely an opportunistic and diffuse expression of general discontent.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-61
Author(s):  
Annika Ullman

Principal C.J.L. Almqvist and the principle of personalityThe Swedish author and visionary Carl Jonas Love Almqvist (1793–1866) was the principal for twelve years (1829–1841) of the government-initiated pilot school ”Nya Elementarskolan” (New Elementary School) in Stockholm. In this position, he argued that both the school and the state should be built on the same basic idea: the right of individual freedom. This argument is often referred to as ”personlighetsprincipen” (the principle of personality), a concept launched by another prominent figure of the liberal culture of the time, Erik Gustaf Geijer (1783–1847). This article explores how the principle of personality is expressed in the texts of Almqvist and is mainly built upon the concept’s allegorical resources. It examines the thesis that Almqvist’s use of the term is best understood if one distinguishes between the political, pedagogical, and existential dimension of the concept. The article ends with some thoughts about the context of the concept and a discussion on whether Almqvist had a greater interest in personalities than in principles.


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