The West German Electoral Law of 1953

1955 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
James K. Pollock

In the spring of 1953, with the approach of the regular parliamentary elections, the West German Bundestag began its deliberations on a new electoral law. The original law of 1949 had been enacted for the sole purpose of electing the first Parliament under the new Bonn Constitution. It was therefore necessary for the expiring Parliament to re-enact the old law, to modify it, or to supersede it with an entirely new system.It soon became apparent that there were wide differences of opinion among the various parties represented in the Bundestag. The Chancellor's party, the Christian Democrats (CDU), presented proposals to establish a single member district system, eliminating proportional representation. The Social Democrats (SPD) presented a draft which largely re-enacted the 1949 law. The official government proposal, which was something of a compromise, leaned very heavily in the direction of the so-called Mehrheitswahl but also had provisions permitting a combination of party lists and additional votes (Hilfsstimmen). It bore some similarity to the law which de Gasperi had pushed through the Italian Parliament shortly before this time, but without the same justification. The various proposals were discussed on first reading on March 5, 1953, and again on March 18. After the report by the Election Law Committee, amended proposals were again discussed on second and third reading on June 17 and 19 and passed on third reading June 25.

2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Millard

The Polish parliamentary elections of 2001 took place in a context of fresh upheavals in the configuration of political parties. The architects of the new electoral law aimed to reduce the seats gained by the social democrats and increase their own. They succeeded in the first aim by a change of electoral formula, forcing the victorious social democratic electoral coalition to seek a third coalition partner. They did not achieve the second aim, as their own failures in government drastically reduced their electoral support and facilitated the breakthrough of populist formations. The result had implications for party development and the composition and workings of both parliament and government. While representation was enhanced by a parliament more accurately reflecting the voters’ choice, the impact appeared potentially harmful to Polish democracy as a whole.


1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-108
Author(s):  
Ben A. Arneson

With the tense international situation as an ominous background, the regular quadrennial parliamentary elections for the lower house were held in Sweden in September, 1940. Four years ago, the autumn of 1936 witnessed spirited and warmly contested parliamentary elections in both Sweden and Norway. Because Norway's constitution was amended in 1937 to provide for quadrennial rather than triennial elections, the autumn of 1940 would—save for the German invasion of the Norwegian democracy—have seen nation-wide parliamentary elections in both countries of the Scandinavian peninsula. With Sweden as the only Scandinavian nation remaining free and independent, it has been interesting to note what effect, if any, the tremendous pressures from the surrounding totalitarian states has had on democratic processes in the Swedish state.Over a year ago, the Swedish cabinet was reorganised into a National Cabinet with all leading political parties represented. As the time for the elections approached, some of the minority parties expressed willingness to postpone the contest, even to the extent of ignoring the constitutional provision for quadrennial elections. The remarkable expression of confidence by the smaller parties in the largest party—the Social Democrats—was countered by an equally remarkable stand taken by the leader of the Social Democrats, Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson, who insisted that the democratic processes of a popular election should be continued. The prime minister's view was accepted by all parties, since it was felt by all leaders that in such a time of stress it would be an indication of democratic strength for the parliament to go to the people. All were agreed also that the parties which would, in normal times, be in opposition should continue as vital going concerns.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 778-792
Author(s):  
Marius Grad ◽  
Claudiu Marian

In the most recent two decades, the political campaigns conducted by the Social Democratic Party in Romania targeted specific groups of voters, with little intention to attract new voters. The reason behind their strategy is that they could secure a relatively constant support of roughly one third of the electorate and so win the popular vote in every election since 2000. However, the 2016 parliamentary elections marked a turning point in this approach and the party used almost exclusively online marketing to organize, streamline and channel its messages. This article seeks to understand why this change occurred although it did not seem to be necessary. This change is more surprising in a context in which the main political competitors were weak and disorganized. Our qualitative analysis aims to identify and explain the main elements that determined this change. It accounts for three main variables: experiential learning, the role of a new party leader and the use of new opportunities.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 452-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens-Uwe Guettel

In his seminalThe German Empire, published in German in 1973, historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler posited that in respect to the German Empire's colonial policies only the SPD, unlike all other political parties, “retained its capacity to take a critical view on matters of principle.” Moreover, in Wehler's view, the SPD's critical stance on this and many other political questions along with the party's massive electoral gains in the 1912 parliamentary elections precipitated a situation in the years immediately preceding the Great War that prompted the German Empire's “old elites” to bet increasingly on a major military conflict to solve the Empire's internal political tensions (“leap into darkness”). Thus in Wehler's view the Social Democrats contributed in no small part to Imperial Germany's perceived domestic crisis, which prompted the infamous “old elites” to choose war over domestic reform in 1914.


Author(s):  
Noah Benezra Strote

This chapter focuses on the Social Democrats and the compromises on values they felt forced to make—particularly the abandonment of their previous platforms of pacifism and internationalism—in order to resonate with West German voters in the climate of the Cold War. In the years after 1953, as the Western Allies turned over sovereign decision-making power over foreign relations to the Federal Republic's government, Germans showed signs of coming to agreement on precisely the issue of values and “ideals” for the German youth that had caused such crisis during Hitler's rise to power in 1933. The common ideal that bound them together was twofold: the value of “Europe” and the foreign policy of “binding to the West.” In the years leading up to 1953, Germans from across the Federal Republic's political spectrum participated in the creation of educational institutions designed to shape a generation of young people capable of overcoming centuries of conflict in a common “European” identity.


2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Jun

Public opinion data gathered from the latest surveys on Germany's upcoming parliamentary elections have turned out to be disheartening for the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Without exception, the Social Democrats take second place and lag behind the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) by several percentage points (Fig. 1). Today, only a few months before the next parliamentary election, a repetition of the electoral victory to the extent of 1998 seems to be rather unlikely. We are therefore faced with the perplexing question of how the SPD could arrive at such a disadvantageous position given the historic electoral success of 1998, when the party achieved its second-best result at parliamentary elections since Word War II. Is the SPD powerless against a strong tendency of the German electorate to cast its ballot in favor of the CDU/CSU, which has pervaded almost the entire history of the Federal Republic of Germany and has been described as “a permanent discrimination of the SPD against the CDU/CSU in the competition of parties.” Or is this situation just a snapshot without deeper consequences for the party?


Significance Romanians elected new mayors, local and county councils on September 27. The elections represented a key test for parties for the December parliamentary elections and offered a chance for the electorate to pass judgment on the National Liberal Party (PNL) which has replaced the Social Democrats (PSD) in government. Impacts The record number of new COVID-19 cases is the result of avoiding imposing tough restrictions against the pandemic before local elections. Rapidly rising deficits and public debt imply difficulties for the next government in balancing the budget in 2021. If a centre-right cabinet emerges from the elections, it is likely to adopt fiscally conservative measures.


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 26-54
Author(s):  
Keith Alexander

In October 1978, diverse members of the West Berlin Left founded the Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz (Alternative Ballot for Democracy and Environmental Protection, AL). This article examines the origins and evolution of the AL. Initially, the new political organization fundamentally opposed the parliamentary system. Within three years, however, the AL won a significant presence in the West Berlin Parliament, and in 1989, the party joined the Social Democrats in governing West Berlin. The AL’s parliamentary participation had a moderating, integrative effect on the party and its members. From the late 1970s through the end of the 1980s, a significant segment of the radical West German Left grew to accept parliamentary democracy, demonstrating the strength of the Federal Republic.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-40
Author(s):  
Vera Eccarius-Kelly

The article examines trends in voting preferences and voting behavior of Turkish-origin German voters. Despite only representing a small percentage of the total German electorate, Turkish-origin voters are gaining an opportunity to shape the future political landscape. While the Social Democrats have benefited most directly from the minority constituency so far, this author suggests that the Green Party is poised to attract the younger, better educated, and German-born segment of the Turkish-origin voters. All other dominant national parties have ignored this emerging voting bloc, and missed opportunities to appeal to Turkish-origin voters by disregarding community-specific interests. 


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