Public Opinion Research—An Opportunity for Political Parties

1950 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 916-923
Author(s):  
Frederick C. Irion

The purpose of this paper is to describe how public opinion research can aid political parties in adopting sound policies and wise courses of action. In view of the crisis brought to a climax by events in Korea, the analysis is confined to how current public opinion research can be used immediately and to how public opinion methodology can be adapted now for more extensive practical application. In addition, since public opinion research throws into focus the critical problems facing political parties, certain of these problems are noted to show the limitations of public opinion research as it can now be used.Before the 1948 polling difficulties, research in the form of questionnaires showed that politicians had a high regard for public opinion polls. Although apparently no comparable research has been conducted since then on their attitude toward polls, statements of individual politicians have shown that polls have dropped sharply in prestige. At present, public opinion research techniques are perhaps undervalued, as they were once overvalued.There is a primary misconception about polls which has been fostered in part by the pollsters themselves. Polls are not accurate to a percentage point or within an artificial “margin of error” under certain circumstances.

Slavic Review ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Brym ◽  
Andrei Degtyarev

Public opinion polls show that between 1988 and 1991 some three percent of adult Russians donated money to various political movements, four percent took part in strikes and just over six percent participated in mass rallies and demonstrations. Fewer than one percent of Russians j o i n ed new political parties, still nascent organizations that attract elites, not masses. At the same time, membership in the Communist Party dropped from ten percent to four percent of the adult population of Russia.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A Peterson

Many public opinion polls report a mythical margin of error. These reported margins of error are calculated on the basis of a nonexistent (fictitious) dichotomous poll question and are completely unrelated to the actual question responses in a poll. Because it can convey a false sense of poll precision, a mythical margin of error can lead to unsupported and even incorrect inferences regarding the precision of a public opinion poll. This research note documents the existence and implications of mythical margins of error and offers suggestions for addressing them.


Author(s):  
Fatbardha Doçi

In polls that conducted today in Albanian reality, note that the margin of error is in the level + - 3%, regardless of other elements that affect in the validity of the polls. In the validity of answers, affects negatively also the questions with delicate problems . For getting these sincere responses, an important role plays the nature of the questions.If the questionnaire is composed of questions that can be characterized as fragile, then for the question that in itself treat political topics, the interviewer has a tendency to not show sincere to these questions. Questions with delicate topics tend to give respond less valuable . The methodology suggests that, when it is not possible to avoid delicate questions, become our best to preserve the anonymity of the respondent, which does not sure by the systematic sampling, which inevitably makes the respondent identifiable .So in this sample,respondents perceive themselves as identifiable. This causes them to feel threatened, if they give honest answers. Insincerity produces additional error that is intended to determine in the context of this paper. The study is not type explanatory, that uses working hypothesis as an assumed response to a research question, but experimental exploratory type, which seeks to test empirically the basic assumption and simultaneously determine the margins of error that are made in measurements to the public opinion when not respected the anonymity of respondents when we make delicate question.The experiment on which this paper is based, aims to test the basic assumption


1992 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Keohane

THE ISSUES OF DEFENCE AND EUROPE DID NOT PLAY A prominent part in the UK general election campaign of March-April 1992. One of the reasons was that public opinion polls throughout the campaign indicated consistently that domestic issues came first with the electorate. Secondly, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the restoration of consensus between the parties on nuclear weapons, defence was not a sufficiently contentious subject for it to be a central topic in the campaign. It was no surprise, however, that the Conservative Manifesto claimed that defence would not be safe in the hands of the opposition parties and that their policies would result in huge job losses in the defence sector.


1950 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 101-103
Author(s):  
Arthur N. Feraru

Author(s):  
William W. Franko ◽  
Christopher Witko

Here the authors present the variation that exists in income inequality across the states, and variation in public awareness or concern about income inequality as measured by public opinion polls. Though politicians may decide to tackle income inequality even in the absence of public concern about inequality, the authors argue that government responses are more likely when and where there is a growing awareness of, and concern about, inequality, which is confirmed in the analyses in this book. To examine this question in subsequent chapters, a novel measure of public awareness of rising state inequality is developed. Using these estimates, this chapter shows that the growth in the public concern about inequality responds in part to objective increases in inequality, but also that state political conditions, particularly mass partisanship, shape perceptions of inequality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022097903
Author(s):  
Alexander P. Landry ◽  
Elliott Ihm ◽  
Jonathan W. Schooler

Metadehumanization, the perception that members of an outgroup dehumanize your group, has been found to exacerbate intergroup conflict by inspiring reciprocal dehumanization of the offending outgroup. Moreover, metadehumanization is distinct from metaprejudice (i.e., the perception that an outgroup hates your group). Given the mutual animosity reported in public opinion polls toward the other side, we believed US–Russia relations would be a worthwhile context in which to extend this model. Therefore, we measured Americans’ levels of metadehumanization and metaprejudice of Russians to determine the association between these perceptions and their hostility toward Russians (Study 1). In this novel intergroup conflict, metadehumanization remained a consequential predictor of outgroup hostility over and above metaprejudice, suggesting that it can exacerbate a broader range of intergroup conflicts than those heretofore examined. Given these findings, we then sought to experimentally differentiate between metadehumanization and metaprejudice. In Study 2, we manipulated both metadehumanization and metaprejudice to (a) determine whether one or both cause greater outgroup hostility and (b) elucidate the underlying mechanisms by which they may produce this effect. Whereas metadehumanization produced greater hostility, metaprejudice did not. Moreover, although both metaperceptions inspired greater prejudice, only metadehumanization led to greater dehumanization. We conclude that metadehumanization may be a particularly potent fomenter of hostility because it inspires reciprocal dehumanization over and above more general negative bias.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Eric Lagenbacher

Although it has not been that long since the articles of the previous special issue devoted to the 2017 Bundestag election and its aftermath have been published, the political situation in Germany appears to have stabilized. After almost six months without a new government, German politics has sunk back into a kind of late-Merkel era normality. Public opinion polls continue to show that the CDU/CSU is slightly above its election outcome, the SPD is still down in the 17–18 percent range, the FDP has lost about 2 percent of its support, while the AfD, Greens and Left Party are up 1–2 percent.


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