The German Social Democratic Party, 1914–1921. By A. Joseph Berlau. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 374. $4.75.)

1950 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 507-508
Author(s):  
Wolfgang H. Kraus
2005 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 112-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Collomp

The Jewish Labor Committee (JLC), founded in New York in 1934, was the vanguard of American labor's anti-Nazi and antifascist activism. The JLC grew out of the Jewish labor movement in the US. In 1940–1941, it achieved the rescue of hundreds of European labor and social-democratic party leaders trapped in France by the invading German army or in Lithuania by the Soviet army. Among these persons were some of the foremost leaders of the Labour and Socialist International and of the International Federation of Trade Unions. Many others were Polish Bundists, the JLC's founders' original political family, doubly exposed to Nazi brutality by their Jewish identity and social-democratic positions. This event is the focal point from which American labor's international solidarity for the labor victims of Nazism and fascism can be observed. In addition, the connection between the JLC and the Emergency Rescue Committee whose agent, Varian Fry, rescued artists and intellectuals, is also established in the paper.


Author(s):  
Ashoka Mody

This chapter discusses how Gerhard Schröder, leader of Germany's Social Democratic Party, proposed to delay the euro's birth rather than start with members who had not achieved the required fiscal discipline. Campaigning to replace Helmut Kohl as chancellor in March 1998, Schröder observed that some countries would struggle to survive the rigors of the monetary union. However, once Schröder was elected chancellor in October, his hands were tied. In April 1998, the Bundestag had already authorized Germany's shift from the deutsche mark to the euro, Germany had made commitments to its European partners, and preparation for launch of the euro was in full swing. Ultimately, the euro was born uneventfully on January 1, 1999. Schröder continued the narrative of Europe's eventual political awakening; he even called for greater European “political union.” To the contrary, Schröder quickly developed a confrontational relationship with European institutions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Thau

Abstract In Denmark, as in other Western European countries, the working class does not vote for social democratic parties to the same extent as before. Yet, what role did the social democratic parties themselves play in the demobilization of class politics? Building on core ideas from public opinion literature, this article differs from the focus on party policy positions in previous work and, instead, focuses on the group-based appeals of the Social Democratic Party in Denmark. Based on a quantitative content analysis of party programs between 1961 and 2004, I find that, at the general level, class-related appeals have been replaced by appeals targeting non-economic groups. At the specific level, the class-related appeals that remain have increasingly been targeting businesses at the expense of traditional left-wing groups such as wage earners, tenants and pensioners. These findings support a widespread hypothesis that party strategy was crucial in the decline of class politics, but also suggests that future work on class mobilization should adopt a group-centered perspective.


1974 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felice Rizzi

A FEW YEARS AGO, GALL1 AND PRANDI WROTE THAT THE UNIFICATION of the socialists represented a phase of rationalization of the Italian political system. Not only did the re-unification of the PSI (Socialist Party of Italy) and the PSDI (Social Democratic Party of Italy) lead to a simplification of the party subsystem (by reducing its excessive numbers), thus rendering the choice between alternatives easier for the electorate. But at last a single voice seemed to emerge which could undertake the task of opposing the twenty years of Christian Democrat predominance, which had been responsible for so many aspects of political ‘immobilism’. Moreover it was possible to discern a strategic design in the socialist plans — an optimistic design perhaps, but entailing possible innovations. The formation of a strong Socialist Party might have led to the overcoming of one of the principal - if not the greatest - defects of the Italian party system: the absence of a mechanism of rewards and punishments.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lubomír Kopeček ◽  
Pavel Pšeja

This article attempts to analyze developments within the Czech Left after 1989. Primarily, the authors focus on two questions: (1) How did the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) achieve its dominance of the Left? (2)What is the relationship between the Social Democrats and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)? We conclude that the unsuccessful attempt to move the KSČM towards a moderate leftist identity opened up a space in which the Social Democrats could thrive, at the same time gradually assuming a pragmatic approach towards the Communists. Moreover, the ability of Miloš Zeman, the leader of the Social Democrats, to build a clear non-Communist Left alternative to the hegemony of the Right during the 1990s was also very important.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document