The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act

1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Belle Zeller

Although the need for such action had long been apparent in Washington, it was not until 1946 that a federal statute was enacted for the regulation of general lobbying activities. Prior to that year, Congress had, on a number of occasions, investigated lobbying practices, and as a result had enacted measures which reached a limited number of groups engaged in them. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the congressional act in 1936 affecting the shipping interests, and the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 were important regulatory measures, but they reached only a few of the groups exerting direct and continuous influence in Washington. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of August 2, 1946, is more general in its coverage; and it has been in force long enough for its effectiveness to be tested.In this article, it is my purpose (1) to supply a brief historical background for the measure referred to; (2) to examine the statute's provisions; (3) to appraise the objections raised to it; (4) to examine the actual administration of the act and point out the difficulties of enforcement, particularly during its first year; and (5) to offer recommendations for strengthening the law.

2020 ◽  
pp. 196-220
Author(s):  
Paul Weirich

Governments regulate risks on behalf of the people they serve. Given that regulatory agencies aim for regulatory measures that the public would endorse if rational and informed, the mean-risk method of evaluating acts provides valuable guidance. It offers a way of constructing for a citizen informed probability and utility assignments for a regulation’s possible outcomes, and using these assignments to obtain for the citizen an informed utility assignment for the regulation. The theory of cooperative games combines the utility assignments of multiple agents to support a collective act, and under simplifying assumptions, supports an act that maximizes collective utility, defined as a sum of the act’s utilities for the agents, in the tradition of utilitarianism. This approach to regulation accommodates acts targeting information-sensitive, evidential risks as well as acts targeting physical risks. Verification of a reduction in an evidential risk can meet the standards of objectivity that the law adopts.


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