International Administrative Regulation: The Case of Rubber

1942 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-337
Author(s):  
Kurt Wilk
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Focused Attention ◽  
War Economy ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Production Distribution ◽  
Post War ◽  
World Organization ◽  
Peace And War

The war in the Pacific has focused attention on rubber as one of the key materials of peace and war economy. It has not only caused domestic adjustments in the United States as previously in other consuming countries, both allied and enemy, but has terminated an epoch in international rubber control. At the same time, it has accentuated the permanent international concern about basic materials—their location, accessibility, production, distribution, and utilization. Thus the international rubber régime, as it operated up to the disruption of trade-lanes and the invasion and devastation of producing areas, is of interest not only because of its effects in the period just ended but also as an approach to problems of international economic policy and administrative technique which are likely to continue into post-war world organization, no matter how different its political and strategical foundations may be.

International Economic Controls in Occupied Japan

1979 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon Hollerman
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
Free Market ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Liberalization ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
Control Laws ◽  
Postwar Japan ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Economic Control ◽  
Government Bureaucracy

The Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) claimed credit for bringing democracy to Japan during the Occupation. With some exceptions, the predominant result of SCAP's activities in economic (as distinguished from political) affairs, was just the opposite. SCAP imposed comprehensive economic controls on Japan and suppressed the free market system. Its intervention was especially repressive on the international plane.Prior to mobilization for the Pacific War, Japan had never had a planned or controlled economy. As the occupation drew to a close, SCAP authorized the Diet to pass legislation for international economic controls to be employed by successor peacetime governments. An extensive Japanese government bureaucracy with a vested interest in the perpetuation of economic controls took charge of their implementation. The economic control laws, and the bureaucracy to which they gave rise, constituted an important part of SCAP's legacy to postwar Japan. This legacy became a primary conditioning factor in Japan's subsequent resistance to economic liberalization—a source of continuing friction in relations between the United States and Japan.

Economic Superpower in an Age of Limits

2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 278-298
Author(s):  
Yu Takeda
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Economic ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
The Other ◽  
Bilateral Cooperation ◽  
Perceptual Changes

This paper examines macroeconomic policy coordination between Japan and the United States under the locomotive strategy from 1977 to 1979. Previous studies have described the strategy as a fiasco because of its negative economic impact. In fact, the Japanese government, after two years of stimulus packages, quit trying to be a locomotive bringing other developed countries out of their economic difficulties and the u.s. government admitted it in 1979. On the other hand, as this article shows, bilateral cooperation with the United States under this strategy expanded the roles and burdens of Japan, an emerging economic superpower, in international economic policy coordination. Japan’s efforts to implement the strategy made the u.s. government believe that Tokyo would continue to respond to its request to bear larger international responsibilities, while it also increased awareness of Japan’s global role in Tokyo. These bilateral perceptual changes paved the way for subsequent policy coordination and Japan’s assumption of greater burdens, notably the adoption of large-scale stimulus packages under belt-tightening budgets.

International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934

1983 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Lake
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Economic ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
Economic Structure ◽  
The United States ◽  
West Germany ◽  
International Economy ◽  
World War ◽  
Foreign Economic Policy

American foreign economic policy between 1887 and 1934 was shaped in important ways by the international economic structure and the position of the United States as a “supporter” within it. As Britain's hegemony declined, and particularly after it joined the United States as a supporter just prior to World War I, American foreign economic policy became more liberal and active. Once Britain was transformed from a supporter into a spoiler in the late 1920s, leaving the United States as the sole supporter within the IES, both the international economy and American policy became more unstable and protectionist. During the 1970s, the United States, West Germany, and France all emerged as supporters within the IES, indicating that a moderately stable and liberal international economy may continue to exist in the future.

THE LABOUR PARTY'S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1940s

2000 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD TOYE
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Labour Party ◽  
Economic Liberalization ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
The Us ◽  
Post War

This article challenges the view that, in accepting the 1945 American loan and its attendant commitments to international economic liberalization, the Labour party easily fell in behind the Atlanticist approach to post-war trade and payments. It is suggested instead that Labour's sometimes seemingly paradoxical behaviour in office was driven, not only by the very tough economic conditions it faced, but also by a fundamental contradiction inherent in its desire to ‘plan’ at both domestic and international levels. This contradiction – the ‘planning paradox’ – is explored with reference to pre-war and war-time developments, including Labour's reactions to the Keynes and White plans of 1943, and to the Bretton Woods conference of 1944. The decision to accept the US loan, and with it the Bretton Woods agreements, is then examined within this context. Finally, an assessment is made of whether, in this key area of policy, Labour's pre-1945 deliberations were effective in preparing the party for the challenges it would face in government.

A Question of Expediency: Britain, the United States and Thailand, 1941–42

1988 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-244
Author(s):  
Richard Aldrich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
Special Operations ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Degree Of Control ◽  
Post War

This passage was written on 27 March 1945 by Major Andrew Gilchrist, a Foreign Office official serving with the Special Operations Executive in Thailand. It neatly demonstrates the manner in which the wartime debate within and between the various Allied bureaucracies responsible for Thailand's post war status appeared to be dominated by the circumstances of Thailand's rapid capitulation to Japan in December 1941. Subsequently, diametrically opposed interpretations of these unhappy events were employed both by Britain to legitimize her wartime plans to re-establish a degree of control over Thailand, and also by the United States to justify her attempts to thwart perceived British aggrandizement in Southeast Asia. Yet despite the clear importance of the events of 1941 for Thailand's relations with the Allies, her place in the outbreak of the Pacific War is not yet fully understood.

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