The Republican Party. By William Starr Myers. (New York: The Century Co.1928. Pp. xii, 487.) - The Democratic Party. By Frank R. Kent. (New York: The Century Co.1928. Pp. xii, 568.)

1928 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 748-750
Author(s):  
Harold R. Bruce
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (105) ◽  
pp. 78-86
Author(s):  
EKATERINA A. NIKONOVA

The article deals with the analysis of the balance of opinion in the newspaper, which is originally realized through editorial and op-ed genres. We analyzed 20 articles from “The Wall Street Journal” and “The New York Times” in the genres of editorial and op-ed about events in Afghanistan in August 2021, which were interpreted differently in mass media due to the role of the White House. The findings prove that in the context of new digital reality the op-ed has lost its original function of conveying alternative positions to the ones stated in the editorial; at the same time newspapers tend to advocate the positions shared by the political parties they have historically developed close relations with: “The Wall Street Journal” - with the Republican Party, “The New York Times” - the Democratic Party.


2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 1111-1133 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICK ANDELIC

ABSTRACTThe 1970s was a decade of acute existential crisis for the Democratic party, as ‘New Politics’ insurgents challenged the old guard for control of both the party apparatus and the right to define who a true ‘liberal’ was. Those Democrats who opposed New Politics reformism often found themselves dubbed ‘neoconservatives’. The fact that so many ‘neoconservatives’ eventually made their home in the Grand Old Party (GOP) has led historians to view them as a Republican bloc in embryo. The apostasy of the neoconservatives fits neatly into the political historiography of the 1970s, which is dominated by the rise of the New Right and its takeover of the Republican party. Yet this narrative, though seductive, overlooks the essentially protean character of politics in that decade. This article uses the 1976 Senate campaign mounted by Daniel Patrick Moynihan – the dandyish Harvard academic, official in four presidential administrations, and twice US ambassador – to demonstrate that many ‘neoconservatives’ were advancing a recognizably liberal agenda and seeking to define a new ‘vital center’ against the twin poles of the New Politics and the New Right. A microcosm of a wider struggle to define liberalism, Moynihan's candidacy complicates our understanding of the 1970s as an era of rightward drift.


Author(s):  
Mark A. Lause

This chapter shows that spiritualism gained its first strong foothold in Washington and began to flourish when Martin Van Buren and kindred politicians trailed back into their Free Soil Party, leaving the antislavery insurgency to the most stalwart radical elements who reorganized as the Free Democratic Party. It explains how these political shifts brought antislavery political leaders to Washington and discusses the growth of spiritualism by 1854–1856 with the rise of sectional tensions. After highlighting the prominence of spiritualists among the Free Democrats, the chapter considers the parallel development and convergence of spiritualism and antislavery politics in New York City. It then examines how the tensions of the spring of 1853–1854 seem to have driven many more people to the spirits and how Kansas became the catalyst for a major shift in Free Democratic circles as well as politics generally. It also explores how spiritualists, particularly in the upper Midwest, made vital decisions that marked the emergence and triumph of a new Republican Party.


1997 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-380
Author(s):  
Kenneth Finegold

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Strate ◽  
Timothy Kiska ◽  
Marvin Zalman

At the November 1998 general election, Michigan citizens were given the opportunity to vote on Proposal B, an initiative that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS initiatives also have been held in Washington State, California, Oregon, and Maine, with only Oregon's passing. We use exit poll data to analyze the vote on Proposal B. Attributes associated with social liberalism—Democratic Party identification, less frequent church attendance, more education, and greater household income—led to increased odds of a “yes” vote. Attributes associated with social conservatism—Republican Party identification and frequent church attendance—led to decreased odds of a “yes” vote. Similar to the abortion issue, PAS's supporters strongly value personal autonomy, whereas its opponents strongly value the sanctity of life. Voter alignments like those in Michigan will likely appear in other states with the initiative process if PAS reaches their ballots.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 1031-1047
Author(s):  
Neil A. O’Brian

What explains the alignment of antiabortion positions within the Republican party? I explore this development among voters, activists, and elites before 1980. By 1970, antiabortion attitudes among ordinary voters correlated with conservative views on a range of noneconomic issues including civil rights, Vietnam, feminism and, by 1972, with Republican presidential vote choice. These attitudes predated the parties taking divergent abortion positions. I argue that because racial conservatives and military hawks entered the Republican coalition before abortion became politically activated, issue overlap among ordinary voters incentivized Republicans to oppose abortion rights once the issue gained salience. Likewise, because proabortion voters generally supported civil rights, once the GOP adopted a Southern strategy, this predisposed pro-choice groups to align with the Democratic party. A core argument is that preexisting public opinion enabled activist leaders to embed the anti (pro) abortion movement in a web of conservative (liberal) causes. A key finding is that the white evangelical laity’s support for conservative abortion policies preceded the political mobilization of evangelical leaders into the pro-life movement. I contend the pro-life movement’s alignment with conservatism and the Republican party was less contingent on elite bargaining, and more rooted in the mass public, than existing scholarship suggests.


Author(s):  
Sheri Berman

The decline of the centre-left over the past years is one of the most alarming trends in Western politics. During the latter part of the 20th century such parties either ran the government or led the loyal Opposition in virtually every Western democracy. Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), once the most powerful party of the left in continental Europe, currently polls in high 20s or 30s. The French Socialist Party was eviscerated in the 2017 elections, as was the Dutch Labour Party. Even the vaunted Scandinavian social democratic parties are struggling, reduced to vote shares in the 30 per cent range. The British Labour Party and the US Democrats have been protected from challengers by their country’s first-past-the-post electoral systems, but the former has recently taken a sharp turn to the hard-left under Jeremy Corbyn, while the latter, although still competitive at the national level, is a minority party at the state and local levels, where a hard-right Republican Party dominates the scene....


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