Changes in Factor Income Shares Under the Social Security Tax

1967 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Deran
1997 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Emmanuel Zelizer

Social Security has achieved a privileged status in American politics. As a result of the Social Security tax, supporters claim, recipients have not received unearned benefits, nor has Congress felt as if it were building a massive welfare state. Indeed, the Social Security tax system has legitimated the program in the minds of policy experts, politicians, and recipients. Through Social Security, the American state has forged a strong alliance with the elderly and their descendants, both with retirees who received cash payments and with working families who did not have to finance their parents' retirement years.


Author(s):  
Julian E. Zelizer

This chapter examines how Social Security finance was reconstructed in response to actions by Congress, which abolished the mandate for a large reserve and authorized the use of general revenue to pay for benefits when payroll taxes became insufficient. After describing the earmarked tax system created by Congress in 1935, the chapter considers the debate between 1939 and 1948 about the survival of the Social Security tax system and whether Social Security would be financed through the same monies as all other programs. It also looks at a cadre of policymakers, including Wilbur Mills and Robert Myers, who redesigned the earmarked tax system into the structure that defined the program until 1972. It shows that the earmarked tax system left the imprint of fiscal conservatism on Social Security by imposing certain long-term restrictions on the program.


2005 ◽  
pp. 89-99
Author(s):  
V. Osakovsky

Public discussion around social security tax reform is mostly concentrated on the size of possible rate cuts. At the same time, game-theoretic analysis shows that the existing mechanism of tax collection and calculation stimulates tax evasion. The stimulating effect is based on the mutual interest of employer and employee in tax minimization schemes, which results in establishing unofficial agreements between them and formation of the social norm of common tax evasion. The analysis also shows that the negative influence of the tax can be minimized by transfering the social security tax from employer to employee. Such transfer results in an occurrence of the conflict of interests between the parties, which under certain conditions can cause formation of the social norm of common compliance with tax legislature.


2020 ◽  
Vol 91 (6) ◽  
pp. 7-18
Author(s):  
О. Skydan ◽  
◽  
О. Nykolyuk ◽  
P. Pyvovar ◽  
P. Topolnytskyi ◽  
...  

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