The Other Samuel Johnson: A Psycho-history of Early New England

1980 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 205
Author(s):  
B. R. Burg ◽  
Peter N. Carroll
1981 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 111
Author(s):  
Bruce Tucker ◽  
Peter N. Carroll
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-59
Author(s):  
Junghyun Hwang

The Salem witch-hunt, invoking the “red hunt” analogy of the McCarthy era, has been a persistent metaphor for persecution, a symbol of fanatic excess in policing the community boundaries. In American cultural history, however, Salem is regarded American only insofar as it proves un-American—as an exception to American exceptionalism. In particular, Tituba, the only non-white “witch” of the trials to whom the unleashing of the hysteria itself has often been attributed, embodies what is negated in Salem against which Americanness is to be affirmed. Maryse Condé’s 1986 novel, I, Tituba, Black Witch of Salem recuperates Tituba from this darkness not only to reconfigure American identity but ultimately to reconsider human subjectivity. In Condé’s Salem, New England Puritanism showcases the primal scene of American identity formation, in which the personal, national, and religious subjectivities are fused to form the American self as the autonomous self-possessed individual. Tituba, in contrast, exemplifies an alternative subjectivity as an embodied being constituted in relation to others. Similar to Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical subject, Condé’s Tituba highlights the primacy of the other in the formation of the human subject, ultimately rupturing the totality of history with a counter-history of silenced voices or the infinity of the other.


1980 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 911
Author(s):  
Howard M. Feinstein ◽  
Peter N. Carroll
Keyword(s):  

1981 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 553
Author(s):  
Donald M. Scott ◽  
Peter N. Carroll ◽  
Robert Mapes Anderson
Keyword(s):  

1979 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 275
Author(s):  
Darryl Hattenhauer ◽  
Peter N. Carroll
Keyword(s):  

1981 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 527
Author(s):  
Cedric B. Cowing ◽  
Peter N. Carroll
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Colby Dickinson

In his somewhat controversial book Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben makes brief reference to Theodor Adorno’s apparently contradictory remarks on perceptions of death post-Auschwitz, positions that Adorno had taken concerning Nazi genocidal actions that had seemed also to reflect something horribly errant in the history of thought itself. There was within such murderous acts, he had claimed, a particular degradation of death itself, a perpetration of our humanity bound in some way to affect our perception of reason itself. The contradictions regarding Auschwitz that Agamben senses to be latent within Adorno’s remarks involve the intuition ‘on the one hand, of having realized the unconditional triumph of death against life; on the other, of having degraded and debased death. Neither of these charges – perhaps like every charge, which is always a genuinely legal gesture – succeed in exhausting Auschwitz’s offense, in defining its case in point’ (RA 81). And this is the stance that Agamben wishes to hammer home quite emphatically vis-à-vis Adorno’s limitations, ones that, I would only add, seem to linger within Agamben’s own formulations in ways that he has still not come to reckon with entirely: ‘This oscillation’, he affirms, ‘betrays reason’s incapacity to identify the specific crime of Auschwitz with certainty’ (RA 81).


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kas Saghafi

In several late texts, Derrida meditated on Paul Celan's poem ‘Grosse, Glühende Wölbung’, in which the departure of the world is announced. Delving into the ‘origin’ and ‘history’ of the ‘conception’ of the world, this paper suggests that, for Derrida, the end of the world is determined by and from death—the death of the other. The death of the other marks, each and every time, the absolute end of the world.


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