Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras

1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mark Ruhl
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Considerable Body

During the last two decades, military rulers have been replaced by democratically elected civilian governments throughout Latin America. Nevertheless, scholars (Mainwaring et al., 1992:3,8) contend that nearly all contemporary Latin American polities remain unconsolidated democratic regimes principally because civilian control over the armed forces has not yet been established. Although the armed forces have returned to their barracks, they have retained considerable political and institutional autonomy. A number of scholars (Loveman, 1994; Agüero, 1992; and others) emphasize that most Latin American constitutions still recognize the military's right to intervene when the constitutional order is threatened. The armed forces are also generally granted broad jurisdiction over internal security, as well as the freedom to organize their institution without civilian interference. There is a considerable body of opinion which maintains that fears of military intervention continue to constrain the behavior of civilian politicians and social groups (Valenzuela, 1992; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Rouquié, 1986; and Rial, 1990).

Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers By Wendy Hunter. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 243p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-243
Author(s):  
Craig Arceneaux
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Theoretical Orientation ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Latin American Politics ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Chapel Hill ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Military Relations

Writing at a time when the literature on transitions to democracy was fixated on the mode of transition, and when concepts such as authoritarian legacy, authoritarian enclave, or the shadow of the past dominated, Wendy Hunter's 1997 book, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, went against the grain. In a direct attack on institutionalist approaches that emphasized the resiliency of military prerogatives in transitions from military regimes, Hunter argues that democracy itself would, over time, reduce the influence exerted by the armed forces. A solid theoretical orientation, rich casework, and insightful commentary on the dynamics behind the creation of civilian control all mark the book as a noteworthy contribution to the literature on democratic transitions, civil–military relations, and Latin American politics.

Civil–Military Relations and Russia’s Post-Soviet Military Culture: A Belief System Analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110629
Author(s):  
Kirill Shamiev
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
System Analysis ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Culture ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This article studies the role of military culture in defense policymaking. It focuses on Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations and military reform attempts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s armed forces were in a state of despair. Despite having relative institutional autonomy, the military neither made itself more effective before minister Serdyukov nor tried to overthrow the government. The paper uses the advocacy coalition framework’s belief system approach to analyze data from military memoirs, parliamentary speeches, and 15 interviews. The research shows that the military’s support for institutional autonomy, combined with its elites’ self-serving bias, critically contributed to what I term an “imperfect equilibrium” in Russian civil–military relations: the military could not reform itself and fought back against radical, though necessary, changes imposed by civilian leadership.

scholarly journals The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

normally only gradually, and this situation is not universally the case. There is growing understanding of the need for security arrangements which underpin the economic and political co-operation whose value is so clear to most decision-makers. Those who wish to see greater co-operation from the Latin American states in the non-proliferation and arms control fields should attempt to understand these phenomena and make a greater effort to bring the Latin Americans along. The North can help a great deal in educating key members of the civilian elites in these countries about defence matters. This would go a long way to easing some of the issues of civil-military relations mentioned. Showing more transparency ourselves in the working of arms control groupings can help to reduce concerns in these countries about their ability to resist excessive northern pressures if they accept the objectives sought by those countries in such groups. Working with nascent but interested elements of civil society, from universities and research centres for example can help to build the constituency for these objectives in key countries. And efforts to show the military that collaboration does not necessarily mean the end of a legitimate degree of armed forces influence in the security area and more widely in foreign policy, and that arms control does not necessarily imply ruin for them and their families, need to be made and indeed should be more closely studied in order to address these real concerns. There is thus a good deal which can be done. But culture remains formative and vital to states and individuals. These societies are the result of a lived historic experience and only an understanding of the very real security concerns they have will allow us to obtain more support from them in security fields which are, as in the past, still offering great challenges globally and regionally.

2012 ◽  
pp. 193-196
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The North ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Research Centres

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-282
Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
The Face ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julián González Guyer ◽  
Nicole Jenne
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Test ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Policy Management ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.

Military Government in Latin America, 1959–1990

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian E. Loveman
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Military Government ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Latin America’s armed forces have played a central role in the region’s political history. This selective annotated bibliography focuses on key sources, with varying theoretical, empirical, and normative treatments of the military governments in the region, from the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990). The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. No pretense is made of comprehensiveness or of treating the “causes” of military coups (a vast literature) and of civil-military relations under civilian governments. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, 1968–1989; Honduras, 1963–1966 and 1972–1982; Chile, 1973–1990; and Uruguay, 1973–1984. In El Salvador the military dominated the government from 1948 until 1984, but the last “episode” was from 1979 to 1984. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. They had staunch supporters and intense opponents, and they were usually subject to internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.

Growing Participation in Peace Operations and Conflict Resolution in Latin American Countries

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Michael Kenkel
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
American States ◽  
The Right ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Latin American Countries

Latin American states have become major providers of troops for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since the early 2000s. MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti), the UN mission in Haiti, 55% of whose troops were from the region, was a major watershed for local security cooperation and PKO contributions. Led by Brazil, these states were able to develop a specific approach to peacebuilding that reflects regional strengths and experiences, rooted in minimizing the use of force and bringing successful domestic development policies to bear abroad. This approach also reflects the common security and intervention culture that underpins policy in the region. Two states in particular have taken on a role as major providers of peacekeeping contingents. Tiny Uruguay, with a population of 3 million people, has maintained over 2,000 troops deployed on UN PKOs (more than 10% of its armed forces) since 2005. While Uruguay’s motivations are mostly economic—UN reimbursements exceed the country’s costs—Brazil’s ascendance as a major peacekeeping provider during MINUSTAH was part of a larger emerging-power foreign policy project. Participating in peacebuilding allowed the country to provide security through actions in the development realm, bridging a key gap in many rising states’ capabilities, and to mount an incipient challenge to the Western-led peacebuilding paradigm. The remaining states of Latin America show considerable diversity in their peacekeeping engagement, with many others sending small or token contributions and some no troops at all. Latin American states’ involvement in PKOs cannot be understood without looking at their interaction with patterns of civil–military relations in the region. In the case of such states, the effect of peacekeeping participation on civil–military relations, while a key point in need of monitoring, has not been decisive, as other factors prevail. Finally, PKOs have served as the locus for a significant increase in policy coordination and cooperation in the defense arena in the region. As the UN moves toward stabilization operations which privilege counterterrorism measures over the peacebuilding paradigm that is a strength of Latin American countries, PKOs may lose attractiveness as a foreign policy avenue in the region. Additionally, the swing to the right in recent elections may serve to reduce the appeal of a practice which came to the fore under previous left-wing governments.

ZMANJŠEVANJE TVEGANJ ZA NASTANEK CIVILNO-VOJAŠKIH KONFLIKTOV

2018 ◽  
pp. 27-45
Author(s):  
BRANIMIR FURLAN
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Leadership ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Military Relations

Povzetek Za sodobne demokratične civilno-vojaške odnose je značilna vključenost vojaških voditeljev v procese kreiranja politik o vprašanjih nacionalne varnosti in uporabe oboroženih sil. Pri oblikovanju obrambnih ali varnostnih interesov, ciljev in strategij se prepletata civilna in vojaška domena. Zaradi različnih pogledov na nacionalno varnost in obrambo ter z njima povezano vlogo vojske prihaja v civilno-vojaških odnosih do trenj, ki večinoma pomagajo pri sprejemanju dobrih odločitev in oblikovanju kakovostnih varnostnih ali obrambnih strategij. Trenja lahko prerastejo v civilno-vojaški konflikt in vodijo v destabilizacijo civilno-vojaških odnosov. Avtor na podlagi teoretičnih spoznanj o civilno-vojaških odnosih ter študije primera prakse tujih civilno-vojaških odnosov opisuje okoliščine, ki vodijo v civilno-vojaški konflikt. Pri tem predstavi nekatere negativne učinke uveljavljanja mehanizmov civilnega nadzora in pozitivne ter negativne zglede odzivanja ob nesoglasju med udeležencema civilno-vojaškega dialoga. Za zmanjšanje tveganja za nastanek konfliktov ter s tem ohranjanje stabilnih civilno-vojaških odnosov izpostavlja med drugim potrebo po zavedanju vojaških voditeljev o prevladujoči vlogi civilnih voditeljev v razpravah, v katerih prihaja do nesoglasij, ter potrebo po preudarni uporabi mehanizmov civilnega nadzora izvajalcev nadzora. Ključne besede: civilni nadzor, civilno-vojaški konflikti, civilno-vojaška trenja Abstract Modern and democratic civil-military relations are characterized by equal involvement of senior military leadership into processes for the creation of politics associated with questions on national security and use of armed forces. Civilian and military domains overlap in the process of defining defence and security interests, goals and strategies. Due to different perspectives on national security and defence, and the related role of the armed forces, civil-military tensions are logical consequence of this process. In most cases, tensions support effective decision making and creation of good security or defence strategies. At certain point, tensions may lead to civil-military conflicts and lead to the destabilization of civil-military relations. Using different theories of civil-military relations and foreign case studies, the author describes circumstances that lead to civil-military conflicts. He describes certain negative effects of implementing civilian control mechanisms, as well as good and bad examples of how both actors in civil-military debate respond to tensions. In order to reduce risks for the development of conflicts and consequently assure the stabilization of civil-military relations, the author highlights, among others, a need for the military leadership to be aware of the supremacy of civilian authorities in debates where consent does not exist, and a need for prudent use of control mechanisms by the civilian authorities. Key words: civilian control, civil-military conflicts, civil-military tensions

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