The United States as Caudillo

1963 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman A. Bailey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cuban Missile Crisis ◽  
Concerted Action ◽  
San Jose ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
American States ◽  
Foreign Ministers ◽  
International Behavior

Latin-American international behavior has always seemed puzzling to the policy-makers of Washington, but perhaps never quite as incomprehensible as in connection with the recent Cuban missile crisis. On various occasions, notably during the San José and Punta del Este Foreign Ministers’ Conferences, the United States had attempted to obtain some concerted action against the aggresive and subversive activities of a Communist-dominated Cuba. The response of the Latin-American nations ranged from lukewarm to frigid, and the maximum that the U. S. was able to obtain (and that by a bare two-thirds vote) in the way of anti-Cuban action, was the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States, a step which one must assume was greeted by the Cuban leaders with something less than total consternation.

scholarly journals The “Cuban Question” and the Cold War in Latin America, 1959–1964

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-151
Author(s):  
Tanya Harmer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cuban Revolution ◽  
Cuban Missile Crisis ◽  
American System ◽  
American States ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Insight Into

This article explains how Latin American governments responded to the Cuban revolution and how the “Cuban question” played out in the inter-American system in the first five years of Fidel Castro's regime, from 1959 to 1964, when the Organization of American States imposed sanctions against the island. Drawing on recently declassified sources from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and the United States, the article complicates U.S.-centric accounts of the inter-American system. It also adds to our understanding of how the Cold War was perceived within the region. The article makes clear that U.S. policymakers were not the only ones who feared Castro's triumph, the prospect of greater Soviet intervention, and the Cuban missile crisis. By seeking to understand why local states opposed Castro's ascendance and what they wanted to do to counter his regime, the account here offers new insight into the Cuban revolution's international impact and allows us to evaluate U.S. influence in the region during key years of the Cold War.

U.S. Influence in the Organization of American States

1975 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Meek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Latin American ◽  
New York Times ◽  
The United States ◽  
Organization Of American States ◽  
American States ◽  
Pro Forma

Literature on U.S. influence in the Organization of American States reveals a marked diversity of views. Some authors consider that U.S. influence is absolute or very nearly so; others hold that it is relative; still others think it is minimal.In the nearly-absolute school, former Guatemalan President Arévalo (1961: 126) says that the United States “always wins” in the OAS. The Ecuadorian writer Benjamín Cardón (1965: 29) says that the OAS “receives orders and complies with them, with the appearance of discussion, and the appearance of votes that satisfy pro-forma the hypocritical quakerism of the masters.” This view might be summed up by a comment attributed to a Latin American delegate to one Inter-American Conference: “If the United States wanted to badly enough, it could have a resolution passed declaring two and two are five ” (New York Times, March 8, 1954).

scholarly journals America's Immigration Policy Fiasco: Learning from Past Mistakes

Daedalus ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 142 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas S. Massey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Undocumented Migration ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
North American Market ◽  
Policy Challenge ◽  
Latin American Immigration ◽  
Critical Policy ◽  
Immigration Management

In this essay I discuss how and why U.S. policies intended to stop Latin American immigration to the United States not only failed, but proved counterproductive by ultimately accelerating the rate of both documented and undocumented migration from Mexico and Central America to the United States. As a result, the Latino population grew much faster than demographers had originally projected and the undocumented population grew to an unprecedented size. Mass illegality is now the greatest barrier to the successful integration of Latinos, and a pathway to legalization represents a critical policy challenge. If U.S. policy-makers wish to avoid the failures of the past, they must shift from a goal of immigration suppression to one of immigration management within an increasingly integrated North American market.

Latin America and the United Nations

1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 714-727
Author(s):  
Bryce Wood ◽  
Minerva Morales M.
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
League Of Nations ◽  
Latin Americans ◽  
American States ◽  
International Bureaucracy ◽  
The Caribbean

When the governments of the Latin American states were taking part in the negotiations leading to the founding of the UN, they could hardly have done so with nostalgic memories of the League of Nations. The League had provided no protection to the Caribbean countries from interventions by the United States, and, largely because of United States protests, it did not consider the Tacna-Arica and Costa Rica-Panama disputes in the early 1920's. Furthermore, Mexico had not been invited to join; Brazil withdrew in 1926; and Argentina and Peru took little part in League affairs. The organization was regarded as being run mainly for the benefit of European states with the aid of what Latin Americans called an “international bureaucracy,” in which citizens from the southern hemisphere played minor roles. The United States was, of course, not a member, and both the reference to the Monroe Doctrine by name in Article 21 of the Covenant and the organization's practice of shunning any attempt to interfere in inter-American affairs against the wishes of the United States made the League in its first decade a remote and inefficacious institution to countries that were seriously concerned about domination by Washington.

An Early Diplomatic Controversy between the United States and Brazil

1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-311
Author(s):  
William R. Manning
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Spanish American ◽  
The North ◽  
Constituent Assembly ◽  
American States ◽  
The Government ◽  
Separatist Movement

It was two years after the United States formally declared for the recognition of the new Latin-American states and after several Spanish-American states had been recognized before the question of recognizing Brazil arose. When, in April, 1824, Rebello presented himself in Washington as the Brazilian chargé, a difference of opinion arose in Monroe’s cabinet, because Brazil was a monarchy, while all of the other American governments were republics, and some hoped that monarchy might have no foothold on the continent. Others, however, advocated the recognition of Brazil the more strongly because it was a monarchy in order to show the world that it was the fact of independence which actuated the United States rather than the form of government.The opposition to recognition was strengthened by recent news of a formidable separatist movement in the north, with Pernambuco as a center, the purpose of which was to establish an independent republic under the name of the Federation of the Equator. This; raised a serious doubt whether the government at Rio de Janeiro were really in effective control. It was reported, too, that the assistance of French naval vessels had been accepted in order to repress the Pernambuco revolt. This conjured up the specter of the so-called Holy Alliance, for the exclusion of which from America Monroe’s famous message of the preceding December had declared. There was also a strong suspicion, supported by persistent rumors, that Dom Pedro (who had allowed himself to be made Emperor when in 1822 Brazilian independence from Portugal was declared, who had summoned a constituent assembly and then quarreled with it and finally forcibly dismissed it because it proved too liberal to suit his ideas of prerogative, and who had appointed a council that had drawn up a fairly liberal constitution in harmony with his wishes which he had not yet taken the oath to observe) really wished to restore Portuguese sovereignty and rule Brazil as a vassal of his father, the King of Portugal. About the middle of May, however, word came that in the preceding March the Emperor had taken the oath to the constitution of the independent Brazilian Empire. After Rebello had given assurances concerning the suppression of the slave trade and the observance of treaties that had been negotiated with Portugal, he was formally received by President Monroe as Brazilian chargé on May 26, 1824. He expressed his gratitude that “the Government of the United States has been the first to acknowledge the independence of Brazil.”

The Coup d'Etat in Bolivia: Internal and External Factors

2021 ◽  
pp. 131-142
Author(s):  
Konstantin S. Strigunov ◽  
◽  
Andrei V. Manoilo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Organization Of American States ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
American States

The aim of the article is to reveal the mechanism of the coup d'etat in Bolivia in November 2019. Based on the research of Russian and foreign experts, as well as official documents of international organizations, a research center, speeches by world leaders, and the media, the authors analyze the internal causes and external factors that contributed to the overthrow of Evo Morales and the coming to power of the right opposition, oriented to the United States and supranational structures. The methods for the research were selected based on the requirements of a multilateral and systematic analysis of the domestic political situation in Bolivia, its cultural, historical, territorial, and economic characteristics, as well as foreign policy factors that influenced the situation in the country. A comparative analysis of the coup d'etat in Bolivia with the situation in some other Latin American states was done. The first section analyzes the domestic political situation in Bolivia, economic factors, and a number of actions by Evo Morales which led to the weakening of his position on the eve of the presidential election. The second section discusses the mechanism of influence of the Organization of American States on the election process in Bolivia. The influence of neo-fascist organizations, which receive external support and financing and became the main shock force of the coup d'etat, is investigated. The channels of influence of international players and organizations on the internal political processes of Bolivia are studied. The authors infer that the ousted president did not solve the task of creating and implementing a development project for all social and ethnic groups of Bolivia while maintaining their own support and state sovereignty. In addition, the authors give a critical assessment to the decision of the Bolivian leadership led by Evo Morales to entrust election monitoring exclusively to the Organization of American States where the US position dominates. The authors suggest that, for political support, in the monitoring of the election, Evo Morales should have involved representatives of states and organizations not controlled by Washington, for example, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For the first time, the authors reveal and thoroughly study the trigger mechanism for activating a coup d'etat using technologies for dismantling political regimes adapted to Bolivian conditions. They conclude that, in fact, counteraction to left-wing political regimes by the United States in Latin America is de facto a continuation of the formally completed Operation Condor, but using modern technologies to eliminate the unwanted regime in a particular country in new geopolitical conditions.

Organization of American States

1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-688 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Costa Rica ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
San Jose ◽  
Organization Of American States ◽  
American System ◽  
American States ◽  
Foreign Ministers

A conference of the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS) opened in San José, Costa Rica, on August 16, 1960, to discuss an agenda reportedly headed by the following items: 1) “strengthening of continental solidarity and of the inter-American system, especially before the threats of extracontinental intervention”; and 2) “inter-American cooperation … for the defense of American democratic institutions against subversive activities of any organization, government, or its agents, directed against these institutions.” The Council had rejected a Cuban substitute agenda centering on charges of United States aggression against Cuba.

The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 2)

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Hershberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cuban Missile Crisis ◽  
Fidel Castro ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Prestige

Though virtually ignored in the historiography, Brazil played an intriguing role in the politics and diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis and in U.S. Cuban relations during the Kennedy administration. In the years after Fidel Castro took power, successive Brazilian governments tried secretly to mediate between Washington and Havana as their mutual confrontation intensified. Newly available U.S., Brazilian, Cuban, and other sources reveal that this role climaxed during the missile crisis, as John F. Kennedy clandestinely sought to employ Brazil to transmit a message to Castro. In turn, Brazil, which was also promoting a Latin American denuclearization scheme at the United Nations as a possible means of resolving the crisis, sought to broker a formula for U.S. Cuban reconciliation that would heighten the prestige of its own “independent”policy in the Cold War. Ultimately, these efforts failed, but they shed light on previously hidden aspects of both the missile crisis and the triangular U.S. Cuban-Brazilian relationship. This is the concluding part of a two-part article.

The Proposed Termination of the Iraq Mandate

1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quincy Wright
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Africa ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Predominantly White ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
League Of Nations ◽  
Great Power ◽  
American States ◽  
Form Part

The announcement on November 4, 1929, that Great Britain intended to recommend Iraq for admission to membership in the League of Nations in 1932 has presented some interesting constitutional questions to the Permanent Mandates Commission, as well as the unusual spectacle of a great Power seeking to convince a skeptical outside body that its dependency is ripe for independence. Heretofore, dependencies that wanted independence have usually had to fight for it, as did the United States, the Latin American States, Belgium, and the various successors to the Ottoman, Romanoff and Hapsburg Empires. It is true, Colombia and Panama, Sweden and Norway, Denmark and Iceland have separated without war but with some heartburnings. British statesmen experienced in the loss of colonies by violence, talked freely in the mid-nineteenth century of the natural destiny of colonies to drop from the mother tree when ripe, and in the twentieth century they have acquiesced in a status of virtual independence for the dominions, soon to include India. They have rationalized this “ climbing process” as one “ common to all the communities which form part of the Empire. Each of them, whether the population is predominantly white or predominantly colored, is gradually, as it develops in strength and capacity, passing upward from the stage in which the community is wholly subject to control exercised from London to that in which the measure of control diminishes, and so on to that in which the control has ceased entirely.”But this was after the event. Before it, history records military episodes in Ireland, India, South Africa, and even Canada.

Subordinate-State Agency and US Hegemony: Colombian Consent versus Bolivian Dissent

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quintijn B Kat
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Agency ◽  
Design Phase ◽  
Plan Colombia ◽  
American States ◽  
Us Hegemony

Abstract The strategies of subordinate states in hegemonic or asymmetrical relations have been widely studied by international relations scholars. Such works generally focus on how a subordinate state can influence the hegemon's behavior so as to address and further the interests of the subordinate state. The relation between subordinate-state agency and the hegemonic system, the makeup of the hegemonic order, itself receives less attention. Through analysis of two cases of US hegemony in Latin America, this article examines how subordinate-state agency may strengthen or weaken the hegemonic system and, as such, makes a case for subordinate-state agency as an underpinning element of hegemony. It explores Colombian agency in the design phase of Plan Colombia as contributing to US hegemony, while Bolivian agency under the presidency of Evo Morales is examined as a challenge. In both instances, it was the United States, rather than the Latin American states, that took on a passive role, leaving the initiative with Colombia and Bolivia. Therefore, instead of reaffirmations of active one-way US hegemony versus passive subordinate states, the paper proposes to understand both cases as demonstrating the importance of subordinate-state agency in the configuration of the hegemonic system.

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