scholarly journals The Wheeling Bridge Exception: Reopening Executory Judgments of Article III Courts

2000 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 547
Author(s):  
Heather L. Nevin
Keyword(s):  
Article Iii Courts

Cases Without Controversies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Pfander
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Antebellum America ◽  
Article Iii Courts ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Over Time

Cases Without Controversies: Uncontested Adjudication in Article III Courts offers a new account of the power of federal courts in the United States to hear and determine uncontested applications to assert or register a claim of right. Familiar to lawyers in civil law countries as forms of voluntary or non-contentious jurisdiction, these uncontested applications fit uneasily with the commitment to adversary legalism in the United States. Indeed, modern accounts of federal judicial power often urge that the language of Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of concrete disputes between adverse parties and rules out all forms of non-contentious jurisdiction. Said to rest on the so-called “case-or-controversy” requirement of Article III, this requirement of party contestation threatens the power of federal courts to conduct a range of familiar proceedings, such as the oversight of bankruptcy proceedings, the issuance of warrants, and the adjudication of applications for mandamus and habeas corpus relief. By recounting the tradition of naturalization and other uncontested litigation in antebellum America and coupling that tradition with an account of the important difference between cases and controversies, this book challenges the prevailing understanding of Article III. In addition to defending the power of federal courts to hear uncontested matters of federal law, this book examines the way the Constitution’s meaning has changed over time and suggests an interpretive methodology that would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to take account of the old and the new in defining the contours of federal judicial power.

The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Closing the Gap

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 446-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J. Yost ◽  
Douglas S. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Active Duty ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
Closing The Gap ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Federal Jurisdiction ◽  
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction ◽  
Article Iii Courts ◽  
The Military

On November 22, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, closing a jurisdictional gap that had concerned the military since the 1950s. The new law establishes federal jurisdiction for crimes committed by civilians who accompany military forces outside the United States, as well as crimes by former members of the military who leave active duty before being prosecuted by courts-martial. Jurisdiction to prosecute under the new statute, however, is granted only to U.S. Article III courts and not to courts-martial.

scholarly journals How Much Democracy is too Much Democracy?

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-27
Author(s):  
Mary Kathleen Dryer
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Minority Groups ◽  
State Level ◽  
The State ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Executive Selection ◽  
Article Iii Courts ◽  
Federal Judges ◽  
Danger To Others

Despite their widespread use, many rightfully question the prudence of using popular elections to fill state courts. A key difference between federal and state courts is that while federal judges are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the majority of jurists at the state level are elected. The reason federal judges, at least judges on the Article III courts, are made by executive selection is the same reason that Supreme Court justices are given life tenure: to insulate them from the whims of public opinion. In this passage, Hamilton articulates the fundamental paradox of democracy, a question that genuine republics have always grappled with: how can we control for the “tyranny of the majority?” In other words, how can we entrust people with the power to govern themselves but also prevent them from stripping away the rights of minority groups or from posing a danger to others?

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