Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights

1961 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 583
Author(s):  
Wallace Mendelson ◽  
Charles L. Black
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

Ten Death and Transfiguration: How the Ninth Amendment Got Filed in the Wrong Place

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lash Kurt T
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Ninth Amendment ◽  
Wrong Place

This chapter discusses how the transfigured Ninth Amendment, although used in support of a broad conception of individual freedom, has become a far smaller provision than that envisioned by its framers and has been rendered altogether unenforceable as an independent provision in the Bill of Rights. It describes how the Ninth Amendment has played an important role in matters involving the Supreme Court of the United States.

Afterword

2019 ◽  
pp. 201-210
Author(s):  
Jeff Broadwater
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
National Authority ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
National Bank ◽  
Internal Improvements ◽  
Louisiana Purchase ◽  
Federal Statute

The afterword deals briefly with constitutional issues Jefferson and Madison faced after the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted. These included questions involving the need for Senate approval of the removal of an executive official whose appointment required Senate confirmation; Congress’s authority to charter a national bank, enact a protective tariff, or subsidize internal improvements; the allocation between Congress and the president of power over foreign policy; the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts; and the president's authority to execute the Louisiana Purchase. The afterword concludes that during the ratification debate, Madison had represented the Constitution as creating a government of limited and carefully enumerated powers, and that he generally honored those representations. Madison, however, advocated states’ rights less aggressively and less consistently than did Jefferson, and unlike Jefferson, was willing to defer to the Supreme Court in resolving conflicts between state and national authority. In fact, after Jeffeson died in 1826, Madison spent much of the rest of his life combating the nullification theory espoused by John C. Calhoun, who claimed a state could lawfully nullity a federal statute.

Cross-fertilisation of Constitutional Ideas

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk

This chapter discusses the New Zealand courts' jurisprudence in regard to the interpretative provisions — sections 4, 5, and 6 — of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It not only gives an overview of the relevant New Zealand case law but also compares the courts' approaches to those of their UK counterparts, in particular the UK Supreme Court (formerly, the House of Lords) in regard to section 3 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998. It is argued that the perceived difference in the approaches can be explained by different contexts rather than different methodology. The chapter thereby questions the view held in New Zealand that the UK courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are more activist than the New Zealand courts.

Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.

Francis Karioko Muruatetu v. Republic

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-713
Author(s):  
Jacquelene Mwangi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Death Sentence ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Trial Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Mandated

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya (Court) in Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v. Republic (Muruatetu), finding the mandatory nature of the death penalty unconstitutional, represents not only a victory for human rights in Africa but also the transformative capacity of contemporary constitutions in Africa and the growing assertiveness of African judiciaries. In the judgment, the Court held that the mandatory death penalty is “out of sync with the progressive Bill of Rights” in Kenya's 2010 Constitution (para. 64) and an affront to the rule of law. The Court also relied on global death penalty jurisprudence to find the mandatory death sentence “harsh, unjust and unfair” (para. 48). Consequently, the Court mandated that all trial courts conduct a pre-sentencing hearing to determine whether the death penalty is deserved. The Court's judgment could spell the end of the mandatory death penalty in Kenya after almost 120 years on the statute books.

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