The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt

1965 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 120
Keyword(s):  
Coercive Function

scholarly journals The Coercive Function of Early Medieval English Art

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (137) ◽  
pp. 34-53
Author(s):  
Luke A. Fidler
Keyword(s):  
Community Policing ◽  
Coercive Power ◽  
Early Medieval ◽  
The Public ◽  
Strong State ◽  
Coercive Function

Abstract This article examines the spectacular representation of confinement in early medieval English sculpture in the context of poems, sermons, and translations. By identifying a series of features that early medieval spectators would have paid special attention to, it shows that sculptors used imprisoned and fugitive figures to craft a discourse about power in the absence of both a strong state and a regime of punitive incarceration. Compelling pictures of prisoners and verbal images of captivity flourished as a kind of carceral imaginary in the public landscape before the carceral state’s rise, as well as licensing forms of community policing in which early medieval subjects were required to participate. As such, these sculptures model a relationship between art and coercive power predicated on historically specific expectations about sculpture’s capacity to instruct and surveil.

Strangers in the Village? Colonial policing in rural Bengal, 1861 to 1892

2015 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 1378-1404 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIN M. GIULIANI
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Colonial State ◽  
Police Administration ◽  
Official Discourse ◽  
Design And Implementation ◽  
Rural Police ◽  
Coercive Function ◽  
Colonial Police ◽  
The Village

AbstractThe chief concern of this article is the organization and administration of rural policing in colonial Bengal during the last 40 years of the nineteenth century. It connects its design and implementation with the consolidation of India's colonial police force, while highlighting the ongoing negotiations made by the Bengal police in a wider colonial model. The article argues that the police administration of rural Bengal was shaped initially by the ordinary constraints of the colonial state which underpinned the design of the Indian police—namely its frugality and preference for collaborating with local intermediaries, a manifestation of salutary neglect. Yet, it highlights the role of Bengal's largely British police executive in renegotiating customs of governance and, ultimately, as an established model of policing in India. The article focuses, therefore, on ongoing and at times informal police reforms which were based upon notions contradictory to an official discourse about policing in India. This article thus contextualizes the development of rural police administration in Bengal in a strong tradition of police-led reform in the province. In so doing, the article redresses a traditional historiographical focus on the political origins and coercive function of the police, and problematizes current research which situates Indian policing within customs of British governance in the subcontinent.

STATE-LEGAL COMPULSION IN THE CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL REGIMES

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serhii Oleinykov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Legal Requirements ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Legal Coercion ◽  
State Coercion ◽  
Legal Forms ◽  
Coercive Function

State coercion analyzed based on the legal nature and legal restrictions of state power. The coercive function of power has a legal dimension - legal foundations and forms, reflected in the concept of state-legal coercion. Sociology reflects the process of adapting its content to the specifics of political regimes – traditional and modernizing, in which the compulsory function of the stage of democratic transition does not exclude compulsory arbitrariness. Metamorphoses of the political regime acquire hybrid forms, mimicry, the apparent legitimacy of democratic forms and institutions, when coercive power measures actually turn out to be both conditioned by legal imperatives and unlawful - a trivial power arbitrariness that ignores both legal requirements and institutions of public opinion, public control and etc. The traditional perception of coercion generated by the archaic mental traditions of etatism. The legal conditionality of state coercion determines its legitimacy, public recognition, as a necessary tool for the protection, protection, implementation and restoration of violated human and civil rights and freedoms. The modern understanding of state coercion, as a legal category, defines it as a public-power activity, the types and extent of which determined by legal principles and norms. Аnd its organization (institutions, powers, legal resources) is carried out in the legal forms provided for by law, containing a system of requirements for subjects state and legal coercion in a democratic regime. The legal requirements also include ethical standards – international legal and national legal, which implemented in modern ethical codes of conduct for civil servants.

The Existence and Uniquence of the Solution for the Newtonian Equation

2010 ◽  
Vol 426-427 ◽  
pp. 334-338
Author(s):  
Yan Qing Feng ◽  
Z.H. Shen
Keyword(s):  
Periodic Solution ◽  
Basin Of Attraction ◽  
Equation Of Motion ◽  
Newtonian Equation ◽  
Coercive Function ◽  
The Basin Of Attraction

In this paper，the methods of the basin of attraction and the nonnegative coercive function are used to discuss the existence and uniquence of the periodic solution to the Newtonian equation of motion. Some Theorem is proved and the main results are generalized and discussed in this papers．

Strategic Violence Among Religious Parties in Pakistan

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niloufer Siddiqui
Keyword(s):  
Minority Groups ◽  
The State ◽  
Student Groups ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
University Campuses ◽  
Western Influence ◽  
Religious Law ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
The Government ◽  
Coercive Function

Islamist parties in Pakistan are theologically diverse but grouped as such because of their belief in the state enforcement of religious law (shariah). While they have only achieved modest levels of electoral success, the country’s Islamist parties are considered important due to their ability to mobilize street power, lobby the state and judiciary from outside of parliament, and serve as key electoral allies of mainstream parties. In addition, these Islamist electoral groups employ a range of violence strategies. Many of these parties maintain militant wings, possess linkages with extremist Islamist outfits, and/or engage in violent politics on university campuses through their affiliated student groups. Existing literature suggests that violence by political parties has certain electoral benefits. First, it serves a coercive function, by intimidating voters to stay home on election day or compelling them to vote a certain way. Second, it can serve to polarize the populace along identity-based lines. However, given the limited success of Islamist parties in elections, it seems unlikely that their involvement in violence serves only an electoral purpose. In particular, much of the parties’ violent activity seems, at least at first glance, unrelated to electoral activity. Why, then, do Islamist parties utilize violence? Violence wielded by Islamist parties in Pakistan serves three functions. First, Islamist electoral groups are able to leverage their unique position as a part of the system with close linkages to militant actors outside of it to effectively pressure the state on a range of policy matters. That is, violence works to advance the party’s strategic goal of lobbying the government from outside of the legislative system. Second, the use of violence serves an ideological function by, for example, targeting specific sects and minority groups, fighting Western influence, and supporting the liberation struggle in Kashmir. The use of violence also helps prove to ideologically aligned militant actors that the parties are on “their side.” Finally, the use of violence can also serve purely electoral purposes. Like other identity-based parties, making salient a particular schism at opportune times can work to increase one’s own vote bank at the expense of other secular parties.

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