Constitutional Law. Definition of Phrase "Prima Facie Evidence". Disorderly Conduct Statutes

1934 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 637
Author(s):  
Harold Alfred Lipton
Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-127
Author(s):  
Dmitry Shustrov

The idea of supra-constitutionality was formulated in the science of constitutional law in the second quarter of the 20th century and associated with the names of M.Hauriou and K.Schmitt, who for the first time noticed the possibility of the existence of norms that are higher than the constitution. This article is an attempt to give the doctrine of supra-constitutionality an actual theoretical and dogmatic meaning in the context of the study of the material limits of constitutional changes. The doctrine of supra-constitutionality claims to play an important role in explaining that unchangeable norms can exist in constitutional law and that they cannot be excluded, changed, limited, overcome, affected by the other sources of constitutional law, including the constitution itself. Supra-constitutionality is viewed as a characteristic of unchangeable constitutional norms that constitute the material limits of constitutional changes. Supra-constitutionality presupposes the existence of norms that surpass the rest of the constitutional norms and predetermine their content through the definition of what can, should and should not be included in the constitution or excluded from it. The basis of constitutional supra-constitutionality is the argument of hierarchical differentiation. In addition to recognizing unchangeable constitutional norms as supra-constitutional, the article raises the question of the existence of natural law and international law supra-constitutional norms. Natural law supra-constitutional norms have an external and non-positive character. They are not enshrined in the constitution, but stem from a reasonably understood concept of what is due in the most civilized societies, which is determined by the constitutional court. International law supra-constitutionality is understood as the superiority of the norms of international law over the constitution. It has an external and positive character. International law supra-constitutionality can cause political objections from opponents of the absolute rule of international law. Supra-constitutional constitutional, natural and international law norms can come into conflict with each other. The paradox of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality lies in the fact that it creates a hierarchy of norms within the constitution itself, distinguishing between simple and supra-constitutional constitutional norms, or distinguishes certain non-positive norms that are outside the constitution, as having priority over the constitution, or puts some norms of international law over all norms of national law, including the constitution. The purpose of the doctrine of supra-constitutionality is to preserve the inviolable fundamental (natural or generally recognized) values, which justifies its logical flaws and paradoxicality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the definition of constitutional law and the characteristics of the British Constitution. Constitutional law looks at a body of legal rules and political arrangements concerning the government of a country. A constitution may take the form of a document or set of documents which declare that a country and its chosen form of government legitimately exists. The British Constitution is largely unwritten, flexible in nature, and based on absolute parliamentary sovereignty. The UK is also a unitary state. There is a central government, as well as devolved legislative and executive bodies in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and England. It is also a constitutional monarchy. This means that the head of state is a king or queen and that they exercise their powers in and through a parliamentary system of government in which the members of the executive are accountable to a sovereign parliament.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 1297-1318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gamper

Innumerable attempts have been made to explore the theoretical nature of federalism. Due to the long history, worldwide existence and interdisciplinary character of federalism, a plethora of literature has been written on the topic. Yet, these endeavours have not even resulted in a clear and commonly used definition of the term. Surely, it is one of the great dilemmas of this field of research that despite so much discussion, there is no settled common denominator of ‘federalism'. Whereas practical studies and exchange of experience between the various federal systems offer a more conventional research arena, comparative theoretical approaches are much more seldom. This is not the least because of the tremendous semantic challenges of a comparative theoretical approach. At first glance, it is sometimes difficult to understand the terminology of federalism, the meaning of which differs according to the perspectives of constitutional law, political science or economics. Even more difficulty arises when the substance of federal theories is discussed. Again, differences between theories may be due to different academic approaches, particularly between understanding federalism as an overall principle or as a more concrete concept of a federal state and, in particular, whether the constituent units of a federal state are states, and, if states, whether they are sovereign.


1974 ◽  
Vol 24 (96) ◽  
pp. 235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Snare
Keyword(s):  

1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-637
Author(s):  
J. Roland Pennock

Political theorists have spilt much ink in controversies over “sovereignty,” while probably even more effort has been devoted to discussion of the nature of law. It cannot be said that the result of all this activity has been to produce a body of generally accepted doctrine, or even that it has greatly clarified the field of discussion. On the contrary, misunderstandings and the abuse of terms have contributed greatly to a general fog.The real issue raised by the pluralists is much more than a question of logic. They challenge the premises of their opponents. They deal largely with the question of the limits of political obligation. With that we are not here concerned. The primary purpose of this article is to search for a meaning of “law” that will at once contribute to the clarification of the question as to the nature of law and aid in the determination of the most helpful legal signification of the term “sovereignty.” The accomplishment of this purpose should aid in settling the incidental questions of the nature of “constitutional law,” the possibility of “nullifying” law, and the status of “international law.”The two subjects—law and sovereignty—are frequently treated independently, but they are so inter-related as to render such treatment inadequate. A brief examination of the controversy over “sovereignty” will demonstrate how it ultimately resolves itself into a question of the definition of law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (5) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Талия Хабриева ◽  
Taliya Khabriyeva

The article deals with the theoretical aspects relating to reforms in the fundamental law of a State — Constitution. It is noted that the Constitution is a developing legal substance which is shaped by and dependent on the existing economic, political, social and even ideological situation; conservation of the basic law can cause both public tension, and also hamper the evolution of statehood. The author attends to the correlation of notions of “constitutional reform” and “change of the constitution”. Also analyzed are the approaches towards the definition of the term of constitutional reform which have been elaborated by the doctrine. It contains a detailed list of terminology which is used in the science of constitutional law and has a direct relevance to reformation of the constitution. Emphasis is made on the new trend in research in the science of constitutional law which reflects the two-sided approach — on the one hand, a factor of progress, and on the other hand, — may be viewed as a tool necessary to make public relations stable and dynamic. The article contains a list of model provisions for the present day constitution which potentially can be employed. It relates to the provisions of the constitution relating to the status of a person, also, economic, social and political systems, etc. Comparative law approach is applied to the contents of constitutional reforms of the XX and XXI centuries in various countries. It notes that a stable basic law of a country is a key symbol of a legal identity of a nation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 6-10
Author(s):  
Vadim Kropanev

The purpose of this research article is to compare the concepts of John Austin and Carl Schmitt on the definition of sovereign - finding the similarities and differences between them. The article analyzes the constitutional law of such states as the Russian Federation and the Vatican City State as a practical application of the results of comparing the concepts of determining the sovereign. In the analysis of the constitutional law of the Russian Federation, the results of the study of the concept of John Austin are used, and in the analysis of the constitutional law of the Vatican City State, the results of the study of the concept of Carl Schmitt are used. The subject of research, the definition of sovereign, is one of the most important topics of Theory of State and Law, therefore, everything stated in the article contributes to the development of understanding of statehood and legal systems and opens new opportunities for study and discussion in the scientific world.


Author(s):  
Nataliia Batanova

The article considers the problems of the theory of functions of constitutional and legal responsibility. The characteristic features of the functions of constitutional and legal responsibility are analyzed. It substantiates the correlation and relationship between the functions of constitutional and legal responsibility and the functions of the Constitution, the functions of constitutional law, the functions of the state, etc. It is proved that the functions of constitutional and legal responsibility are characterized by legal features that reveal the essence and content of this category, in particular: 1) express the nature and content of this type of legal responsibility, its purpose in society and the state, as well as its place in the system of protection of the Constitution and constitutional order; 2) interrelated with the main functions of the state; 3) is an active way of acting of constitutional and legal responsibility and constitutional law as a whole (its principles, tasks, functions); 4) having an objective nature, on the one hand, is a form of purposeful willful behavior or activity of the subjects of constitutional liability and constitutional law in general (subjects of instances of constitutional responsibility and subjects of violators of constitutional law and order (delinquents)), and, on the other hand, the system of legal states that give rise to the constitutional rights and obligations of participants in constitutional-controversial and constitutional-conflict relations; 5) directly related to the system of constitutional law institutions (people, state, elections and referendums, bodies and officials of state power and local self-government, people and citizens, territorial hromadas, political parties, etc.); 6) are in synergy with the sources of constitutional law as a branch of law (above all the Constitution and its functions); 7) directly affect the constitutional and legal relations (first of all, constitutionally-controversial and constitutional-conflict) and their properties, subject-object composition, constitutional legal facts; 8)are organically related to the functions of constitutional law as a legal science and academic discipline and the like, etc. The definition of the concept of the functions of constitutional legal responsibility as the main normative and organizationally secured areas and types of its influence on the constitutional and legal relations with the purpose of protection of the Constitution, restoration of the constitutional order and proper fulfilment of tasks, functions and powers of the subjects of these relations, constitutional disputes between them and overcoming constitutional conflicts is formulated.


Author(s):  
Marshall Swain

Based upon an analogy with the legal and ethical concept of a defeasible, or prima facie, obligation, epistemic defeasibility was introduced into epistemology as an ingredient in one of the main strategies for dealing with Gettier cases. In these cases, an individual’s justified true belief fails to count as knowledge because the justification is defective as a source of knowledge. According to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, the defect involved can be characterized in terms of evidence that the subject does not possess which overrides, or defeats, the subject’s prima facie justification for belief. This account holds that knowledge is indefeasibly justified true belief. It has significant advantages over other attempts to modify the traditional analysis of knowledge in response to the Gettier examples. Care must be taken, however, in the definition of defeasibility.


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