Does an Inferential Role Semantics Rest upon a Mistake?

1993 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Paul A. Boghossian
Keyword(s):  
Inferential Role ◽  
Inferential Role Semantics

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Shea
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Informational Semantics ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Inferential Role Semantics

This chapter offers a breezy introduction to the content question, the question of what determines the content of a mental representation. Existing approaches are outlined: informational semantics, inferential role semantics, correspondence theories, ascriptionism and the intentional stance, and teleosemantics. This discussion highlights the major issues that the book’s positive account must address if it is to succeed.

scholarly journals Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 575-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Whiting
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
De Re ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Meaning Holism ◽  
Inferential Role Semantics

According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression. Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.It is widely recognised that this holism leads to two prima facie problems for IRS. First, since no two speakers share the same beliefs, they will inevitably be disposed to make, or treat as correct, different inferential transitions involving an expression. Hence, according to IRS, the same word in different mouths will possess a different meaning and be understood in different ways. It seems to follow that communication is impossible.

Holism: mental and semantic

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Block
Keyword(s):  
Kinetic Energy ◽  
Real Difference ◽  
Theoretical Terms ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
The World ◽  
Energy And Momentum ◽  
Small Parts ◽  
The Web ◽  
Belief Content

Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. For example, the meaning of ‘chase’ might be said by a molecularist to be ‘try to catch’. Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently of their relations to other sentences or beliefs. One major motivation for holism has come from reflections on the natures of confirmation and learning. As Quine observed, claims about the world are confirmed not individually but only in conjunction with theories of which they are a part. And, typically, one cannot come to understand scientific claims without understanding a significant chunk of the theory of which they are a part. For example, in learning the Newtonian concepts of ‘force’, ‘mass’, ‘kinetic energy’ and ‘momentum’, one does not learn any definitions of these terms in terms that are understood beforehand, for there are no such definitions. Rather, these theoretical terms are all learned together in conjunction with procedures for solving problems. The major problem with holism is that it threatens to make generalization in psychology virtually impossible. If the content of any state depends on all others, it would be extremely unlikely that any two believers would ever share a state with the same content. Moreover, holism would appear to conflict with our ordinary conception of reasoning. What sentences one accepts influences what one infers. If I accept a sentence and then later reject it, I thereby change the inferential role of that sentence, so the meaning of what I accept would not be the same as the meaning of what I later reject. But then it would be difficult to understand on this view how one could rationally – or even irrationally! – change one’s mind. And agreement and translation are also problematic for much the same reason. Holists have responded (1) by proposing that we should think not in terms of ‘same/different’ meaning but in terms of a gradient of similarity of meaning, (2) by proposing ‘two-factor’ theories, or (3) by simply accepting the consequence that there is no real difference between changing meanings and changing beliefs.

Inferentialism and Singular Reference

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark McCullagh
Keyword(s):  
Singular Terms ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Binary Partition ◽  
Singular Reference

In Making It Explicit (1994) Robert Brandom claims that we may distinguish those linguistic expressions with object-representational purport — the singular terms — from others merely by the structure of their inferential relations. A good part of his inferentialist program rests on this claim. At first blush it can seem implausible: linguistic expressions stand in inferential relations to each other, so how could we appeal to those relations to decide on the obtaining of what seems to be relation between linguistic expressions and objects in general (viz., x purports to represent y)? It is perhaps not surprising then that Brandom's proposal fails. But it definitely is surprising how it fails. The problem is that in order to specify the sort of generality there is to an expression's inferential role, one must appeal to some version of the traditional distinction between extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions, and there appears to be no way to draw anything like that distinction in inferentialist terms. For the inferential proprieties governing the different occurrences an expression can have are so varied that they do not determine a binary partition of those occurrences.

Meaning as an Inferential Role

Erkenntnis ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Peregrin
Keyword(s):  
Inferential Role

Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental Contents

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Functional Role ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Functional Relations ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Functional Role Semantics ◽  
Mental Contents

Almost no one cites Sellars, while reinventing his wheels with gratifying regularity. (Dennett 1987, 349)In philosophy of mind, there is functionalism about mental states and functionalism about mental contents. The former — mental State functionalism — says that mentalstatesare individuated by their functional relations with mental inputs, Outputs, and other mental states. The latter — usually called functional or conceptual or inferential role semantics — says that mentalcontentsare constituted by their functional relations with mental inputs, Outputs, and other mental contents (and in some versions of the theory, with things in the environment). If we add to mental State functionalism the popular view that mental states have their content essentially, then mental state functionalism may be seen as a form of functional role semantics and a solution to theproblem of mental content,namely, the problem of giving a naturalistic explanation of mental content. According to this solution, the functional relations that constitute contents are physically realized — in a metaphysically unmysterious way — by the functional relations between mental inputs, outputs, and the mental states bearing those contents.

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