Cognitive Neuroscience, Research Directions in Cognitive Science: European Perspectives Volume 4

1993 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 144
Author(s):  
Bruce Bridgeman ◽  
Guy A. Orban ◽  
Wolf Singer ◽  
Niels Ole Bernsen
2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 2945-2955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana I. Tamir ◽  
Jason P. Mitchell

Humans enjoy a singular capacity to imagine events that differ from the “here-and-now.” Recent cognitive neuroscience research has linked such simulation processes to the brain's “default network.” However, extant cognitive theories suggest that perceivers reliably simulate only relatively proximal experiences—those that seem nearby, soon, likely to happen, or relevant to a close other. Here, we test these claims by examining spontaneous engagement of the default network while perceivers consider experiencing events from proximal and distal perspectives. Across manipulations of perspective in four dimensions, two regions of the default network—medial prefrontal cortex and retrosplenial cortex—were more active for proximal than distal events, supporting cognitive accounts that perceivers only richly simulate experiences that seem immediate and that perceivers represent different dimensions of distance similarly. Moreover, stable individual differences in default activity when thinking about distal events correlated with individual variability in an implicit measure of psychological distance, suggesting that perceivers naturally vary in their tendency to simulate far-off or unlikely experiences.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 847-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antti Revonsuo

Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena.


2020 ◽  
pp. 282-310
Author(s):  
Patricia A. Reuter-Lorenz ◽  
Alexandru D. Iordan

This chapter reviews evidence from behavioural and cognitive neuroscience research that supports a unitary view of memory whereby working memory and long-term memory phenomena arise from representations and processes that are largely shared when remembering over the short or long term. Using ‘false working memories’ as a case study, it highlights several paradoxes that cannot be explained by a multisystem view of memory in which working memory and long-term memory are structurally distinct. Instead, it is posited that behavioural memory effects over the short and long term relating to semantic processing, modality/domain-specificity, dual-task interference, strategic processing, and so on arise from the differences in activational states and availability of different representational features (e.g. sensory/perceptual, associative, action-based) that vary in their time courses and activity, attentional priority, and susceptibility to interference. Cognitive neuroscience evidence primarily from brain imaging methodologies that support this view is reviewed.


F1000Research ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 2573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rüdiger J. Seitz ◽  
Raymond F. Paloutzian ◽  
Hans-Ferdinand Angel

Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals’ behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Segal

This article defines and explains the concept and trait of social empathy and the relationship to interpersonal empathy. Both concepts are explained using the latest cognitive neuroscience research on brain activity. Through brain imaging, the components that together make up the full array of empathy have been identified and are discussed in relation to social work practice. The application of social empathy in the policy-making arena is described, and the implications for social work practice to enhance empathy are discussed.


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