Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior: Selections

1965 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 323
Author(s):  
S. Vajda ◽  
Martin Shubik
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior

Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior

1966 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 56
Author(s):  
T. Paulsson Frenckner ◽  
Martin Shubik
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior

scholarly journals Zur Dynamik prosozialen Verhaltens in einem asymmetrischen sozialen Dilemma: ein Beitrag zur experimentellen Spieltheorie / The Dynamics of Pro-social Behavior in an Asymmetric Social Dilemma: A Behavioral Game-Theoretic Approach

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Vogt ◽  
Werner Raub ◽  
Jeroen Weesie ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Prosoziales Verhalten ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Pro Social Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir prosoziales Verhalten im Sinne wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen. Als formales Modell verwenden wir ein asymmetrisches wiederholtes Solidaritätsspiel zwischen zwei Akteuren. Wir modellieren Asymmetrie in drei Dimensionen: (1.) Nutzen, den ein Akteur aus der Hilfeleistung des anderen zieht, (2.) Kosten der eigenen Hilfeleistung und (3.)Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein Akteur Hilfe benötigt. Wir untersuchen die Effekte von Asymmetrie auf die Dynamik wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen im Verlauf des Spiels. Wir nehmen an, dass die Häufigkeit, mit der sich die Akteure helfen, vom Nutzen und den Kosten der Hilfeleistungen sowie von der Wahrscheinlichkeit abhängt, Hilfe zu benötigen. Unser Beitrag zur Theoriebildung ist ein einfaches adaptives Verhaltensmodell für die Erklärung wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen, das an das Forschungsprogramm der experimentellen Spieltheorie („behavioral game theory“) anschließt. Wir präsentieren zwei Varianten eines solchen Modells: eine sozialpsychologisch inspirierte Variante und eine Variante, die auf spieltheoretischen Verhandlungsmodellen beruht. Unser Modell ist robust in dem Sinn, dass beide Varianten zu ähnlichen Vorhersagen führen. Empirische Daten aus zwei Laborexperimenten bestätigen diese Vorhersagen.

Der Niedergang des Strukturfunktionalismus und der Aufstieg paradigmatischer. Alternativen in der Ethnologie

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürg Helbling
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Structure ◽  
Social Environment ◽  
Evolutionary Economics ◽  
Conflict Theory ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Norms And Values ◽  
Structural Functionalism

AbstractThe paper explores the main paradigmatic failures of structural functionalism in anthropology. Structural functionalism explains institutions and social behavior by their contribution to the reproduction of social structure. Starting from Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, who represent two main variants of functionalism in anthropology, its main paradigmatic problems are discussed: its inability to analyze social conflict and change, its reducing of society to norms and values as well as its mode of explaining social facts. These failures are illustrated by two functional theories of tribal wars, by Evans-Pritchard and by Rappaport. Various theoretical alternatives emerge from the decline of functionalism in anthropology. Conflict theory as well as game theory, new institutionalism, theories of collective action and evolutionary economics represent true alternatives. This again is illustrated by a theory of tribal war, explaining cooperation both within local groups and between allies against the background of the warlike social environment in which local groups are interacting.

Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior.

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 813
Author(s):  
Robert H. Somers ◽  
Martin Shubik
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior

scholarly journals Social Behavior and Game Theory

1998 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-221
Author(s):  
H OGAWA ◽  
S MATSUMURA ◽  
H OURA ◽  
M NAKAMARU ◽  
K OKAMOTO ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior

scholarly journals The Game Theory of Politeness in Language: A Formal Model of Polite Requests

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Muehlenbernd ◽  
Przemyslaw Zywiczynski ◽  
Sławomir Wacewicz
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Mathematical Proof ◽  
Signaling Theory ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Human Social Behavior ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Linguistic Politeness (LP) is a fascinating domain of language, as it directly interfaces with human social behavior. Here, we show how game theory, as a higher-order theory of behavior, can provide the tools to understand and model LP phenomena. We show this for the specific case of requests, where the magnitude of request and the resultant Rate of Imposition are subsumed under a more powerful explanatory principle: alignment of interests. We put forward the Politeness Equilibrium Principle (PEP), whereby the more disalignment there is between the interests of Speaker and Hearer, the more LP Speaker needs to offset the imbalance. In the second part of our paper, we flesh out our ideas by means of a formal model inspired by evolutionary signaling theory, and provide a mathematical proof showing that the model follows the PEP. We see this work as an important first step in the direction of reconciling theories of language with signaling theory, by incorporating language into more general models of communication.

Trustees’ and Investors’ Behavior in the First Two Rounds of a Trust Game: Overview and a (Partial) Explanation Based on Cooperative Game Theory

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Misha Koshelev ◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Simple Games ◽  
Partial Explanation ◽  
The Third

To study social behavior, researchers studied simple games like the multi-round trust game. Based on experimental data, several models have been proposed to explain how players behave in the third and following rounds depending on their previous behavior in this game. However, none of these models explain the behavior in the first rounds. In this paper, we show that cooperative game theory can lead to a partial explanation of the trustees’ (and investors’) behavior in the first rounds.

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