Constitutional Law. Regulatory Takings. Federal Circuit's Holding Introduces Subjective Factors into Takings Clause "Denominator" Analysis. Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

2001 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 926 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Regulatory Takings ◽  
Takings Clause

James Bryce and the Australian Constitution

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Stephen Gageler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Practical Operation ◽  
Responsible Government ◽  
Shed Light

James Bryce was a contemporary of Albert Venn Dicey. Bryce published in 1888 The American Commonwealth. Its detailed description of the practical operation of the United States Constitution was influential in the framing of the Australian Constitution in the 1890s. The project of this article is to shed light on that influence. The article compares and contrasts the views of Bryce and of Dicey; Bryce's views, unlike those of Dicey, having been largely unexplored in contemporary analyses of our constitutional development. It examines the importance of Bryce's views on two particular constitutional mechanisms – responsible government and judicial review – to the development of our constitutional structure. The ongoing theoretical implications of The American Commonwealth for Australian constitutional law remain to be pondered.

International Agreements and U.S. Foreign Relations Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 155-171
Author(s):  
Jean Galbraith
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Constitutional History ◽  
Administrative Reforms ◽  
Administrative Efficiency ◽  
International Commitments

Over its constitutional history, the United States has developed multiple ways of joining, implementing, and terminating treaties and other international commitments. This chapter provides an overview of the law governing these pathways and considers the extent to which comparative law has influenced them or could do so in the future. Focusing in particular on the making of international commitments, the chapter describes how, over time, the United States came to develop alternatives to the process set out in the U.S. Constitution’s Treaty Clause, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. These alternatives arose partly from reasons of administrative efficiency and partly from presidential interest in making important international commitments in situations where two-thirds of the Senate would be unobtainable. These alternatives have had the effect of considerably increasing the president’s constitutional power to make international commitments. Nonetheless, considerable constraints remain on presidential power in this context, with some of these constraints stemming from constitutional law and others from statutory, administrative, and international law. With respect to comparative law, the chapter observes that U.S. practice historically has been largely but not entirely self-contained. Looking ahead, comparative practice is unlikely to affect U.S. constitutional law with respect to international agreements, but it might hold insights for legislative or administrative reforms.

Constitutional Law of the United States

1936 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 102 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. D. G. Ribble ◽  
Hugh Evander Willis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States

The Constitutional Law of the United States.

1911 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 545
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell ◽  
Westel Woodbury Willoughby
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States

WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONS, AND WHAT SHOULD (AND CAN) THEY DO?

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Principal Function ◽  
Fundamental Law

AbstractA constitution is, as Article VI of the United States Constitution declares, the fundamental law of the land, supreme as a legal matter over any other nonconstitutional law. But that almost banal statement raises a number of theoretically vexed issues. What is law? How is constitutional law to be distinguished from nonconstitutional law? How do morality and moral rights fit into the picture? And what are the implications of the answers to these questions for such questions as how and by whom should constitutions be interpreted? These are the issues that I shall address.Alexander proceeds as follows: In section I he takes up law's principal function of settling controversies over what we are morally obligated to do. In section II he then relate law's settlement function to the role of constitutional law. In particular, he discusses how constitutional law is distinguished from ordinary law, and he also discusses the role of constitutions in establishing basic governmental structures and enforcing certain moral rights. In section III he addresses the topic of constitutional interpretation, and in section IV the topic of judicial review. Finally, in section V, he discusses constitutional change, both change that occurs through a constitution's own rules for amendments and change that is the product of constitutional misinterpretations and revolutions.

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