Same-Sex Marriage. Vermont Supreme Court Holds State Must Extend Same-Sex Couples the Same Benefits as Married Opposite-Sex Couples. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)

2000 ◽  
Vol 113 (7) ◽  
pp. 1882 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Macedo

This chapter examines the many “legal incidents” of marriage: the specific benefits, responsibilities, obligations, and protections that are associated with marriage by law. While critics focus on the special privileges or benefits that spouses acquire in marriage, those are balanced by special obligations. The chapter suggests that the whole package seems reasonably appropriate for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. It also considers the ways in which marriage seems to promote the good of spouses, children, and society, along with the class divide that now characterizes marriage and parenting. It argues that this class divide, not same-sex marriage, is the great challenge for the future.


2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2005
Author(s):  
Ronalda Murphy

The Reference re Same-Sex Marriage1 is not a major opinion on the rights of same-sex couples in Canada, but it is nonetheless an important and fascinating case. There are only a few lines that are about the “rights” of same-sex couples. Did the Supreme Court of Canada “duck” the issue? Was the Court carefully gauging how much or little political capital it had and making a political decision to say as little as possible on this topic? The Court certainly displayed strategic brilliance, but it did not do so in the name of avoiding the “political” hot topic of same-sex marriage. It is factually difficult to maintain the view that the Supreme Court of Canada is loath to enter into this political debate. It has been the lead social institution in Canada in terms of responding to the claims of gays and lesbians to equality in law,2 and it has never been shy of dealing with topics simply because they involve controversial political issues.3 Rather, the Court’s brilliance lies in its minimalist and almost weary tone. This approach had the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of those opposed to same-sex marriage: the same-sex advocates definitely win the constitutional race, but they do so because according to the Supreme Court, there is no provincial constitutional headwind that can stop them. In short, provinces can complain all they want about the federal position in favour of same-sex marriage, but the wedding will go on despite and over their objections to the ceremony.


The authors of this book, sitting as a hypothetical Supreme Court, rewrite the famous 2015 opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, which guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. In eleven incisive opinions, the authors offer the best constitutional arguments for and against the right to same-sex marriage, and debate what Obergefell should mean for the future. In addition to serving as Chief Justice of this imaginary court, the book's editor provides a critical introduction to the case. He recounts the story of the gay rights litigation that led to Obergefell, and he explains how courts respond to political mobilizations for new rights claims. The social movement for gay rights and marriage equality is a powerful example of how — through legal imagination and political struggle — arguments once dismissed as “off-the-wall” can later become established in American constitutional law.


Author(s):  
Sarah Song

The 2015 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in favor of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges was a historic day for gay rights as well as for the institution of marriage. The Court's decision led many of the states that introduced marriage equality prior to Obergefell to eliminate civil unions on the grounds that same-sex couples could now get married. A reading of Carson McCullers's novel The Member of the Wedding in the context of Obergefell reveals the shadow marriage casts over nonmarital affinities and relationships. McCuller's protagonist, Frankie, desires not to join the wedding as a member but to disrupt it. Through Frankie's wedding fantasies, McCullers illuminates forms of belonging that are ostensibly outside the law and that move across temporal and spatial boundaries, unseating marriage as the measure of all relationships.


Family Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 92-94
Author(s):  
Roiya Hodgson

This chapter discusses the scope of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004) which came into force on 5 December 2005 and the formation of civil partnerships. It outlines civil partnership and same-sex marriage under The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. It also explains the differences between civil partnership and marriage. Once a partnership has been formed, civil partners assume many legal rights and responsibilities for each other, third parties, and the State. It does explain that adultery, however, is not a fact to establish the ground for dissolution of a civil partnership as it is in marriage. The Civil Partnership (Opposite-sex Couples) Regulations 2019 are also outlined.


This chapter will focus on the biggest moral issue in recent history-the debate over same-sex marriage. This unprecedented case began in 1990 when three same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses from the State of Hawaii. They were refused and challenged the state's decision. In May 1993, the Hawaiian Supreme Court ruled the state needed to show compelling reasons why the same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry. Although the battle in Hawaii began in the court, it ended up in the state legislature where it spread rapidly across the nation. Legislators have responded to the promotion of same-sex marriage by sponsoring and passing bills claiming that it contravenes their faith based principles.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Hayward

OPPOSITE-SEX couples are prohibited from forming a civil partnership. Following the introduction of same-sex marriage, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was not extended to opposite-sex couples, resulting in the unusual position that English law permits same-sex couples access to two relationship forms (marriage and civil partnership) yet limits opposite-sex couples to one (marriage). This discrimination was recently challenged in the courts by an opposite-sex couple, Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keidan, who wish to enter a civil partnership owing to their deeply-rooted ideological opposition to marriage. Rejecting marriage as a patriarchal institution and believing that a civil partnership would offer a more egalitarian public expression of their relationship, the couple argued that the current ban constitutes a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-188
Author(s):  
Nicola Barker

Abstract In 2018, the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda revoked the right to marry for same-sex couples. In a judgment that reconceives the relationship between sexual orientation and religious freedoms, the Bermuda Supreme Court and Court of Appeal found this revocation to be unconstitutional. I explore the political and legal context in which same-sex marriage was granted and then revoked in Bermuda. I also consider the Bermuda Courts’ judgments in light of the subsequent judgment of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in Steinfeld, among others. While there was an assumption from both the Bermuda and United Kingdom Governments that the revocation provision was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, I argue that this underestimates the significance of the distinction between declining to recognise a right to same-sex marriage and revoking a right that has already been exercised. While the European Court of Human Rights has not yet found the absence of same-sex marriage to be a violation of Article 12 of the Convention, I argue that the revocation of a right to marry between same-sex couples that had been recognised in accordance with national law changes the terrain on which the Convention arguments would be made.


2021 ◽  
pp. 171-190
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

Chapter 13 tells the story of the DeBoer v. Snyder trial, the expert testimony on both sides, and how the witnesses called to defend Michigan’s same-sex marriage ban were found to be entirely lacking in credibility. Defense witness Douglas Allen presented graphs that he admitted were not even intended to be accurate. Defense witness Mark Regnerus’ testimony was disavowed by his department chair and criticized by his professional organization. The plaintiffs’ expert witnesses described the scholarly consensus about the health of children raised by same-sex couples. This scholarly consensus was accepted by Judge Friedman. The DeBoer trial resulted in a victory for plaintiffs DeBoer and Rowse and their children, but the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision on constitutional grounds, necessitating a showdown in the U.S. Supreme Court.


2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth McK Norrie

The opening, in the Netherlands, of the institution of marriage to same-sex couples will sooner or later give rise to the question of whether the Scottish international private law rules relating to marriage will permit or even demand the recognition here ofsuch unions validly entered into there. It is suggested in this article that the proper approach is not to ask whether the Scottish court will recognise the relationship as the institution ofmarriage as such, but whether the Scottish court will give effect to consequencesflowingfrom thefact that the relationship has been sanctioned by the Dutch state. For many purposes the answer to that question is unavoidably yes, and it is argued that since that is so then on grounds ofprinciple, policy, and practicality the Scottish court should give effect to such consequences as it would in relation to a Dutch opposite-sex union. There is no public policy objection to doing so.


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