Constitutional Law. Free Speech Clause. California Supreme Court Upholds Injunction against Harassing Speech in the Workplace. Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System, 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999) (Plurality Opinion), Cert. Denied, No. 99-781, 2000 WL 652909 (U. S. May 22, 2000)

2000 ◽  
Vol 113 (8) ◽  
pp. 2116 ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge R. Roig

Inspired in part by the recent holding in Bland v. Roberts that the use of the “Like” feature in Facebook is not covered by the Free Speech Clause, this article makes a brief foray into the approach that courts have taken in the recent past towards questions of First Amendment coverage in the context of emerging technologies. Specifically, this article will take a closer look at how courts have dealt with the issue of functionality in the context of First Amendment coverage of computer source code. The analysis of this and other recent experiences, when put in a larger context, reflects a continuing dissatisfaction on the part of both courts and legislatures with the current Supreme Court doctrine on First Amendment coverage. From this discussion, we can also derive some meaningful normative insights regarding the interplay between emerging technologies and First Amendment coverage doctrine. Finally, this article hopes to serve as a stepping stone in a more profound and long term pursuit of a comprehensive theory of constitutional individual rights coverage issues that might serve us well as the future brings unexpected changes in our society.


Liars ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 89-105
Author(s):  
Cass R. Sunstein

Can people protect their reputations? What if someone is circulating vicious lies about them? The US Supreme Court has given broad protection to libelous statements, saying that it must do so in order to allow “breathing space” for free speech. That idea is a cornerstone of the law of free speech. But in the modern era, and in light of the potentially devastating effects of falsehoods on individual lives and democracy itself, constitutional law should be updated. People should be allowed to demand retractions when they have been libeled, and they should also be able to obtain at least a modest amount of compensation. Much more needs to be done to allow people to protect their good name.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Raghav Kohli

Abstract Unlike the First Amendment of the United States, the quest to develop a grand theory to explain the scope and purpose of the free speech clause of the Indian Constitution has rarely been attempted. In this void, the significant constitutional question of when expressive conduct should trigger free speech protection has not received adequate academic and judicial scrutiny in India despite its global resonance. This article examines the evolution of the current doctrine by the Indian Supreme Court on the issue of expressive conduct and finds that the Court's ad-hoc approach fails to provide a meaningful resolution framework. Analysing the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court on its First Amendment, it discusses two potential approaches available to the Indian Supreme Court: one based on the speaker's conduct, and the other, based on state purposes. It argues that focusing on state purposes not only provides a principled answer to this conundrum but is also consistent with Indian free speech jurisprudence. Contrary to contemporary scholarship, it demonstrates that the law on Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, as moulded by the Indian Supreme Court over decades, has implicitly treated the examination of state purpose as its predominant inquiry. This article concludes with some ideas on the limitations and prospects of adopting such an approach.


Author(s):  
Timothy Zick

Chapter 3 examines the Free Speech Clause’s interactions with its First Amendment cousins—the Assembly Clause, Press Clause, and Petition Clause. It explains how and why the Supreme Court collapsed these distinctive rights into a general “Free Expression Clause” that is governed primarily by free speech doctrines and principles. The chapter examines in detail the events and influences that led each clause to be subordinated to or supplanted by the Free Speech Clause. It explains the negative consequences of free speech expansionism, for the non-speech rights and the freedom of speech. The chapter considers existing proposals for recovering or reviving the Assembly, Press, and Petition Clauses, but argues that we must rethink and expand the project. We need to work toward a First Amendment pluralism that not only disaggregates the elements of the fictional “Free Expression Clause,” but also reconnects once and still “cognate” rights of speech, assembly, press, and petition.


Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe Jr.

Texas has created more constitutional law than any other state. In any classroom nationwide, any basic constitutional law course can be taught using nothing but Texas cases. That, however, understates the history and politics behind the cases. Beyond representing all doctrinal areas of constitutional law, Texas cases deal with the major issues of the nation. This book charts the rich and pervasive development of Texas-inspired constitutional law. From voting rights to railroad regulations, school finance to capital punishment, poverty to civil liberty, this book provides a window into the relationship between constitutional litigation and ordinary politics at the Texas Supreme Court, illuminating how all of the fiercest national divides over what the Constitution means took shape in Texas.


Author(s):  
Timothy Zick

This book examines the relational dynamics between the U.S. Constitution’s Free Speech Clause and other constitutional rights. The free speech guarantee has intersected with a variety of other constitutional rights. Those intersections have significantly influenced the recognition, scope, and meaning of rights ranging from freedom of the press to the Second Amendment right to bear arms. They have also influenced interpretation of the Free Speech Clause itself. Free speech principles and doctrines have facilitated the recognition and effective exercise of constitutional rights, including equal protection, the right to abortion, and the free exercise of religion. They have also provided mediating principles for constructive debates about constitutional rights. At the same time, in its interactions with other constitutional rights, the Free Speech Clause has also been a complicating force. It has dominated rights discourse and subordinated or supplanted free press, assembly, petition, and free exercise rights. Currently, courts and commentators are fashioning the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in the image of the Free Speech Clause. Borrowing the Free Speech Clause for this purpose may turn out to be detrimental for both rights. The book examines the common and distinctive dynamics that have brought free speech and other constitutional rights together. It assesses the products and consequences of these intersections, and draws important lessons from them about constitutional rights and constitutional liberty. Ultimately, the book defends a pluralistic conception of constitutional rights that seeks to leverage the power of the Free Speech Clause but also to tame its propensity to subordinate, supplant, and eclipse other constitutional rights.


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