Antitrust Laws. Sherman Act. Vertical Restraints: Enforcement of Resale Location Restrictions Is a Per Se Violation of Section One of the Sherman Act. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T. V., Inc., 1974 Trade Cas. [paragraph] 75,072 (9th Cir., May 9, 1974), Petition for Rehearing En Banc Granted, Civil No. 71-1705 (Dec. 12, 1974)

1975 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 636 ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 58-81
Author(s):  
Henrik Lind

AbstractThe case law supports the proposition that joint ventures are illegal under the Sherman Act only if unresonable restraints of competition are proven to exist. Put differently, joint ventures are of neutral effect under the Sherman Act: Joint subsidiaries do not of themselves infringe the Act, but on the other hand the formation of a joint venture does not save an otherwise unreasonable restraint of competition. An exception to the abovementioned conclusion may be joint ventures between actual competitors, at least as far as horizontal integration is concerned. In this case a per se rule may apply. Finally, the competitive impact of a foreign joint venture may in some cases be such as to validate it under the Sherman Act where its domestic counterparts would have been struck down.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 104-108
Author(s):  
Alex Han

The major purpose of the Sherman Act was to prevent mergers from forming monopolies. It ensures consumers are protected from price discrimination, and there is free competition. Several economists, classical economists, neoclassical economists, Chicago school and Harvard school, pointed out several antitrust laws. Classical economists led by Smith argued that monopolists set prices at higher prices and raise their charges higher through understocking the markets hence corporations and mergers should be prevented. Neoclassical economists developed a model which assumes that there are no barriers to entry whereby there is free entry to the market. Harvard school also advocated for free competition. Either, the Chicago school was against the idea of free competition and proposed some acts from the antitrust laws to be removed.  However, with advancements in technology, the Sherman Act has become outdated and some languages used are held, making it a challenge to interpret in courts. There is a need for the antitrust laws to be reformed to fit the changing technology. Bills should be proposed to make improvements to the acts. For example, Klobuchar Amy, in April 2021, proposed a bill seeking to reform antitrust laws to better perfect competition in the American economy.


1951 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. Dishman

The “rule of reason” remains after almost forty years the most curious obiter dictum ever indulged in by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mistaken though it was in its basic assumptions, the rule nevertheless persists as the Court's standard for construing the Sherman Act. This is not to say, as some critics have said, that the rule has seriously hampered the Department of Justice in enforcing the antitrust laws. We have it on the authority of Thurman Arnold that without the rule die Sherman Act would be “unworkable … because every combination between two men in business is in some measure a restraint of trade.” The rule, he has said, “has the effect of preventing the antitrust laws from destroying the efficiency of diose combinations that are actually serving, instead of exploiting, the consumer.” The fact remains, however, that in adopting the rule the Court erred in at least two respects: first, in applying a test of reasonableness where in the early cases at least none was called for and, second, in basing that rule on a misunderstanding of the common law. For the first of its sins the Court has been scolded many times; for the second, it has received surprisingly litde criticism.


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