Federal Courts. In General. Action May Be Transferred to District Which, under Conflicting Interpretation of Federal Statute, Denies Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. Ackert v. Bryan (2d Cir. 1962)

1962 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter analyzes and recommends federal corporate governance enhancements that should be implemented. These enhancements, which should be adopted in a measured and directed manner, are necessary to remediate certain deficiencies that currently exist. Consistent therewith, this chapter focuses on several important matters that merit attention, including the undue deference by federal courts to state law, the appropriate application of federal law to tactics undertaken in tender offers, the need for a federal statute encompassing insider trading, and the propriety of more vigorous oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (such as with respect to the “current” disclosure regime, the SEC’s Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, and the Commission’s neglecting at times to invoke its statutory resources). Thus, the analysis set forth in this chapter identifies significant deficiencies that currently exist and recommends measures that should be implemented on the federal level to enhance corporate governance standards.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin C. Walsh

Virginia v. Sebelius is a federal lawsuit in which Virginia has challenged President Obama's signature legislative initiative of health care reform. Virginia has sought declaratory and injunctive relief to vindicate a state statute declaring that no Virginia resident shall be required to buy health insurance. To defend this state law from the preemptive effect of federal law, Virginia has contended that the federal legislation's individual mandate to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. Virginia's lawsuit has been one of the most closely followed and politically salient federal cases in recent times. Yet the very features of the case that have contributed to its political salience also require its dismissal for lack of statutory subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has placed limits on statutory subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which a state seeks a declaration that a state statute is not preempted by federal law-precisely the relief sought in Virginia v. Sebelius. These statutory limits are a sea wall; they keep out, on statutory grounds, some suits that should otherwise be kept out on Article III grounds. The statutory and constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction over suits like Virginia v. Sebelius insulate federal courts from the strong political forces surrounding lawsuits that follow from state statutes designed to create federal jurisdiction over constitutional challenges by states to federal law. This Article identifies previously neglected jurisdictional limits, shows why they demand dismissal of Virginia v. Sebelius, and explains why it is appropriate for federal courts to be closed to suits of this type.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Preis

In the article, I argue that federal causes of action ought to be treated as (1) distinct from substantive rights, (2) synonymous with the availability of a remedy (but not whether a remedy will in fact issue) and (3) distinct from subject matter jurisdiction (unless Congress instructs otherwise). This thesis is built principally on a historical recounting of the cause of action from eighteenth century England to twenty-first century America. In taking an historical approach, I did not mean to argue that federal courts are bound to adhere to centuries-old conceptions of the cause of action. I merely used history to show why the cause of action has taken on various identities and, further, why these identities have changed over time. By closely attending to these changes, we can better determine whether linguistic changes signal substantive changes in doctrine, or are simply loose language.


2015 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradford C. Mank

In rare cases, a president refuses to defend a statute based upon a belief that the statute is unconstitutional. The law is unclear whether either House of Congress has Article III standing to defend a statute that the president refuses to defend. In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court in 2013 addressed the onstitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The Obama Administration took the middle position of declining to defend DOMA, but still enforcing it, despite its view that the statute was unconstitutional to assist federal courts in reviewing the constitutionality of the statute. It was unclear whether an appeal was proper in the case once a district court held the statute was unconstitutional, and the Executive Branch essentially agreed with that decision. Applying both prudential standing principles and mandatory Article III standing rules, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, recognized that the Executive Branch was an appropriate party on appeal because it continued to enforce the statute. Additionally, the majority acknowledged that briefs filed by House of Representatives leadership supporting the constitutionality of DOMA supplied the necessary adverseness in the case given the Executive's view that DOMA was unconstitutional. The majority did not fully resolve the thorny issue of Congressional standing in cases where a president refuses to enforce a federal statute. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, emphasized the almost exclusive role of the Executive Branch in defending federal laws under Article II, squarely rejected Congressional standing, and argued that no party had standing to appeal in Windsor because the Executive agreed with the district court's judgment holding Section 3 unconstitutional. By contrast, Justice Alito, in his dissent, would have expressly recognized the authority and standing of the leaders of either House to defend any federal statute that the president does not defend. Yet by acknowledging that Congressional participation could supply the necessary adverseness to litigate a case when the Executive Branch agrees with the challenger that a statute is unconstitutional, the Court's opinion in Windsor likely will pave the way for increased Congressional participation in unusual cases where the Executive Branch believes a statute is unconstitutional, but at least one House of Congress wishes to defend the statute's constitutionality.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (04) ◽  
pp. 1350011 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANKITA TYAGI ◽  
OMNI YADAV ◽  
AJAI KUMAR GARG

Personal computers (PC) have significantly increased demand for mass market software. Computer software has also now become an enabler for all fields of technology; innovation is inevitable for growth of this fast emerging industry. For economic viability for such innovations, there is an increased advocacy for incorporating software as a patentable subject matter forcing countries to make computer software patentable either completely or in limited form. However, patenting of computer software related inventions have not been without its own set of controversies. Not only software patents globally are being protected under vastly divergent legal perspectives, with varying interpretations of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement, but are also still evolving through continued interventions from policy makers and federal courts. This has led to a very broad boundary between patentable and non-patentable subject matter and has resulted in a large number of trivial inventions being accepted as patents in this area. This paper analyzes these varying perceptions as regards to software patents in different jurisdictions like United States, Europe, Japan and India. Linkage between software patents and innovation has also been attempted by taking into account historical perspectives of technological arts and their effect on promoting innovation.


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