Douglas of the Supreme Court: A Selection of His Opinions

1960 ◽  
Vol 73 (5) ◽  
pp. 1040
Author(s):  
Vern Countryman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Selection Of

scholarly journals The Non-Professional Judge as a Component of Civic Culture in Poland

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-132
Author(s):  
Dariusz Kużelewski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Civic Culture ◽  
Gradual Reduction ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
Justice Of The Peace ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract The objective of the paper is to present the role of the non-professional judge in Poland as an important manifestation of civic culture based on citizens’ activity in the sphere of justice among other things. The paper also highlights the importance of an appropriate selection of citizens who are to adjudicate and possibly place restrictions on access to judicial functions using the example of Polish law. The last part addresses the problem of the gradual reduction of the participation of lay judges in the Polish justice system and the controversial attempts to halt this trend, such as the introduction of lay judges to the Supreme Court and the start of discussions on the introduction of the justice of the peace to common courts.

Repeat Litigators and Agenda Setting on the Supreme Court of Canada

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 811-833 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy B. Flemming ◽  
Glen S. Krutz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Comparative Research ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
High Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Selection Of

The expanding public policy role of high courts heightens concerns over whether societal and political inequalities affect the outcomes of litigation. However, comparative research on this question is limited. This article assesses whether status inequalities between parties and differences in the experience and resources of attorneys influence the selection of cases for judicial review in the Supreme Court of Canada. A series of statistical models reveal that governments are more likely than other parties to influence whether leave is granted but that the experience and resources of lawyers, unlike in the United States, have little impact. The decentralized, low volume and high access features of the Canadian process may explain this finding.

scholarly journals PERAN KOMISI YUDISIAL DALAM SISTEM KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ujang Bahar
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
State Institution ◽  
Independent State ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Audit ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Selection Of

The Judicial Commission (JC) is a new independent state institution established as a product of the reform in the constitutional system and its existence is confirmed in the 1945 Constitution. The Judicial Commission was established following the idea of a one-roof system in the judicial authority. Among the roles and authority of the Judicial Commission are to propose appointment of the Supreme Court justices to the House of Representatives (DPR) and to supervise the conducts of justices/judges in order to maintain their respect, dignity and honor and good conduct.  However, in the performance of its duties, the Judicial Commission is not yet as independent as it has been expected. It can be seen from its limited authority. In supervising the conduct of the judges/justices, the Commission is not authorized to impose any sanctions and in the process of selection of candidates for the Supreme Court justices, its authority is limited only at the ratio 3:1. Therefore, the existence of the Commission under the 1945 Constitution becomes unclear, since it is placed under the chapter of the judicial authority, but in reality it does not exercise its judicial authority and only functions as a supervisory agency like the State Audit Board (BPK) instead. Consequently, the Commission only serves as the supporting institution to the Supreme Court, President and the House of Representatives. In order that the Commission becomes truly independent as an institution which supervises the implementation of the judicial power sitting at an equal level with other state institutions, it is necessary to strengthen the institution by making amendments (to re-determine the position of the Judicial Commission) in the 1945 Constitution and other relevant laws and regulations.

Conclusions: Specialism and the Primacy of the Legal

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-282
Author(s):  
Chris Hanretty
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Final Outcome ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Initial Selection ◽  
Selection Of

This final chapter draws out some of the key messages of the book—how the behavior of judges on the Supreme Court can be best characterized using legal factors; and that among these, specialization in areas of law plays a key role. A review of the different models presented in the book shows that legal factors predominate when explaining the initial selection of cases, the size of the panel, the identity of the lead opinion author(s), and the final outcome. The conclusion identifies the key findings for different audiences, and sets out directions for future research on judges in common law systems.

scholarly journals Can Structural Changes Fix the Supreme Court?

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-142
Author(s):  
Daniel Hemel
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Age Limits ◽  
Legitimacy Crisis ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Normative Implications

Proposals for structural changes to the US Supreme Court have attracted attention in recent years amid a perceived “legitimacy crisis” afflicting the institution. This article first assesses whether the court is in fact facing a legitimacy crisis and then considers whether prominent reform proposals are likely to address the institutional weaknesses that reformers aim to resolve. The article concludes that key trends purportedly contributing to the crisis at the court are more ambiguous in their empirical foundations and normative implications than reformers often suggest. It also argues that prominent reform proposals—including term limits, age limits, lottery selection of justices, and explicit partisan balance requirements for court membership—are unlikely to resolve the institutional flaws that proponents perceive. It ends by suggesting a more modest (though novel) reform, which would allocate two lifetime appointments per presidential term and allow the size of the court to fluctuate within bounds.

scholarly journals Explaining the Selection and Rejection of Harriet Miers: George W. Bush, Political Symbolism, and the Highpoint of Conservatism

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin J. McMahon
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
White House ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Political Symbolism ◽  
The Right ◽  
President Bush ◽  
Selection Of

Following the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist in the summer of 2005, President George W. Bush appeared to be in alliance with conservatives in his desire to fill the two vacancies with strong ideologues who would push the Supreme Court to the right. However, after pleasing conservatives with his selection of John Roberts for one of the vacancies, President Bush angered many of his ideological brethren by choosing White House counsel Harriet Miers for the other. This article considers why the president decided on Miers and why her selection upset so many conservatives. It concludes by suggesting that Miers’s forced withdrawal represented a highpoint in the conservative effort to transform the Court.

Access to the Supreme Court – Polish Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 233-244
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Zembrzuski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
View Selection ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Special Character ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Preliminary Selection

The article presents the evolution of cassation complaint in Polish civil procedure. The author describes the nature of this appellate measure and the requirements of its admissibility. Aditionally, the text provides an insight into a preliminary procedure designed to select cassation complaints, which will be subsequently examined by the Supreme Court on the merits. The author depicts the evolution of Polish cassation into an extraordinary appellate measure and analyses how it has affected access to the Supreme Court. He argues that the preliminary acceptance procedure does not constitute a limitation of the admissibility of the cassation complaint. It is an additional, independent instrument regulating access to the Supreme Court. In his view, selection of admissible complaints with regard to preliminary acceptance is a better solution than developing limitations related to the admissibility of cassation complaints. The author concludes that requirements for cassation complaints are high and difficult to fulfil. The special character of cassation complaint, the relevance of the institution of preliminary selection, as well as other limitations, justify the thesis that Polish procedural law provides only a narrow access to the Supreme Court.

scholarly journals Kohtunike valiku kriteeriumid Eesti Vabariigis 1934–1940 [Abstract: Selection criteria of judges in Estonia 1934–1940]

2018 ◽  
pp. 363
Author(s):  
Hannes Vallikivi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Selection Criteria ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Ethnic Origin ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Political Views ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Estonian Language ◽  
Selection Of

Criteria for the selection of judges should be objective and the selection process should be transparent in order to secure the independence of the judiciary. It would be natural to assume that the authoritarian governance in Estonia from 1934 to 1940 affected the independence of the judiciary. The article discusses criteria that were applied to the selection of judges during that period, how objective the criteria were and how transparent the selection process was. In 1934, there were 166 judges and investigating judges in three levels of the civilian courts in Estonia. This figure increased to 176 by the summer of 1940. There were close to 170 vacancies for judicial offices during the researched 6.5-year period. The process of application for vacancies, review of applications, and selection of candidates for appointment was prescribed by law and Supreme Court regulations. Judges were appointed by the head of state (the Prime Minister, later the President of the Republic). The head of state had a choice between two candidates (three from April of 1938) selected by the plenary of the Supreme Court. From 1938 onward, the President of the Republic could request up to three additional candidates. Before selecting the candidates, the Supreme Court consulted with lower courts and reviewed opinions given by the plenary of either the Court of Appeal or Circuit Courts. The process of selection was generally well documented. In around 80 per cent of cases, the head of state in 1933–40, Konstantin Päts, chose the first name on the list. In cases when he selected the second or third candidate, he did not explain his choice. There was an average of 6.4 candidates per vacancy during the researched period. The option introduced in 1938 of choosing from up to six candidates theoretically gave the executive branch the opportunity to select almost any applicant for the vacancy. In practice, Konstantin Päts required additional candidates only once, in January of 1940. Candidates had to meet several written and unwritten criteria. The law prescribed that Estonian citizens at least 25 years old with higher legal education could stand as candidates. Previous experience as a judge, prosecutor or lawyer ranging from four to ten years was required in most cases, and candidates had to have a clean criminal and personal solvency record. Unwritten criteria derived from the nature of the work of judges and from the text of the judicial oath. The latter required honesty, impartiality and loyalty to the Constitution. The unwritten criteria related to the qualifications, skills and capacity of the candidates (such as diligence, social communication skills, independence, addictions, health condition, Estonian language skills and even academic achievements) or to their integrity. In the selection process, all the unwritten criteria were applied. When a judge applying for a vacancy had some issues with the criteria (e.g. was deemed too slow or ineffective, not independent enough, or not smooth enough in communication), his progress was usually slower. Nevertheless, judges were always preferred over external applicants, with the exception of prosecutors. Prosecutors and judges had equal opportunities to be selected, while lawyers and notaries were left aside in the selection process. The ethnic origin or political views of the applicants were sometimes reviewed, but they did not play a major role in the selection process. Few ethnically non-Estonian judges (Russians or Germans) were turned down because of their weak Estonian language skills. As the research period begins with the coup staged in 1934 by Konstantin Päts and his allies against the League of Veterans’ of the Estonian War of Independence, the fate of judges who supported the League is of special interest. League members expelled from the judiciary or preparatory service of the judiciary were never selected. However, judges who were once members or supporters of the League, were selected and appointed to higher posts. In summary, the applied selection criteria were generally objective and there was no discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin or political views of judges applying for vacancies. While the selection process was transparent, the appointment of judges (i.e. selection from among the last 2–3 candidates by the head of state) was not.

Selection of Justices and Judges

2020 ◽  
pp. 141-146
Author(s):  
Danny M. Adkison ◽  
Lisa McNair Palmer
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter highlights Article VII-B of the Oklahoma constitution, which concerns the selection of justices and judges. Section 1 states that “the provisions of this Article shall govern the selection and tenure of all Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma.” Section 2 sets forth the procedure for a judicial officer to run for unlimited additional terms of office. The provision in Section 3 creates a Judicial Nominating Commission, which possesses jurisdiction to determine whether the nominees for judicial office meet applicable requirements, and to determine the existence of vacancies on the commission. In the event of a judicial vacancy, Section 4 instructs the Judicial Nominating Commission to submit the names of three nominees to the governor and the chief justice of the supreme court. Section 5 sets forth the specific parameters of judicial terms of office. In an attempt to prohibit political partiality by judges, Section 6 prohibits judges from making contributions to, or holding office in, a political entity. Lastly, Section 7 concerns the effective date of Article VII-B.

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