Constitutional Law. Relations between State and Federal Government. State Law Prohibiting Advocacy of Overthrow of Federal Government Invalidated by Smith Act's Occupation of Field

1954 ◽  
Vol 67 (8) ◽  
pp. 1419 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
State Law

Part IV Federalism, A Federalism in Canada, Ch.20 The Spending Power in Canada

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kong Hoi L
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The Political ◽  
Federal Spending ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Division Of Powers ◽  
Constitutional Legitimacy

In this chapter, I will argue that the Canadian Constitution authorizes the federal government to spend in areas of provincial jurisdiction and constrains the scope of this power. I will, moreover claim that effective enforcement of these limits requires that the judiciary recognize its institutional limits and that the political branches act with restraint. The arguments advanced will seek to occupy a middle ground, between proponents of an unlimited spending power and critics who would bind federal spending to the limits imposed by the legislative division of powers, strictly interpreted. In staking out this ground, I will undertake an approach to constitutional interpretation that closely examines the sources of constitutional law and carefully considers issues of institutional competence and constitutional legitimacy.

scholarly journals The Legal Character of Provincial Agreements with Foreign Governments

2005 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 1093-1124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gibran van Ert
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political Dialogue ◽  
Legal Question ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
Foreign Governments ◽  
Legal Character

The object of this article is to consider the legal character of provincial agreements with foreign governments and the constitutional authority of provincial governments to make them. The matter is controversial ; Quebec has long maintained that provincial governments are competent to conclude treaties in areas of provincial jurisdiction, while the federal government asserts that it alone can conclude binding treaties. The argument of this essay is that the traditional arguments made for and against provincial competence to conclude treaties are equally unsatisfying. The best answer comes from a close analysis of the unwritten constitution from which the treaty power arises. Such analysis suggests that the otherwise credible argument, that the treaty-making power has devolved uniquely upon the federal government by a crystallization of constitutional usage into constitutional law, is blocked by Quebec's persistent objections over nearly forty years. Thus, the legal question of capacity to conclude treaties remains unresolved and indeed irresolvable without political dialogue. Finally, the article suggests that even if provinces do not have the power to make binding treaties, courts may nevertheless use provincial agreements with foreign governments, in the proper case, as a guide to the construction of legislation.

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