Federal Courts. Rules of Criminal Procedure. Discovery against the Government Does Not Extend to Documents Obtained Other Than by Seizure or Process

1951 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
pp. 1011
1997 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Greaney

Justice Stewart’s 1966 dictum about the inevitability of government success in challenging mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act held true for another fifteen years or so. In the early 1980s, however, federal enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), began to find the federal courts less hospitable to antitrust merger cases as more sophisticated economic inquiries and changing proof burdens complicated the task of identifying anticompetitive mergers. Indeed, since the early 1980s, the government has lost more litigated merger cases than it has won and has come under criticism from some quarters for becoming gun shy and not adequately policing the wave of consolidations that have occurred over the past decade.Hospital mergers, however, are a different story. Until two years ago, the government rode a streak of important victories in federal courts and FTC administrative proceedings, and had obtained consent decrees from scores of hospitals that had announced plans to merge.


Author(s):  
Juan Luis Gómez Colomer

El Ministerio Fiscal español tiene ante todo un problema de identidad orgánica. Se desea que sea independiente del Gobierno, pero las normas confirman una cierta dependencia. El Ministerio Fiscal debe ser dependiente del Gobierno si se consuma la reforma hacia un modelo adversarial de enjuiciamiento criminal, porque ésa es la naturaleza que mejor cuadra con dicho sistema, en donde el acusado sabe que enfrente tiene a la Administración, que, cumpliendo con su deber público, le exige con todo su poder responsabilidad por sus actos. Hasta que se produzca el cambio, es mejor dejar las cosas como están. El Ministerio Fiscal no debe instruir el proceso penal ni dirigir la investigación del crimen mientras no tengamos el antedicho sistema adversarial vigente en España. Sería constitucional si lo hiciera, pero no está probado que esté preparado para hacerlo, y probablemente, a pesar de declaraciones oficiales, no desee asumir ahora esa responsabilidad. Con las normas y la práctica actual, correría el peligro de ser visualizado en los casos más importantes como un órgano no objetivo.The Spanish Public Prosecution Service has, foremost, a problem of organic identity. It is believed that it should be independent from the Government, but the laws confirm some degree of dependence. The Public Prosecution should depend on the Government if the reform toward an adversarial model of criminal procedure is pursued, because that is the nature that best fits a system in which the defendant knows he is facing an Administration that, fulfilling its public duty, is demanding with all its powers that he takes responsibility for his actions. Until the change is produced, it is better to leave things as they are. The Public Prosecution Service should not direct the criminal investigation while the foresaid adversarial system in not in force in Spain. If it did, it would be constitutional, but it has not been demonstrated that it is ready to do so and, probably, in spite of official declarations, the Public Prosecution does not want now to assume that responsibility. With the current laws and practices, the Prosecution Service would be in danger of being taken as a non-objective organ in the most important cases.


2020 ◽  
pp. 205
Author(s):  
Jacob Podell

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)—as part of its dual goals of cleaning up hazardous-waste sites and ensuring that the polluter pays for that cleanup—gives private parties two mutually exclusive causes of action: cost recovery and contribution. Contribution is available in limited circumstances, including if the party has “resolved” its liability with the government. But CERCLA does not define this operative term. Federal courts are split over how the structure of a settlement resolves liability. Several courts follow Bernstein v. Bankert, which held that any conditions precedent and nonadmissions of liability strongly suggest that a party has not yet resolved its liability. The Ninth Circuit’s recent case, ASARCO LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., said liability is resolved if the settlement determines the party’s obligations with “certainty and finality.” Bernstein deviates from CERCLA’s text and policy, leading to serious inconsistencies in the interpretation and application of the statute. ASARCO injects uncertainty into the statute, which disincentivizes settlements. When the stakes are the reallocation of billions of dollars and the amelioration of the most notorious environmental disasters, getting it right is paramount. This Note proposes a bright-line rule—liability is resolved when the settlement contains any covenant not to sue, conditional or unconditional—and argues that this reading cleans up many of the issues the current circuit split imparts on the statute.


JURNAL BELO ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Juanrico Alfaromona Sumarezs Titahelu

Over the past few years these crimes have been growing more rapidly and disturbing the public. In the criminal acts of terrorism have become increasingly destructive form of crime with global scope. The Government has issued Government Regulation (decree) No. 1 of 2002 on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism. Then on April 4, 2003 decree that legalized as Law No. 15 Year 2003 on Eradication of Terrorism. But in reality proving criminal acts of terrorism is still a lot that is not in accordance with the existing rules, which means that there are many deviations that occur in the process of proving the criminal act of terrorism. Proving that in many criminal acts of terrorism against the rules of the higher law (Criminal Procedure Code) in comparison with the criminal act of terrorism law itself (Law No.15 of 2003). So that there are obstacles in proving the crime of terrorism is one of the Human Rights in value has been violating basic human


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Mansour Rahmdel

<em>Normally, the right to compensation refers to the victim’s compensation. The legislator also typically refers to the right to it, as the Iranian Criminal Procedure Code has done so in articles 14 and 15. But the present paper, refers not to the victim’s, but the accused right. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1912 and 1999 referred to the possibility of compensating the accused by the iniquitous private complainant. However, none of them referred to the government’s obligation to compensate to the innocent accused. In contrast, the Penal Code of 2014 stipulates the government’s obligation to compensate the defendant for damages, but does not rule out the possibility of compensation by iniquitous complainant. Certainly, it does not exempt the complainant to compensation. Reaffirming the responsibility of the government to offset the losses of innocent accused, in line with international conventions, is one of the highlights of the new code. But the lack of compensation for unjustified detention is one of the gaps in the new code. This paper proposes that the Iranian new code of criminal procedure, serves as a development in respecting the accused right in creating comprehensive compensation schemes.</em>


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-241
Author(s):  
A D Kerimov ◽  
E V Halipova

The article, in fact, a response to the ideas contained in the monograph A.I.Aleksandrova "evil philosophy and the philosophy of Crime (questions of philosophy of law, criminal policy and criminal procedure)." Readers are invited to meditation, inspired by philosophical and legal views A.I.Aleksandrova on such fundamental issues as the understanding and the ratio of good and evil crimes and atrocities, socially approved, lawful and unlawful conduct, political and moral responsibility of the government of the state of affairs in the field of the fight against crime, the intrinsic value of education, education and education not only youth, but also all citizens of the state of organized society, and others.


Author(s):  
Elise C. Boddie

In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 declared unconstitutional voluntary, race-based plans to integrate public schools in Jefferson County, Kentucky and Seattle, Washington. The decisionrested on a critical distinction in constitutional law between “de jure” segregation—resulting from purposeful discrimination by the government—and “de facto” racial imbalance derived from unintentional or “fortuitous” actions by state and private entities. The Court held that de facto school districts could not voluntarily assign students to schools according to their race for purposes of promoting integration. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Breyer argued the “futility” of the de jure–de facto distinction, contending that both districts should have been afforded the constitutional flexibility to pursue voluntary remedies that address racial imbalance in their schools. This chapter takes up Justice Breyer’s dissent to explore the complicated origins of school segregation outside the South and the federal cases that adjudicated its constitutionality. Its central contribution is to recover the often confusing legal narratives about segregation in the period after Brown and how federal courts struggled to discern the constitutional boundaries between de jure and de facto discrimination. The chapter briefly describes the constitutional turns that facilitated the Court’s decision in Parents Involved, including the advent of the intent requirement in equal protection and “colorblindness” doctrine, which treats any use of race as presumptively unconstitutional, regardless of its integrative purpose.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-235
Author(s):  
Unanza Gulzar

Reorganization towards a restorative criminal justice scheme in India was undertaken based on an amendment made to the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) of 1973 in 2008. The said amendments were conceded by the Government of India in order to advance the country’s antiquated criminal laws. However, the main problem was keeping the definition of victim stagnant when, in fact, changes relating to victim and, further, reorganizing obsolete laws which have connection with the laws relating to compensation to victims continue. Unfortunately, another difficulty was that the existing laws on determination of victim compensation leave it to the sole discretion of authorities provided under the CrPC. This article highlights that the provisions in the CrPC after the new changes are more general in their attitude of addressing predicament of victims. Yet the irregularity with which the sections are appealed by the judiciary in an effort to accomplish victim fairness and lessen the griefs of the victim would reduce these laws as futile and be the dwindling theme of victim compensation laws in India. Moreover, this article emphasises that some minor developments which occurred in the field of compensation to victims have no doubt reduced an accused-oriented approach, but at the same time there were still numerous lacunae left in this field. Last but not the least, the article focuses on the interface between victim compensation laws and evaluation of victim compensation–amended laws.


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